Volume 5

October - December  2002

ISSN 1541-2482

BOOK WATCH

National Human Rights Institutions in the Asia Pacific Region

NHRI gravy train: The Bangladesh line

During the past seven years the Bangladeshi government has undertaken a number of initiatives and studies to examine the optimal functioning of NHRIs; however to date there is no Bangladesh National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), and legislation containing a mandate has been repeatedly stalled by the Government. The project of establishing a Bangladesh NHRC began in 1996, when the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme  (UNDP) created an "Action Research Study on the Institutional Development of Human Rights in Bangladesh" (IDHRB). As part of the project the IDHRB has set up a Participatory Rural Appraisal programme, organised numerous seminars, conducted international study tours to six different countries, and conferred with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.  In April 1999 the Cabinet of the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh approved a draft bill that resulted from the IDHRB project.  This bill does not make the proposed NHRC effective or independent.  It was then announced in April 2002 that the bill, having languished in bureaucratic limbo for three years, will be set aside in favour of a proposed Protection of Human Rights Act.  The establishment of an NHRC has become nothing more than a gravy train for Dhaka officials who have proven to be effective only in their ability to procure UN money.

India's NHRC: Whither compliance?

The National Human Rights Commission of India was created under the Human Rights Protection Act, 1993, primarily as a result of international and domestic political pressure. The current deficiencies of the NHRC can be listed under nine broad headings: (1) lack of implementation of past evaluations; (2) lack of transparency; (3) contributing to a national culture of impunity for the armed forces; (4) failure to ensure the ratification and implementation of international human rights instruments, as required by the NHRCs mandate; (5) obfuscation and tardiness in processing complaints; (6) failure to maximise the effectiveness of state human rights commissions; (7) administrative inefficiencies and the lack of logistical support; (8) failure to ensure the right to citizenship of the Chakmas and Hajongs; and (9) a lack of Government response to recommendations, and a corresponding lack of follow up on the part of the Commission. After eight full years of operation, the inherent weaknesses of the NHRC and its originating legislation have become evident.

Komnas HAM: Hope stillborn?

The Indonesian Human Rights Commission, usually referred to by the common appellation Komnas HAM, was created by Presidential Decree No. 50 in 1993.  At the time of its inception, many critics voiced the opinion that Komnas HAM had been founded as a means of deflecting international political pressure regarding human rights abuses in Indonesia.  This lack of commitment on the part of the Indonesian Government is illustrated by Komnas HAM's weak mandate and subsequent attempts to erode what little power has been gained by the institution. 

Komnas HAM’s mandate, as laid out in Presidential Decree No. 50 and augmented by the 1999 Human Rights Act, fails to meet the Paris Principles' standards of independence, accountability and transparency.  In practice, it has proved to be lacking in accessibility and in use of investigative and extra-judicial powers.  It is unfortunate that an institution that once took a strong stand on sensitive government issues is now crippled by weak legislation and a hostile political climate.  

The Korean Commission: Future tasks

The Korean National Human Rights Commission Act was promulgated on 24 May 2001 and the Commission was launched on 26 November of the same year.  Although it is still early for a definitive evaluation of the Commission's effectiveness, there are a few potentially problematic areas worth noting.  First, the Act does not contain sufficient provisions to guarantee the Commission's independence with respect to its composition, operations, or budget. Second, the language of the Act is, at times, ambiguous in describing whether the Commission is to base its activities on international human rights norms or domestic legislation.  Third, the limitations placed on the Commission's authority of investigation and remedy will make it difficult to process petitions in a manner that is consistent with high public expectations.  Due to the fact that many of these problems are a result of conditions that are beyond the control of the Commission, it is hard to expect that the Commission will be able to solve all of these problems within a short period of time.     

Suhakam: Yet to earn its spurs

The Malaysian Human Rights Commission, known by the Malay name Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia Malaysia (Suhakam), was established August 1999.  While Suhakam has made some progress in promoting human rights in Malaysia, it is still unclear if the Malaysian government will allow the Commission the power and respect provided by the 1999 Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act. 

This unwillingness has, on several occasions, hampered Suhakam's ability to carry out necessary investigations and has resulted in little, if any, reactions to Suhakam's recommendations for legislative reform.  There are also areas of the Act that need revision if full conformity with the Paris Principles is to be achieved. Specifically, those sections relating to Suhakam's independence, extra-judicial powers, transparency and accountability need to be strengthened. Suhakam has progressed in the establishment of institutional structure and procedures, however there are still many aspects that need to be strengthened before it will be able to advocate effectively for human rights in Malaysia.

The Nepal NHRC: Long road to nirvana

The National Human Rights Commission of Nepal was constituted on 26 May 2000 after nearly a four-year-long delay.  The recent appointment of two well-respected human rights activists to the Commission, as well as the Commission's demonstrated willingness to confront the government, are signs that the Commission is taking its role seriously. However, the Nepal government's unwillingness to grant the NHRC the independence that the Paris Principles deem imperative has raised serious questions about the body's efficacy and credibility.

Most problematic is a lack of adequate resources for the Commission, which currently operates on an allocation that is one-fourth of the amount its internal budget estimates demand.  Appointment procedures have suffered from a lack of transparency, and its mandate should be amended to broaden the field of qualified candidates and require transparency and public input in the commissioner selection process. The Commission also suffers from constraints on investigative jurisdiction and its extra-judicial powers.  Thus although the government has been trumpeting the Commission's formation as an example of its commitment to human rights, there are many reasons to suspect that the Commission lacks the strength to improve human rights in Nepal.

NZ Commission: Room for improvement

The New Zealand Human Rights Commission was established by the Human Rights Commission Act of 1977 and subsequently redefined by the Human Rights Act of 1993 and the Human Rights Amendment Act of 1999.  An excellent effort has been made to give the New Zealand Human Rights Commission adequate powers in fulfilling the educational and promotional role described in its mandate. However, it would benefit from increased independence, specifically in the form of additional provisions to assure political non-partisanship in the process of selecting Commissioners and processing complaints in coordination with the Human Rights Review Tribunal.

The Philippine Commission

The Philippines Commission on Human Rights looks spectacular on paper: it is supported by the Constitution, legislation that is detailed and varied, and has numerous publications.  However, its execution is lacking in many respects.  In particular, NGOs have little faith in the organisation's supposed independence from the government, and there are examples, such as the Child Rights Center and the Barangay Human Rights Action Center, of projects that need assistance in execution despite their conceptual integrity. 

Yet there are also hopeful signs for the future.  The current chairperson, Professor Purificacion Valera-Quisumbing, has extensive human rights experience and Commission employees are found to be hardworking and diligent.  Thus the foundation for success is in place but proper execution and leadership is needed.      

Sri Lankan Commission: Unproductive past

The Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka, chartered in 1996, largely failed to meet the expectations generated during its initial three-year mandate. The operations of the Commission were ineffectual because internal division and administrative lethargy hampered them.  This period of institutional weakness extended into the beginning period of the next commission. Although many practical problems remain, the Sri Lankan Commission has shown noticeable improvement in its strategic vision since the September 2001 meeting of the Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions.