| Volume 7, Issue
2 |
22-28 March 2004 |
CHINESE
CHEQUERS
China’s
salvo against Item 9 has touched a chord among Asian
Govts, but many have constituencies back home to answer
to
IT
must have been a difficult first week for Ambassador Mike
Smith, the Chairperson of the 60th Session. It was also a
rewarding week for him and others who sought to keep the
agenda of the 60th session on track. On the very first day,
the Chinese dragon stomped its feet and blew dragonfire
across the assembly hall. Speaking on behalf of the Like
Minded Group (LMG) it stated that country resolutions under
Agenda item 9 had to go. Cuba rode shotgun in support and
Nigeria also waded in.
The
Chinese, not known to show their cards so early in the game,
were clearly hoping that the fire, brimstone and bluster
would rally the wavering troops amongst the Asian group.
This is yet to be and will not be, if there is some
meaningful and substantive dialogue between cooler heads in
all the regional groupings.
Their
appetites whetted by successes at the 59th session, with
each of the African country mandates falling like ninepins,
South Africa, Nigeria and Zimbabwe decided that it was time
to move in for the kill at the 60th session. They hoped that
through resolution 110, they could ask for a suspension of
the discussion on agenda item 9 and subsequently move ECOSOC
for a deletion of the agenda item altogether. The Cubans,
congenital diplomats of resistance that they are, could
smell opportunity. They hurried to carry the tidings to the
Asian group, which they addressed in the first week of
March. The Asians, with a few dishonourable exceptions, were
not convinced by this maximalist game of brinkmanship. Many
of them were not happy with what they saw as the selective
use of country resolutions by the Western Group of
countries. Sure, they said in private, China did not have a
human rights rights record that would merit a mention in the
dispatches, but why was the US struck with laryngitis when
it came to Saudi Arabia. After all they are only too aware
of how the Wahhabite kingdom treated Asian workers. Or
France, which invariably lost its voice when human rights
violations in Morocco, Algeria or Tunisia came up. Yet, many
Asians have democratic constituencies to answer to at home.
A jettisoning of agenda item 9 is not yet part of the Asian
Group's roadmap.
The
moderates in Asia know that an incremental dialogue is
already showing effect. A case in point is the draft
resolution on Nepal put in circulation by the Swiss. The
Swiss, mindful of the sensitivities around agenda item 9,
are proposing to move it under agenda item 19. The Swiss
draft resolution itself is weak and is not going to satisfy
civil society in Nepal or even the official Nepal National
Human Rights Commission, which has taken a more forthright
position on the abominable human rights situation in Nepal.
The more astute among the Asian Governments know that the
Swiss position is a minimalist one. Not supporting this will
boomerang next year at the CHR or even at the General
Assembly later this year in a stronger resolution from
elsewhere. Even the Asians are aware that an absolutist
monarch is no substitute for multiparty democracy in the
Himalayan kingdom if democracy and human rights are to be
preserved and the Maoists kept at bay.
The
European Union also appears to have chosen to ignore the
European Parliament recommendation on sponsoring or
co-sponsoring a resolution on the killings of Muslims
|
Talking
shop or righting wrong? |
|
“It
is our hope that the CHR can be a forum of dialogue and cooperation,
which the founders of the CHR wished it to be. In this regard, the LMG
supports the initiative of some states that calls for the CHR to
re-evaluate its consideration of agenda
item 9. (China, on behalf of the LMG)
If
a government fails in its duty to protect human rights, the
international community needs to address it. The (CHR) has a key role
here. We must voice our common concern, or the CHR loses its raison
d’être. (Isao Matsumiya,
Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Japan) |
the
Indian state of Gujarat. North Korea has painted itself into
a corner and has few friends even in Asia. No one is about
to raise the issue of Aceh in Indonesia, and the move
against China by the US is not going to fly. The more
sensible Asians are aware that China is not doing itself a
favour by the new aggressive posturing. Yet, historical
experience has shown that it is best to allow China to be
hoist on its petard.
NGOs
are also aware that eternal vigilance is the price for space
at the 60th session. Being kicked upstairs to the rarefied
climes of the balcony during the high-level segment was
indicative of how they are viewed in the Club of Nations
United. The Norwegians will bring a feel-good resolution on
human rights defenders. Yet, the draft does little to
comfort defenders in the hurly burly of events, far away
from the placid tranquility of the Norwegian fjords.
Meanwhile, Egypt, India and Russia, soon to be followed by
others, are starving frontline NGOs through draconian
legislation on international funding for NGOs.
The
Russians have already fired a salvo from Battleship Potemkin.
All hands off Chechnya. We are fighting terrorism, and so
what if some more innocents rather than Chechen hardliners
get short shrift. The Americans with their blunderbuss
strategy on counter-terrorism fail to see that the Mexican
draft resolution actually gives them a sensible opportunity
at course correction. It remains to be seen if the wisdom of
the Aztecs will moderate the Bald Eagle. The battle against
terrorism needs to be fought but it must be done so by
democratic means. Ends and Means - does anyone remember that
debate from a hoary past?
At
the end of the week there was some comic relief for the
uninitiated, with Palestine and Israel joined by India and
Pakistan going at each other like Kilkenny cats. It is
tragic that serious issues like Palestine and Kashmir and
the larger debate on the right to self determination has
been reduced to a theatre of the absurd.
The
first day saw some brilliant diplomatic footwork by
Ambassador Smith, who adopted the agenda before taking up
resolution 110, Rev 1.
The Chinese, Cuban and African troika could only look
on in stupefaction. On Friday, he again squelched efforts to
reopen 110, Rev 1. A judicious use of the gavel has kept the
hatches battened with the waters swirling below.
One
down, five weeks to go. Advantage Ambassador Smith.
Reflections
of a former Special Rapporteur
PARAM
CUMARASWAMY
THE
United Nations special procedure mechanism is a creature
outside the UN Charter. It is not provided for in any of the
UN treaties on human rights. Pursuant to the 1946 Convention
on Privileges and Immunities of the UN and a couple of
advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice,
those appointed with mandates under this mechanism are
classified as "experts on mission".
Since
1979 special mandates have been entrusted to these experts
by exigencies of time to examine specific country situations
or themes from a human rights perspective. To date there are
no less than 45 such mandates. It is now acknowledged that
this mechanism contributes to the UN early warning system to
alert the international community to human rights
violations. It is also acknowledged that the reports of
these experts presented annually at the sessions of the UN
Commission on Human Rights bring the inter-governmental
debate on human rights closer to reality on the ground.
These experts are often described as the 'eyes and ears' of
the Commission.
Indeed
paragraph 95 of the Vienna Declaration underlined the
importance of preserving and strengthening the system of
this mechanism and called upon the Commission to provide the
experts with the necessary human and financial resources. It
also asked all member States to "co-operate fully with
these procedures and mechanism".
The
experts are not paid any stipend for their services. All
experts accept the mandate as an honour to serve the
international community in the field of their expertise.
I
have had the honour of serving the mandate on the
independence of judges and lawyers since its creation in
1994 until 2003. During this period I intervened with
governments in more than 100 countries and carried out in
situ missions in some countries of every region including
some developed countries.
Governments
generally do not like these experts, particularly when the
reports are critical of human rights situation in their
countries. They find these experts intrusive. I drew the
fury of the Government in my own country, Malaysia, where
for five years I battled libel suits claiming to the tune of
US$73 million against me before the Malaysian courts. The
suits were in regard to a published interview I gave in my
capacity as a Special Rapporteur to a London-based
periodical, International Commercial Litigation, on
improprieties in the Malaysian judiciary.
The
Secretary General of the UN determined that I was entitled
to immunity from legal process under the Convention for the
impugned words. The Malaysian Government refused to accept
that. Concerned international NGOs, jurist organisations and
governments saw this not just as a harassment against me
personally but a threat and intimidation to the entire
thematic procedure of the UN human rights system. It became
a dispute between the UN and the Government. Efforts by the
Secretary General of the UN to resolve it diplomatically
failed. The dispute was finally resolved by an Advisory
Opinion of the International Court of Justice against the
Malaysian Government. The Opinion delivered in April 1999
was sought by the Secretary General through ECOSOC.
What
was most embarrassing (more for the Malaysian Government
than for me) was that subsequent to the Advisory Opinion the
Malaysian Government in a concerted move in Geneva actually
attempted to prevent my being re-appointed in year 2000 to
the mandate under the transitional provision in para. 7(ii)
of the Commission Chairperson's statement of 28 April 1999
(E/1999/23-E/CN.4/1999/167 para. 55; E/CN.4/2000/120 and
E/CN.4/2000/120).
Resulting
from this saga, a point for discussion among some who were
following the developments in my case was whether I was
right in investigating my own country. In its Advisory
Opinion, the International Court of Justice made no comment
on this. However, subsequently in a letter dated 2 August
2000, the Secretary General of the UN advised the then Prime
Minister of Malaysia and said that I, inter alia, "had
received a universal mandate from the Commission on Human
Rights to investigate such complaints wherever they arise.
Malaysia was merely one of about 100 countries in which he
intervened. The Special Rapporteur on the independence of
judges and lawyers had a right and a duty to investigate
Malaysia's judiciary in the course of the performance of his
mission". The contents of this letter were brought to
the attention of the Malaysian Court at the request of the
Secretary General. I felt vindicated when the concerns I
expressed in the interview more than six years earlier were
confirmed by events in the country's judiciary.
Even
the United States Government did not spare me over my public
statement on the military commission and the denial of due
process to detainees in Guantanamo Bay. Its delegation's
statement during the 59th session last year on the Hungarian
resolution on Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary
(L.48) was, I thought, most uncharacteristic of a developed
nation like the United States which has a reputation, among
other things, for monitoring human rights violations
worldwide.
But
the worst attack levelled against me was by the Government
of Zimbabwe in a four-page scathing communication dated 27
September 2002 to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
over my public statement on the arrest, detention and
charges brought against retired Judge Blackie. I replied
appropriately in writing. After all those attacks levelled
against me, I was pleased to learn that on 30 June 2003, all
the charges against Judge Blackie were withdrawn. Later, I
was more pleased to learn that the Supreme Court Bench of
Zimbabwe declared the arrest and earlier detention of
Justice Paradza unconstitutional. I had publicly protested
against the arrest and detention of Justice Paradza, and
went public no less than nine times on the Zimbabwe
situation simply because the Government failed to respond to
my communications. The same Government had earlier resiled
from an agreement to permit me to carry out an in situ
mission.
About
a year ago, a journalist asked me whether I had any
disappointments in relation to my work over the past nine
years. I replied that my one disappointment was that I was
unable to prevent the murder of that courageous lawyer in
Belfast, Rosemary Nelson. Since the first time I met her and
heard about the threats she was subjected to, I knew she was
at risk and could one day meet the same fate as Patrick
Finucane in 1989, another fearless lawyer in Belfast. Every
threat against her brought to my attention was relayed to
the UK government immediately, urging protection for her.
What I feared happened exactly 10 years after Patrick
Finucane's murder.
One
perennial frustration for experts under the special
procedures system is the lack of resources from the OHCHR
for the discharge of mandates. Once, an arranged mission of
mine to South Africa had to be aborted because until the day
of my scheduled departure for Johannesburg, I did not
receive the travel ticket!
My
mandate, particularly, required intensive research. I could
not be seen going wrong in the assessment and evaluation of
facts, and more particularly, in the analysis of the laws
and constitutions of member States. It was not until the
year 2000 that my mandate began to receive additional
resources, both human and financial.
Another
frustration in the system was the little time allocated to
experts to present their reports at the annual Commission
sessions. The worst scenario was the 58th session where the
restriction imposed was so intolerable that some experts
refused to be humiliated in that way. They merely told the
session that they took it that their reports had been read.
Subsequently, we expressed our frustrations at a press
conference. There was improvement at the 59th session which
provided for a few minutes for interactive debate after
presentation of reports.
Yet
another frustration was the failure of member States to
comply with the recommendations of the experts given in
their reports. There were also no effective procedures to
follow-up on recommendations on the part of the experts.
This, of course, was largely due to inadequate human
resources at the Office of the High Commissioner. Member
States who are unable to comply with any or all of the
recommendations of the respective experts should be called
upon by the Commission to explain in writing at the
following Commission session.
Whatever
may be the shortcomings in the system, and regardless of
attacks and threats by States, the experts should not be
deterred. They should be consoled by the thought that if a
Government has expressed unhappiness over his or her report,
then that must mean that he or she has discharged his or her
mandate independently and honourably. In my experience, no
Government, however liberal it may be, however supportive it
may be of the special procedure mechanism, and however
pleased it may be with the work of a particular expert, the
same Government will not be happy if it is criticised
publicly by the expert. Those are the realities the experts
must live with in the discharge of their respective
mandates. However, experts who tailor their reports
according to the needs or dictates of Governments or NGOs
will do a disservice to the cause of human rights
protection.
In
the last three or four years, there has been a gradual
decline in the effectiveness of the Commission. Some States
are seen seeking membership of the Commission and then using
it as a shield to avoid Commission strictures against
themselves for human rights violation in their States. The
experts too could be more effective if there was greater
co-operation and cohesion among them. While each mandate is
personal to its holder, to be discharged independently and
impartially, there are times when joint or collective
statements of experts during Commission sessions,
particularly on widespread violations in a particular
country requiring scrutiny under several thematic mandates,
could be effective to trigger the Commission into action.
The Office of the High Commissioner could co-ordinate this
procedure.
Member
States of the Commission must be reminded that when the 171
States in 1993 adopted the Vienna Declaration and Programme
of Action they solemnly pledged to respect human rights and
fundamental freedoms and to undertake individually and
collectively actions and programmes to make the enjoyment of
human rights a reality for every human being. In paragraph
95 of the same Declaration, member States agreed to
"co-operate fully" with the experts to realise the
pledge undertaken.
Member
States therefore should accept the concerns and
recommendations expressed by these experts in their reports
and other communications in good faith. These experts who
have nothing to gain from the UN or from any other quarter,
financial or otherwise, and have no hidden agendas against
any particular government. Their only agenda is their
commitment to the cause of human rights protection.
Invariably it was for that commitment that they were and are
appointed. While constructive government criticisms of
findings in experts' reports are always healthy and welcome,
personal attacks against these experts will be perceived by
the international community, particularly the victims of
human rights violations, as an attack on the very objectives
the Commission was mandated to realise. The Commission
should not be seen as undermining its very foundation.
Dato'
Param Cumaraswamy was Special Rapporteur on the independence
of judges and lawyers since the creation of the mandate in
1994 until 2003.
‘CHR
work must not be undermined’
|
INTERVIEW |
|
H.E
Jose Ramos Horta |
WHEN
His Excellency JOSE RAMOS HORTA spoke to Human
Rights Features last year, East Timor had been
independent for a year, its institutions were being set up,
and the country and its leaders were grappling with
competing conceptions of justice and accountability. A year
later, Mr. Horta revisits some of these issues, speaks of
the constraints on his young nation, and urges the
international community and the Commission on Human Rights
not to attempt to undermine the gains made with respect to
the promotion of human rights over the past 50 years…
Rights
Features (HRF): It
has been reported that you are not in favour of pursuing the
establishment of an international tribunal to address human
rights abuses that occurred during Indonesia's rule. Do you
not agree that successor governments of a State have a
responsibility to own up to historical wrongs and seek to
right them? Are you not contributing to a climate of
impunity?
H.E.
Jose Ramos Horta (JRH): In
an ideal world, yes. An international tribunal to try
individuals, whoever they may be, for war crimes and crimes
against humanity is a logical indispensable tool to redress
the wrongs done to the people. But we are not in an ideal
world, we have to weight the pros and cons, consequences,
implications for a decision to be made. In East Timor, we
consider it an absolute priority the normalisation of
relations with Indonesia in all aspects. At the same time,
[we need to] consolidate our national institutions all of
them still fragile, including the court system. The
establishment of an international tribunal does not depend,
in any case, only on the will of the East Timor side, but
depends also on the will of the five permanent members of
the Security Council and the ten non-permanent members.
There is no guarantee that we will secure enough votes in
the Security Council to have an international tribunal, or
assuming we secure the vote for an international tribunal,
there is no guarantee that we will get the funding necessary
for a tribunal to function. And, at the same time, assuming
we do get funding, there is no guarantee that the court will
function, because there are no people to try because
Indonesia will not cooperate.
So what we have
proposed to the United Nations and to different countries is
[that] instead of an international tribunal, we would like
to see an international truth panel established with some
five eminent jurists, who would review the facts of the
events of 1999 in East Timor, establish the facts,
responsibilities, name names and then leave it to each
individual country to take additional action, unilaterally
on their own, if they deem [it] morally, politically
necessary. I conclude my answer with this: a grave injustice
was done to the people of East Timor by another country.
This injustice was addressed by the international community
in helping pave the way for East Timor's freedom and
independence. This is the greatest act of justice of all. We
are prepared to swallow the bitter pill that some of the
worst elements responsible for the carnage and destruction
of 1999 might never go to jail.
HRF:
The US State Department report on human rights practices for
2003 sets out several cases of the use of torture in your
country. Given East Timor's history, should there not be a
complete abhorrence of torture?
JRH:
I do not bother reading the State Department human rights
reports. Who gave the legitimacy, the mandate to the US to
monitor, to comment, to opinionate on the human rights
situation around the world? Ironically, in their own report
there is not one chapter on the US; maybe if they were to
address their own messy internal human rights situation, it
would require a whole volume on themselves. The US is not
exactly the moral barometer of the world. If one country
should be elected to be the monitor of the human rights
situation around the world, I would prefer maybe Iceland,
maybe Tasmania, not really the US. So I won't even comment
on their very biased, politically motivated reporting on any
country.
HRF:
When do you intend to sign and ratify the Optional Protocol
to CAT?
JRH:
First let me say obviously that there is no torture in East
Timor. Whoever has alleged that there is torture, I
challenge them to prove it. It goes against our culture, our
national legislation. There might have been reported abuses
by police officers whenever they handle individual cases of
law and order, but I have never heard of one single case of
torture in my country. If you read it in the US State
Department human rights report, I would advise for your own
sanity to ignore it because I would say the State Department
is not exactly the most credible source of reporting on any
human rights situations around the world. My country might
start issuing its own human rights report, starting with the
human rights conditions in US jails, in Guantanamo, the
behaviour of the Los Angeles, Chicago, New York police, the
immigration authorities at JFK, at Los Angeles Airport the
way they discriminate, they insult individuals from
different countries that enter that country.
HRF:
East Timor is a small country and could become the Costa
Rica of Asia without a standing army and committed to human
rights within itself and the region. Given your own
background and that of your head of state, what proactive
measures is East Timor going to take to take the moral high
ground and act as a moral beacon in the region with respect
to human rights?
JRH:
We do not wish to be a model to anyone, it would be too
pretentious. What we want to do is to be true to ourselves,
to our history, to our own values, and that is why from day
one, we began working on acceding to all the relevant
international human rights treaties. And even though the
reporting process is cumbersome, duplicating, wasteful, we
are working hard with the OHCHR to streamline the reporting
mechanism process and to fulfil all our obligations under
the treaties.
Our first
obligation is to the people of East Timor. Working with the
people, with civil society in order to create a truly
democratic State where the rule of law prevails, and where
there is a culture of respect, of tolerance toward everyone
including different ethnic groups, different religions. Even
though East Timor is 98 percent Catholic, we do have very
small Protestant and Muslim communities which must be
respected and cherished.
We
are working hard with the NGO community, with the Commission
on Human Rights, the thematic bodies, and the Special
Rapporteurs to make sure they help us in fulfilling our
obligations, to the people first and foremost, and to the
international community. Will that make East Timor a model?
Well, maybe. But we don't have such a pretentious ambition
to be a model to anyone.
HRF:
As you are the only Roman Catholic country in the region
apart from the Philippines, given that the Vatican's
pronouncements on the death penalty are clear, when do you
propose to sign the Second Optional Protocol to the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
relating to the death penalty?
JRH:
We intend to accede to every single instrument and protocol
relating to human rights and to the humanitarian field. If
we haven't done so, it is only because we have been
independent for less than two years. We have acceded so far
to more than to 20 international instruments, human rights
instruments, and also to many relevant conventions related
to non proliferation, to chemical and biological weapons,
and so on. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a particular
division called the Division of Treaties, Legal Affairs and
Human Rights, staffed with three people. So, it is obvious
that we cannot accede to all the international treaties
within the first two years. We have done more than most
countries that have been independent now for 50 years. More
than the US, for instance, that they have such ambition to
be the moral judge of the rest of the world. The US has not
ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and many
others.
HRF:
It is reported that pre-trial detention is a problem in East
Timor. As your judicial mechanisms are still finding their
feet, do you propose to give your citizens an international
remedy by signing the first optional protocol to the ICCPR?
JRH:
We do acknowledge we have some serious deficiencies in our
court system because of a lack of judges, prosecutors, infrastructure, clerks and
administration personnel. Because of that, yes there are
numerous cases of individuals detained beyond what would be
normally accepted. We have been trying, since the beginning
of 2003, to declare 2003 the year of justice and public
administration, whereby the Government puts special emphasis
on correcting the deficiencies that we have.
But there are no
shortcuts. We cannot train lawyers and judges and
prosecutors in a year or two. Neither Portugal nor Indonesia
had put much effort in having a strong, independent
judiciary. As I said earlier, if we have not acceded to the
remaining relevant protocols is only because there is only
enough time in a day for two or three people to do [what
they can]. In that particular division that handles all the
treaties there are, as I said, three people. Our obligation
in the division is not only to satisfy the international
community in terms of human rights and humanitarian
obligations, but also we have bilateral agreements with many
countries and multilateral agencies that we accede to. So we
cannot paralyse everything just in order to [make time to]
accede to human rights and humanitarian conventions and
protocols. In due time, inshallah, God willing, with more resources, financial and human, we
will accede to all the protocols.
We have had good
co-operation from the Office of the High Commissioner, [with
the Office] seconding one or two individuals to advise us.
We have two units in the country working with the office of
the Prime Minister, one is a human rights unit, the other is
a gender unit. Working in co-operation with the Foreign
Ministry and the other government agencies, the Minister of
justice, the police, and civil society, we have developed a
national human rights action plan.
It has been drafted and approved and will make, I
hope, a real impact on the protection and promotion of human
rights. That includes combating child labour, combating
human trafficking, although we have minor problems. One area
in which we have a serious problem is domestic violence. It
is widespread, and working with the UN, and also with the
Church, we try to curtail this problem.
HRF:
Now that you are a member of the Asian group in the
Commission on Human Rights, what is East Timor's view on
China's proposal to suspend consideration of agenda item 9
and subsequently go to ECOSOC for its deletion altogether?
Wouldn't this mean the emasculation of human rights in the
Commission? After all, the East Timor issue was kept alive
because of agenda item 9.
JRH:
I have not personally studied the Chinese proposal, but I
would caution the international community, in general, not
to undermine or curtail the competence of the Commission on
Human Rights to hear [reports of] human rights situations
around the world. If member countries undermine the work of
the Commission, as it has been for many years now, the
Commission will lose all its credibility and raison d'être
and it would severely undermine the whole UN system.
One of the
greatest achievements of the last 50 years is in the field
of promotion of human rights, with UN bodies like the
Commission making themselves accessible to NGOs. We know
from the examples of the last few years how increasingly
important NGOs and civil society are in shaping world public
opinion. Developing countries should be the very first ones
to nurture relationships with civil society and NGOs, both
NGOs in the South and in the North, because developing
countries that are vulnerable to outside pressures,
including from multinationals and financial institutions, do
not have much of a defence or protection. And it has been
the civil society and NGOs that have been forefront in the
battle against the international trade barriers, against all
the protectionist barriers that deny poor countries access
to rich countries. Developing countries would be shooting
themselves in the foot if we connive in undermining the
NGOs. I can speak for myself as Foreign Minister of East
Timor, and I will resist any attempt at setting back the
tremendous gains the UN has made in the last 50 years.
HRF:
Now that East Timor has freedom, what are your views on
other oppressed nationalities in Indonesia, such as the
Papuans, and the Acehnese?
JRH:
I hesitate to offer comments or prescriptions for problems
in each individual country. The human rights situation in
Aceh particularly has been widely reported. The Indonesian
side, fresh from the East Timor experience, probably should
know that the use of force is not the best way to obtain the
allegiance of people or to resolve a conflict. Therefore, I
hope that Indonesia, or any country facing similar problems,
would not give up peaceful means.
But at the same
time, the rebels, the insurgents, wherever they are, are not
all angels. Sometimes, we tend to put all the blame on the
government security forces and ignore human rights
violations caused by insurgents themselves. I am far too
familiar with many insurgents around the world, and I would
not want to see them in power, because in their fight for
their freedom they have already committed such gross abuses
of human rights. Can you imagine what will they do when they
have the whole state machinery in their hands? I am not naïve
to simply make a blank negative judgment about one side or
the other.
The rebels in
Aceh, like in many other countries, they themselves have to
clean up their act if they want to take the moral high
ground to argue with the government.
|
|

|
'Shining'
India has a dark side
|
INDIA |
Treaty
Compliance-II
|
An
abysmal record of compliance with international norms and treaties takes the
shine off New Delhi's image-building campaign. This is the second of a
two-part series…
THE
portrayal of India favoured by the current Government as 'Shining India', a
nation making unprecedented social progress, is fundamentally contradicted by
the Government's regressive attitudes towards its basic human rights
obligations. Far from boasting a 'shining' human rights record, the
Government's stance on the issues of torture and the rights of women and
children is fraught with contradictions. Although it has acceded to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), most of the provisions of
these treaties are yet to be translated into concrete protections of human
rights.
Furthermore,
its continuing failure to ratify the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CAT) is a clear derogation of
international human rights standards. India has also made reservations,
euphemistically termed “declarations”, to all three treaties. Consistent
with its position in relation to the ICCPR, the ICESCR and the ICERD, the
Indian Government continues to demonstrate a commitment to rhetoric rather
than action.
The
Prevalence of Torture
The
systematic use of torture by police as a tool of interrogation, or even as a
form of summary punishment against detained individuals, is evident throughout
India. In fact, in 1996 the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture noted that marks
of torture were often found on the bodies of detainees who died in custody.
The methods of torture that have been documented include beating, burning with
heated objects, electric shocks and rape. Torture is prevalent in the state of
Jammu and Kashmir. It is perpetrated by security forces to extract confessions
from suspected militants. However, torture is not limited to the situation in
Jammu and Kashmir.
No
Redress
Articles
12 and 13 of CAT require States to ensure individuals have the right to allege
torture and have these allegations impartially and promptly examined without
fear of retribution. In India, no such impartial mechanism for receiving
complaints of torture presently exists. Complaints have to be made to the
police - the same party often accused of perpetrating the crime - potentially
exposing the complainant to intimidation and pressure to withdraw the
complaint.
Although
the National Human Rights Commission is theoretically mandated to investigate
individual complaints of torture, it is rendered powerless in practice because
it is prohibited from investigating the armed forces. In light of the
proportion of complaints implicating the armed forces, this effectively
undermines any capacity it has to address allegations of torture. The impunity
this confers on the armed forces is especially alarming given the powers
granted to them under laws such as the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 1958,
which allows security forces to fire at any person if it is considered
'necessary for the maintenance of law and order' in areas declared a
'disturbed area' by the Central Government.
Other
legislation in force acts to further thwart the investigation of torture. The
Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act 1990 stipulates that
unless approval is obtained from the Central Government, no "prosecution,
suit, or other legal proceeding shall be instituted...against any person in
respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of the powers of
the act." The provisions of India's Criminal Procedure Code (specifically
sections 45(1), 132(1) and 197) also deny courts the jurisdiction to hear
complaints of human rights violations committed by public servants or members
of the armed forces while acting or purporting to act in discharge of their
duties, unless courts receive prior authorisation from the government.
Even
if a complaint of torture is investigated, the provisions of India's Penal
Code that address the punishment for torture (sections 330 and 331) are widely
recognised as inadequate to give effect to the provisions of CAT.
Article
14 of CAT enshrines the fundamental right of victim of an act of torture to
'fair and adequate compensation.' This has been endorsed by the Supreme Court
of India in several cases including Rudul Shah v. State of Bihar, Bhim
Singh v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and M C Mehta v. Union of India. A discretionary remedy is available to
victims of torture under Articles 32 and 226 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
although they have generally been exercised conservatively by the judiciary.
More to the point, the State has still not enacted mandatory compensation
provisions recognising this right to compensation. This unsatisfactory
situation is exacerbated by the reported reluctance of victims to accept
compensation out of fear of retribution.
Legitimising
Torture?
Under
Section 27 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002 - India's most recent
counter-terrorism legislation - confessions made to police are now admissible
as evidence in court. This overrides the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act
that previously made such confessions inadmissible. Along with the
extraordinary powers of arrest and detention conferred on police by the
Disturbed Areas Act and the National Security Act, this practically gives
authorities carte blanche to disregard the rights of detainees and use any
means possible to coerce confessions.
Obstructionist
Approach
The
Indian Government's reluctance to allow international scrutiny of its human
rights record is apparent in its opposition to the draft Optional Protocol to
the CAT. The Optional Protocol creates a system of inspection of places of
detention in order to prevent the torture and ill-treatment of detainees. Its
obstruction of this development is especially unusual because States are not
obligated to sign the Optional Protocol until they become a party to the
Convention itself - which India is not.
Unsurprisingly,
India's Home Ministry has also consistently refused to extend an invitation to
the UN Special Rapporteurs on Torture and on Extrajudicial Killings.
The
Neglected Rights of the Child
The
Indian Government's ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
in 1992 has done little to alleviate the miserable plight of millions of
Indian children. The civil, political, economic and social rights affirmed in
the CRC are designed to protect one of Indian society's most vulnerable social
groups. In spite of this, the routine exploitation and neglect of children in
India continues.
Article
28 of the CRC recognises the obligation of the State to institute a system of
compulsory and free primary education for all children. This has been
reiterated by the Supreme Court in its judgment in Unnikrishnan
v. State of Andhra Pradesh, in which it held that all citizens of India
have a fundamental right to education up to 14 years of age. However, this
right remains largely illusory. The Government does not provide universal
primary education, and only approximately 59 percent of children between the
ages of five and 14 attend school.
The
Government is also expressly obligated to protect the welfare of children and
ensure their freedom from “arbitrary interference.” However, an average of
30,133 children go missing annually in India and 27 percent of these children
are not traced. Although the Government has enacted the Juvenile Justice (Care
and Protection of Children) Act 2001, this is no guarantee that its provisions
will be respected or realised in practice. For example, the existence of the
Child Marriage Restraint Act has made a negligible difference to the incidence
of child marriage in rural India. Furthermore, the enactment of statutes
outlawing child labour has not made any difference to the lives of over 10
million children currently working under conditions of bonded labour.
Government
has failed to even notionally address the issue of the traditional preference
for male children in some parts of India, even though protection from
discrimination on the basis of sex is enshrined in Article 2 of the CRC.
Accordingly, the female to male ratio among children aged between zero and six
continued to fall between 1991 and 2001 from 945 females per 1,000 males to
927 females per 1,000 males. Despite the disturbing implications of this trend
- the practice of female infanticide - the Government has not considered any
measures to prevent it.
Other
statistics attest to the serious neglect of the welfare of Indian children and
the State's responsibilities under the CRC. The fact that 47 percent of
children under the age of three are malnourished speaks volumes about the
Government's implementation of the right to health in Article 24 of the
Convention. The Government has also failed to develop effective steps to
combat the prevalence of violence and sexual abuse committed against children.
In a move in the opposite direction, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002
allows for the prosecution of children by special courts and disregards
limitations on the age of criminal responsibility enunciated by the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child.
Rights
of Women - A Lesson in Inequality
The
pattern of disparity between the Indian Government's rhetoric and its action
is also reflected in the status of women in Indian society. The Government has
ratified CEDAW, committing itself to ensuring equal rights for men and women.
However, women are systematically discriminated against in both the public and
private domains. This is illustrated by the list of human rights violations to
which women are routinely subjected - domestic violence, rape, abduction,
dowry deaths, torture and molestation.
Incidents
of rape, molestation and extortion are increasing - statistics show that on
average, a woman is raped every hour in India. This in itself illustrates how
much progress needs to be made before the rights of women to life, liberty and
dignity are protected in India.
This
is another area in which an activist Indian judiciary has taken significant
steps to affirm India's international obligations, only to have its progress
undermined by apathetic State and Central Governments. In accordance with
Article 11 of CEDAW, the Supreme Court in Muthamma v. Union of India and Air
India v. Nargesh Mirza struck down discriminatory service conditions
requiring female employees to obtain government permission before marriage and
denying married and pregnant women the right to be employed.
Moreover,
looking to remedy the inaction of State authorities, in Vishaka
v. State of Rajasthan, the Supreme Court issued guidelines to ensure women
have equal working conditions and are protected from sexual harassment. This
was endorsed in Apparel Export Promotion
Council v A K Chopra. However, as the National Human Rights Commission has
noted, these guidelines are not being followed in either the public or the
private sector.
The
practice of trafficking women into India for the purposes of forced
prostitution also continues unabated, with between 12,000 and 50,000 persons
being trafficked into India annually.
Another
recent development that threatens to further compromise the rights of women is
the introduction of a draft Criminal Law Amendment Bill (Bill No. LX of 2003)
into Parliament which seeks to make the offence of subjecting a woman to
cruelty bailable. Providing for the accused to be released on bail will only
make victims less likely to file a complaint for fear of harassment by the
accused.
Conclusion
The
plight of India's most vulnerable citizens - women, children, and individuals
in detention - has not been improved by the establishment of international
instruments recognizing their fundamental human rights. Where the Government
has purported to commit itself to these standards, it has not taken tangible
measures to give effect to these rights.
With
respect to the prevention of torture, the Government has chosen to shirk its
responsibilities altogether. As long as the Government continues to pay
lip-service only to its international obligations, both India's citizens and
its international reputation will continue to suffer.
MAINSTREAMING
HUMAN RIGHTS
'UNESCO
is a human rights organization
THE
protection and promotion of human rights has not been a major preoccupation of
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).
However, of late, the organisation appears to be taking a fresh look at the
human rights components of its programmes. In May 2004, UNESCO will organise
the World Forum for Human Rights in Nantes, France, with the aim of bringing
together the various actors that inform and influence the debate on human
rights and whose paths do not always converge. Last week, PIERRE SANÉ,
Assistant Director-General for Social and Human Sciences at UNESCO, was in
Geneva to present an overview of the planned Forum, and spoke to Human
Rights Features…
Human
Rights Features (HRF):
It is evident that UNESCO has rediscovered human rights in the last few years.
What are the main issues that you seek to focus UNESCO's attention on?
Pierre
Sané (PS): Why do you say rediscover? I consider UNESCO a human rights
organisation, set up to push the right to education, to share the benefits of
scientific advances, working for justice and peace. In the 1946 Constitution
of UNESCO, there is reference to democratic principles. So, to a certain
extent, you can consider UNESCO a human rights organisation.
It is true that over the past
three years, there has been a lot of contemplation on human rights, because of
the multiplicity of human rights actors and the complexity of issues. So we
engaged in a long process of consultation which makes clear what we are going
to do and what not. UNESCO's strategy focuses on intellectual contribution. So
we want total support for research in, for example, economic, social and
cultural rights, especially the right to education. We want to bring in new
actors. We're taking an initiative to build a coalition of cities united
against racism because cities have become sites where you have multicultural
societies. We want to encourage them to take action through their municipal
projects… to push issues of tolerance.
In terms of awareness-raising, I
can give you an example, in the field of bioethics and the threats that
genetics poses to human rights in the future. Through the development of
standards etc we try to ensure that science advances on an ethical framework
that advances human rights.
HRF:
You have identified the fight against racism as a key area of UNESCO's work.
How do you plan to integrate the Durban Declaration and Program of
Action in UNESCO's own work plan for the next few years?
PS:
We've done that already. In Durban, there were special recommendations
addressed to UNESCO, for example, on the slavery route project, and to look at
how we continue to build the memory around slave trade, how we encourage
cultural dialogue between the people of African and European descent and
indigenous cultures.
We have been asked to produce
educational materials and research on racism, so when we came back from
Durban, we extracted not only the special recommendations of Durban but also
the recommendations that fall within the domain of UNESCO, and this is what
we're implementing now.
For example the World Coalition of
Cities, will assist municipal policy making. Cities will sign up to an ethical
charter and contribute to fighting racism at the municipal level.
HRF:
The country offices of UNESCO have not been known to be proactive in the area
of human rights. Most of their
past contact has been with governmental agencies in the host country.
How do you propose to create a new relation between them and civil
society to defend human rights?
PS:
The first thing we'll do is implement a strategy on human rights…
mainstreaming of human rights is the first. We're going to evaluate the
mainstreaming and develop our own plan including specifically in field
offices. Our field offices will be championing the right to education and
poverty… it will take time, but we can learn from the experiences of
agencies like UNICEF and OHCHR to see how we can shape our contributions.
HRF:
The High Commissioner for Human Rights has announced an initiative to have
a Convention on Human Rights Education. What are your perceptions of this
initiative?
PS:
I have not seen the details, but whatever can encourage governments to pursue
vigorously the objectives of the first decade of human rights education will
be welcome. UNESCO has worked with the OHCHR during the first decade to see
what lessons can be learnt. It's a good idea, it will take time to develop a
convention, but that should not stall efforts in this direction.
For us, human rights education has
to be seen as a core right within the right to education. So in the coming
weeks and months, we will be exchanging information with OHCHR on the specific
details.
HRF:
Following from that, what are your views on the initiatives of some to have a
second Decade on Human Rights Education?
PS:
In view of the results of the first decade, a second decade will be needed,
just like the decade on women and on racism. So if another decade allows us to
concentrate energies and resources, then it's fine. But the first decade has
to be evaluated first.
HRF:
The work of the complaints mechanisms available in UNESCO on academic and
media freedoms is not very well known. How do you plan to correct this lack of
information?
PS:
It is true, it is not very well known. I've had many discussions in the course
of developing new strategies. As we've had consultations, we've taken
opportunities to disseminate information. One central element of that strategy
would be to educate NGOs on what the mechanisms are. It's not in competition
with the Geneva mechanisms, but it is useful. Many NGOs have said it is not
effective, but it is not effective because they have not used it. I hope that
with publicity and awareness-raising, more NGOs will use these mechanisms.
HRF:
Are you contemplating convening a meeting with treaty bodies and special
mechanisms on building a synergy between UNESCO complaint mechanisms and those
available under the CHR?
PS:
I think there is already an exchange of information. For example if there is a
complaint to UNESCO, we check if the complaint was made here or not, to avoid
duplication. We envisage a meeting with all special rapporteurs, treaty bodies
and others interested in poverty and human rights. We're doing conceptual work
at the moment with intellectuals and academics and other actors. As we look at
the concept of poverty, we will organise a seminar in Geneva with experts to
advance this thinking.
HRF:
The forthcoming UNESCO World Forum on Human Rights will need a proactive
method to involve civil society from the South.
How do you propose to do this?
PS:
The first [step] is to share and disseminate information. We have sent out
10,000 brochures, we are reprinting a different brochure which will
communicate more powerfully the nature of this Forum. This is important, so
that people don't misunderstand the Forum, as its purpose is very different.
We have a website too.
We have funding constraints. We
have had hundreds of requests for funding. We have not secured funding for
many participants… the forum itself does not have money to pay for everyone.
But we are in discussions with funding agencies… I would encourage NGOs to
liaise with funding agencies, and to approach embassies and governments in an
attempt to source funding.
HRF:
Finally, are there any other issues that you would like to inform the readers
about?
PS:
What we want and where I see the role of UNESCO is to strengthen the linkages
between research and action through the academic community and others, to
tackle adequately those challenges. It is important that action is based on
thoughts. We want to generate food for thought and thought for action.
|
World
of possibilities? |
|
THE
World Forum for Human Rights, to be held in Nantes, France, in May 2004,
aims to provide “space for an extensive and free dialogue on issues
related to the implementation and protection of human rights.”
The
programme includes plenary sessions on key challenges, including
terrorism and human rights, poverty and the fight against
discrimination. It will also include round-tables, to be organised by
and at the initiative of the participants, including United Nations
bodies, programmes and agencies, regional intergovernmental
organisations, cities, international, regional and national
non-governmental organisations, national human rights institutions,
research centres, etc.
The
event, as was emphasised by Pierre Sané during the lunch hour meeting
on 19 March, is not aimed at condemning any government or State. The
event brochure further explicitly states that round tables “should NOT
contain any material which has for its main purpose to condemn or incite
to condemn any government or any State.” (emphasis original) In this
regard, some participants at the 19 March meeting asked about the
expected outcome of the conference. It was pointed out that the
panelists included, for example, the Vice President of Colombia, a
country with serious human rights problems.
Funding,
as Mr. Sané stated during the meeting and in the interview with Human
Rights Features, is a problem at the moment. With participants expected
to foot the bill themselves, the Forum may not find too many takers from
the countries of the South. |
|

|

|
Technical
assistance is the easy part
THE
international community took a firm stance last year by passing a resolution
on Turkmenistan at the 59th Commission on Human Rights (CHR). Inherent in the
CHR's resolution was the decision "to continue its consideration of this
question at its sixtieth session."
Over
the past year, the international community has taken additional steps to
strengthen last year's resolution and further engage and cooperate with the
government of Turkmenistan. In November 2003, the General Assembly (GA)
approved a resolution criticising the situation of human rights in
Turkmenistan, furthering the recommendations outlined by last year's
resolution. On 16 January 2004, the European Parliament called on the European
Union (EU) to sponsor or co-sponsor an additional resolution on Turkmenistan
at the 60th session.
Of
fundamental importance to the CHR this year is Turkmenistan's recent decision
to possibly cooperate and engage with the United Nations. On 2 March 2004,
Turkmenistan and the UN reached an agreement over a five-year
strategic-planning document that outlines a system of cooperation between UN
agencies and Turkmenistan for the next five years. The importance of this
agreement, as facilitated by Turkmenistan's signing of the United Nations
Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), has been characterised by Ruven
Menikdiwela, head of UNHCR's Ashgabat office, as the "first time…the UN
had issued a collective, five year 'plan of action' for the country."
Although
this agreement could signify a positive first step towards improving relations
and engagement with the UN, it could also be read as an attempt by the
leadership of Turkmenistan to mask their inaction in the run-up to the 60th
session. An overview of Turkmenistan's compliance with the CHR's
recommendations since last year and their compliance with UN mechanisms in
general provides a clearer picture.
The
Reality in Turkmenistan
A
year after last year's resolution, political suppression continues. "The
treatment of accused individuals in violation of the ICCPR following the
events of 25 November 2002" and the "persistence of a governmental
policy based on the repression of all political opposition activities"
(as addressed in last year's resolution) remain unchanged. In fact, the
relationship between the alleged perpetrators and political opposition has
become all too clear. In her annual report for 2003, the UN Special Rapporteur
on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions raised concerns over alleged
deaths in custody and the treatment of the supposed coup ringleader Boris
Shikhmuradov. Her request to visit Turkmenistan is still pending.
A
year later, civil society remains oppressed. The prime example is the
implementation of Turkmenistan's new law 'On Public Associations'. The new
law, which took effect on 21 November 2003, forces all NGOs to register with
the government. In addition, the law requires NGOs to register all foreign
assistance (coordinated through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), with the
Ministry of Justice and the State Agency for Investment. The law's most
dangerous provision makes operating an unregistered NGO a criminal offence.
Such executive action is a blatant violation of the CHR's recommendation,
"[t]o remove restrictions on the activities of non-governmental
organizations." (See “Need for a resolution to protect funding” in
this issue)
A
year later, religious minority groups in Turkmenistan still face systematic
harassment. On 10 November 2003, Turkmenistan passed a new law, similar to the
law 'On Public Associations', that requires all religious organisations to
register with the government. Similarly, the illegal operation of an
unregistered religious group is now a criminal offence. In an unexpected step
on 11 March 2004, President Saparmurat Niyazov relaxed registration
requirements for religious organisations. Although the new decree eliminates
an old requirement that barred religious groups with less than 500 members in
a single district from enjoying official registration, it remains unclear
whether or not these changes will actually be put into practice. Most
international observers remain sceptical.
A
year later, freedom of expression and independent media remain severely
restricted. In their Annual Report for 2003, Reporters Sans Frontières
recognised "the lack of press freedom in the country, [as being] one of
the most repressive in the world." The request of the UN Special
Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression to visit the
country is still pending. Two journalists from Radio Free Europe's
Turkmenistan service were arrested on 26 February and 1 March 2004. Access to
the internet in Turkmenistan is still available only through state-owned
Turkmen Telecom.
A
year later, education in Turkmenistan continues in its downward spiral.
Despite the CHR's specific concerns over "the number of years of
compulsory education," the level of general education remains reduced
from eleven to nine years. The lack of educational opportunities in
Turkmenistan has the potential to create serious problems and fuel future
unrest.
Failure
to Comply with UN Mechanisms
Turkmenistan
has been a member of the United Nations since 1992. Even though Turkmenistan
is a party to: the Convention Against Torture, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention of the Rights of the Child,
the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights the government
has yet to file a single report with any UN treaty body.
A
year after the CHR's resolution, Turkmenistan's attitude towards and
engagement with the UN remains unchanged.
The
country's continued decision to not submit reports to the appropriate UN
bodies or "ensure the full [or partial] implementation of their
recommendations" highlights Turkmenistan's lack of respect for the CHR's
resolution itself.
A
commendable step taken by the Government of Turkmenistan, as mentioned in the
recent GA resolution, is the invitation extended by Turkmenistan to "a
delegation of experts of the OHCHR to provide technical assistance in the area
of human rights." Although this is a step towards the fulfillment of
Turkmenistan's international obligations, it fails to adequately address the
specific recommendations outlined by the CHR and the subsequent GA resolution.
If
the Government of Turkmenistan was truly committed to improving human rights
it would fully engage with the CHR's special mechanisms. Turkmenistan's lack
of cooperation with the special mechanisms is evident by the country's refusal
to extend invitations to UN thematic rapporteurs to conduct investigative
missions within Turkmenistan.
Moreover,
and of additional concern, is whether or not "technical assistance"
will be used by the Government of Turkmenistan to further restrict substantive
action and/or access to adequate information. Given this, and recognising
Turkmenistan's lack of compliance with the UN in general, the integrity of
Turkmenistan's "technical assistance" gesture should be viewed with
scepticism.
During
the 59th session, the representative of Turkmenistan claimed an improvement in
Turkmenistan's human rights situation, and stated that in order "[t]o
continue the process... [Turkmenistan] needed more time and the help of the
international community in finding ways to develop the political, civil,
social, economic and cultural rights of its citizens."
What
the government of Turkmenistan fails to acknowledge is that this is and was
the intention of the international community last year in passing their
resolution. The recommendations, as outlined in last year's resolution, were
an attempt by the international community to provide such a roadmap.
Unfortunately,
the actions of the Government of Turkmenistan make it clear that it wishes to
do the very least to protect and ensure the fundamental rights of its
citizens, reinforcing the need for the international community to further
engage the Government of Turkmenistan.
Uncertainty
Niyazov's
cult of personality permeates all facets of Turkmen life. The control he
exercises over the people of Turkmenistan and society's subsequent decline
raises serious concerns over future developments. Niyazov's glorification of
Turkmen ethnic identity through the suppression of minority groups and a
poorly educated populace only adds fuel to the potential fire. With the
ingredients for social and political disaster, the future of Turkmenistan
looks grim, indeed.
The
time has come for the international community to show Niyazov that it will no
longer support business as usual in Turkmenistan. In passing an additional and
more critical resolution, the international community will further its
commitment to acknowledging and assisting those who face the brunt of
Niyazov's policies. It is through such action that change, however small, will
take place.
|
|
Votes
in favour of the resolution on Turkmenistan (59th session):
Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, France,
Germany, Guatemala, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Poland,
Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States,
Uruguay.
Against:
Armenia,
Bahrain, China, Cuba, Gabon, India, Libya, Malaysia, Pakistan, Russian
Federation, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine, Viet
Nam, Zimbabwe
Abstaining:
Algeria,
Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Thailand. |
|
|
Turkmenistan
has invited a delegation of experts of the OHCHR to provide
technical
assistance in the area of human rights. However, this is only one
small step towards implementing the resolution passed at the 59th
CHR session. There have been no invitations to the CHR’s special
mechanisms, and the Government has not submitted compliance
reports to the treaty bodies |
|
|

|

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HUMAN
RIGHTS DEFENDERS
Need
for a resolution to protect funding
GAUGING
by the increased global application of laws designed to stifle and suppress
the functioning on NGOs, the right to receive and utilise resources for human
rights defenders barely exists as a right at all. This is a critical problem
for NGOs in Russia, India, Egypt and other countries where they happen to be
the most vital actors in holding States publicly accountable for violations of
human rights. The meagre protections that international law presently affords
human rights defenders in the course of their work is of no use whatsoever if
defenders are starved of access to funding. It is on this basis that any
resolution presented at the Commission on Human Rights on human rights
defenders should focus attention on the issue of funding as a prerequisite.
The
Present Limitations of International Law
In
1999, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Right and
Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and
Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(“Declaration”). At the time, it was heralded as constituting “a clear
commitment on the part of all UN member states to respect the rights of human
rights defenders at the national and international levels.”
In
fact, the Declaration's worth is entirely compromised by its status as a
non-binding instrument. The majority of its provisions are mirrored in other
international human rights Conventions, and apply equally to human rights
defenders as to all individuals. Therefore, the Declaration offers no new
protections to defenders specifically in this regard.
To
illustrate a few examples, Articles 1 and 5 of the Declaration reaffirm the
right to association and assembly, as provided for by Article 21 and 22 of
ICCPR, Article 5(d)(ix) of ICERD, and Articles 2, 3, 5 and 11 of ILO
Convention No. 87.
Articles
2 and 4, concerning the responsibility and duty of States to promote and
protect human rights, including the rights of human rights defenders, simply
reaffirm the principle upon which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
was founded, and is repeated in all human rights conventions that derive from
the UDHR. This is the general character of the Declaration on Defenders.
How
Protection of Funding is Circumvented by the Declaration
It
is on a convoluted path from Article 17 to Article 3, and on to Article 13,
that the weakness of the Declaration is understood. Article 17 posits the
rights and freedoms referred to in the Declaration as limited rights. Limiting
certain rights is, of course, a standard feature of international conventions
and declarations. Article 17, however, allows for limitations of all of the
rights of the Declaration as "determined by law solely for the purpose of
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and
of the meeting of the just requirements of morality, public order and the
general welfare in democratic society". This is irrespective of whether
or not these rights are derogable.
The
criteria for limiting any or all rights of the Declaration on the grounds of
the "general welfare of society" is also a new grounds for
limitation and is a lower threshold than previously allotted to States. This
affords considerable leverage to oppressive States to determine what they
consider to be in the interests of the "general welfare of society."
If
one appreciates the potential of Article 17 for interference by States in the
activities of human rights defenders, then Article 3 compounds this problem.
It positions domestic law as the "judicial framework within which human
rights and fundamental freedoms should be enjoyed'.
This
may appear, at first glance, as reasonable, as it would suggest the alignment
of domestic legislation with States' international treaty obligations and
other norms of customary law. However, these international obligations are not
explicitly stated in Article 3. The concession to domestic law as the arbiter
of human rights thus further curtails the possibility of the Declaration
introducing any new protections outside the scope of existent human rights law
instruments.
The
adverse effect of Article 3 is best illustrated in Article 13, which happens
to constitute the only unique contribution of the Declaration towards the
specific rights of human rights defenders. Article 13 states: "Everyone
has the right, individually and in association with others, to solicit,
receive and utilize resources for the express purpose of promoting and
protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, through peaceful means, in
accordance with article 3 of this Declaration."
However,
as discussed above, this is subject to the limitations of Article 3 and
domestic law, which, in those countries where human rights defenders are most
active, and in most need of funding, is rarely in conformity with
international standards. All that is required to contravene the rights of
human rights defenders from receiving international funding is to brand them
'politically motivated' organisations or allege that they constitute a threat
to national security, public order, or even the 'general welfare of society'.
The
potential for subverting these clauses renders redundant any protection that
the Declaration could conceivably offer. Such control of funding by
governments has served as an effective means to crush human rights
organisations whilst still acting in compliance with the limitations of
international law.
The
Funding Crisis in Real Terms
The
following two cases of India and Egypt are select examples of a global
problem. In India, the government has resurrected the Foreign Contributions
Regulation Act (FCRA), an anachronistic, Emergency era statute which was
passed under the Defence of India Rules, in itself a criminal statute.
Restricting funding to either directly or indirectly political organisations,
Section 10 of the Act permits the Government, at its discretion, to prohibit
altogether, or require prior permission for, the receipt of foreign
contributions by any individual, group of individuals, or organisation if the
Government "is satisfied" that the acceptance of such foreign
contributions would be prejudicial on one or more of the five enumerated
grounds of "the sovereignty or integrity of India; the public interest;
freedom or fairness of election to any Legislature; friendly relations with
any foreign State; or harmony between religious, racial, linguistic or
regional groups, castes or communities."
The
expansive nature of the last two grounds - the likelihood of prejudicial
effect to "the public interest" or to "harmony between
religious, racial, linguistic or regional groups, castes or communities"
- extends the Government's discretion well beyond the limits of this first
category. This potentially
encompasses individuals and organisations far removed from participation in
government or in electoral politics, and whose activities may be wholly
legitimate.
The
Home Ministry has already been using ambiguous language in the FCRA to make
arbitrary decisions. Armed with a set of 'guidelines' that are equally
ambiguous and are not even reflected in formal legislation, officials are
renowned for refusing access to international resources, without any required
explanation, to those that it deems critical of government policy. On
occasion, by way of punishment for criticism, the FCRA has been directly
applied as a political weapon by the ruling party. No objective criteria for
the definition of a "political" organisation are applied.
In
Egypt, the situation is perhaps even more critical. According to Human Rights
First, "by a series of deliberate policy measures and acts of persecution
over a period of years the Egyptian government has all but destroyed an
independent human rights movement that had developed in Egypt in the late
1980s and early 1990s."
As
early as January 1995, the Legislative Department of the Ministry of Justice
issued a ruling declaring that non-profit civil companies were illegal and
that all such companies must seek registration under the law on associations,
or face prosecution. This Law 32 of 1964 gave the government intrusive powers
to control the work of NGOs. Refusal upon application, as happened to the
Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights, amounted to NGOs being classified as
"illegal organisations."
The
government's further restriction of the independent activities of NGOs was
laid down by Law 153 of 1999 which outlawed "political" activities
by NGOs, again without determining any criteria and thus allowing official
discretion to penalise legitimate activities by human rights defenders.
Article 75 of the law, also prohibited the receipt of international funds or
domestic fundraising without prior permission from the authorities. The law
was suspended in June 2000 on procedural grounds but the government has
expressed its intention to apply the law without substantive change when the
procedural aspects are clarified.
Governments
have a legitimate interest in holding NGOs accountable for financial or other
wrongdoing. However, normal regulatory and criminal justice procedures provide
sufficient institutional resources to accomplish this task. Similarly,
narrowly tailored financial reporting requirements for NGOs serve legitimate
governmental interests and should remain in place.
However,
the administration of such laws should be the task of Finance Ministries,
rather than Home Ministries. And to the extent that the direct channels of
political participation are to be reserved for citizens, the targets of
regulation should be political parties and the candidates they field for
office, not NGOs and advocacy groups.
These
indefensible practices are not only contrary to the democratic principles of
transparency, accountability and independence, but impinge upon the legitimate
right of defenders to exercise their function by curtailing freedom of
association and expression.
It
remains to be seen how States sympathetic to the plight of defenders on the
ground - those who Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs Brian Cowen referred to
as "the brave individuals around the world who risk discrimination,
imprisonment or worse to ensure that governments live up to their human rights
obligations"- act upon their words by addressing human rights defenders'
most immediate and pressing concern.
Dictatorial
notions of democracy
Togo’s
membership of the CHR this year is another example of the use of a seat in
Room XVII to deflect criticism
TOGO
is a country quick to adopt international conventions on human rights, as its
ratification of all the core UN conventions, and its acceptance of the
competency of the Human Rights Committee to consider individual complaints
under the first optional protocol of the ICCPR, all attest. Its membership of
the Commission on Human Rights for the last three sessions may likewise be (mis)interpreted
to indicate a commitment to the principles of international human rights law.
Yet, despite its rhetorical willingness to accede to international and
regional treaties on human rights, Togo's domestic practice points to a
government that operates with impunity in persistent violation of its
obligations. The election of Togo to the Commission might be more accurately
understood as an insidious opportunity to deflect attention from its own
record. Dictatorships, after all,
are rarely advocates of international best practice.
Despite
attempts to introduce a democratic multiparty system in 1991, Togo continues
to exist under the rule of Africa's longest serving dictatorship. Human rights
violations, engineered primarily to protect President Gnassingbe Eyadéma's
regime, are widespread. Inquiries into allegations of human rights violations
have been met with strong government denials, best illustrated by their
refutation of allegations presented in Amnesty International's 1999 report
'Togo: Rule of Terror', following the repression of demonstrations opposing
the fraudulence of the 1998 elections. This resulted in the establishment of a
joint UN and OAU International Commission of Inquiry, which fully confirmed
the findings of Amnesty, and further publicised the atrocities committed
against the Togolese population. Nonetheless,
the same violations and the same culture of impunity have persisted to the
present day as those detailed by the Commission, and as have existed for the
past 37 years.
The
June 2003 elections highlighted two particular forms of existent violations:
firstly, the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public
affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to
public service, as prescribed by Article 25 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Togo is a party; and secondly,
the collective rights to freedom of expression, assembly and association, as
prescribed by Articles 19,21 and 22 of the ICCPR. These rights are
inextricably linked.
As
the general comment of the Human Rights Committee on political participation
explains: "Citizens also take part in the conduct of public affairs by
exerting influence through public debate and dialogue with their
representatives or through their capacity to organize themselves. This
participation is supported by ensuring freedom of expression, assembly and
association." In Togo, this is anything but the case.
Free
Elections
Elections
in Togo have traditionally been marred by violent intimidation, repression of
all criticism, and widespread corruption. To prevent a repeat of the 1998
elections, the government of Togo, in co-operation with the EU, accepted the
1999 Lomé Framework and established an Independent National Electoral
Commission (CENI). The process of
erosion began in 2001 with the modification of the Electoral Code to prohibit
the registration of persons in exile, or those with double nationality, as
electoral candidates. This was chiefly designed to prevent Gilchrist Olympio,
the main political opponent to Eyadéma in exile, to run for election. In
December 2002, the Constitution was amended in order to allow Eyadéma to run
for a third mandate. Finally, a
new Electoral code was adopted in February 2003, transferring the
responsibility for the preparation of elections from CENI to the interior
minister.
Following
allegations by Amnesty International of ensuing fraud at the election poll,
and the general use of "heavily armed soldiers circulat[ing] in the
country and commit[ting] exactions on the population", Eyadéma secured a
strong majority, to nobody's surprise.
Freedom
of Expression, Assembly and Association
The
June 2003 elections were preceded by a calculated campaign against members of
opposition parties and the media. Freedom of expression was gravely
undermined, with journalists subjected to arbitrary arrest, and subjected to
unfair trials for defamation against the State or President whilst attempting
to exercise their duty to provide information.
Multiple
examples have been reported concerning the editors of newspapers or weekly
magazines. Franciscans International reported the arrest on 19 June 2003 of
Dimas Dzikodo, editor of the weekly newspaper L'Evènement, released after the payment of 500,000 CFA. Journalist
Komlan Dodji Djilan was also arrested on grounds of defamation and disturbance
to public order. This followed the release on 7 May 2003 of Sylvestre Djahlin
Nicoué, editor of Le Courrier du
Citoyen, who had been detained without trial for four months at Lomé
Civil Prison for "inciting citizens to take up arms against the state
authority."
Pressure
was also applied to the Foreign Press. According to the Fédération
Internationale des Droits de l'Homme (FIDH), Radio France International (RFI)
was prevented entirely from covering the elections. Additionally, the Special
Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression noted in last year's report to
the Commission on Human Rights that the change in the Press Code (2002)
permitted the Togolese authorities to censor all publications and broadcasts
that they deemed to be 'offensive' or 'controversial' Togolese journalists
consequently work under the continual threat of arrest for criticism of any
form of government activity.
Freedom
of assembly has also been effectively curtailed. Preceding the June elections,
marches and meetings organised by political opponents to the president or
students were banned or repressed by the security forces, preventing any
visible displays of dissent against the authorities before the elections. To
give two examples, on 15 March 2003 a march organised by the New Popular
Dynamic, an umbrella organisation of young opposition party activists, was
banned without explanation; in March 2003 30 people were arrested for meeting
peacefully at the residence of an opposition party representative. All were
released without charge, and without explanation for their arrest. These are
indicative of a systematic policy.
In
1993 the EU suspended its allocation of aid to Togo on account of its record
of persistent human rights violations. The EU position was reviewed in 2003,
whereby aid was again granted on condition of the government's commitment to
the 'reinforcement of democracy'. On the contrary, this renewal of aid, in the
immediate aftermath of Eyadéma's election, is tantamount to an endorsement of
a patently anti-democratic regime. Togo's consistent flaunting of its
international human rights obligations is antithetical to the aspirations of
the EU in supporting "good governance".
It
can only be hoped that Togo's membership of the Commission on Human Rights
will shine a spotlight on their own flagrant violations of human rights, and
not, as has happened in the past, be a shield behind which Togo can hide its
true colours.
MALDIVES
Trouble
in Paradise
Tiny,
idyllic island conceals a disturbing pattern of human rights violations and
suppression of political freedoms
FOR
most, the Maldives is associated with images of an idyllic
paradise - palm trees, white sand and turquoise waters.
Until recently, the size (a population of less than 300,000)
and lack of geographic and political importance of this
popular holiday destination has aided the government of the
Maldives in avoiding international scrutiny. However, recent
violent civil unrest has given the outside world a glimpse
of the festering anger and disillusionment of the Maldivian
people that is simmering beneath the surface.
A
‘Unique Democracy’
Re-elected
in October 2003, following presidential elections in which
he was the only candidate, President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom is
Asia's longest-serving leader, having governed the Maldives
since 1978. The President has been reported as describing
the Maldives as a "unique democracy", and the
government claims that since assuming the Presidency, the
governance of the Republic of Maldives has been conducted in
a style and manner that it compatible with an atmosphere of
"openness", press freedom and guided by the
principles of universal adult suffrage. Unfortunately,
however, a more accurate description of the political
situation in the Maldives is that the country is suffering
under the rule of a repressive dictator.
President
Gayoom's rule is characterised by complete government
control of the media, rampant nepotism and corruption,
executive control of the judiciary and the legislature, a
brutal National Security Service (NSS), a prohibition on
opposition political parties and repression of all forms of
criticism and political dissent. The people of the Maldives
live in a climate of fear and intimidation as arbitrary
arrests, imprisonment and torture are commonplace, and the
laws of the country prohibit public statements
"contrary to government policy" and prohibit the
practice of any religion other than Islam.
Not
only is Mr Gayoom President of the Republic of Maldives, he
also holds the positions of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces and of the Police, Minister of Defence and National
Security, Minister of Finance and Treasury and Governor of
Maldives Monetary Authority. The President appoints the
Cabinet and one-sixth of Parliament, and under the
Constitution, he is given the "supreme authority to
propagate the tenets of Islam". President Gayoom also
has control over the judiciary, enjoying the power to
appoint and dismiss judges, and to review and overturn
decisions of the High Court.
The
Maldivian Government's disregard for the human rights of its
citizens is further exemplified by the fact that the
Maldives has not ratified or signed the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, nor the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
Repression
of political opposition
Although
article 27 of the Maldivian Constitution provides for
freedom of association, the President has discouraged the
formation of political parties on the grounds that they
cause disharmony and are inappropriate to the homogeneous
nature of society. In 2001, the President refused to
register the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) as a political
association, and the government banned the MDP website in
December last year. The MDP is now operating in exile out of
Sri Lanka.
Supporters
of the MDP and their family members were arrested last month
in overnight raids prior to an organised march to protest
the government's failure to curb the deteriorating law and
order situation in the country. According to Amnesty
International, it is believed that they were arrested for
their involvement in the election of the Governing Council
of the MDP, which had taken place some three hours prior to
the arrests. It was also reported that the Government placed
a 24-hour ban on SMS messages throughout the country in an
attempt to disrupt the planned protest.
Arbitrary
Detention and Torture
Amnesty
International has reported an endemic pattern of arbitrary
detention of government critics and their continued
imprisonment before and after convictions in grossly unfair
trials where they were denied access to a lawyer or to an
independent appeal mechanism.
Amnesty
International has also reported a pattern of torture and
ill-treatment of prisoners and the failure of the government
to investigate reports of torture. Many prisoners are held
in solitary confinement without adequate food or access to
medical treatment.
Repression
of Press Freedom
Public
statements contrary to government policy and Islam, that
threaten the public order or are libellous are prohibited by
law. The government ignores the constitutionally enshrined
guarantee of freedom of expression, imposing severe
restrictions on media independence through stringent
registration requirements and bureaucratic processes.
Editors and journalists practice self-censorship due to the
threat of being arrested and imprisoned for publishing
articles critical of the government. Radio and television
stations are government owned or controlled. The country`s
main daily newspapers and magazines are controlled by
friends and relatives of the President.
In
4 March 2003, the Government announced that it had amended
the law to make it easier to revoke newspaper and magazine
licences. That same day 22 publication licences were
cancelled due to a failure to comply with the new law, with
no opportunity having been given to comply with the new
requirements.
In
July 2002, three men were sentenced to imprisonment for
life, and a woman to 10 years imprisonment, for publishing
an email newsletter that was critical of the President and
government. The Working Group on Arbitrary detention was of
the opinion that the deprivation of liberty of the four
persons was arbitrary, being in contravention of articles 9
and 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The
September Riots
In
September last year, a prison inmate, Hassan Evaan Naseem,
was beaten to death by guards, sparking riots within
Maafushi Jail. Three more prisoners died when NSS guards
fired upon the inmates. The incident provoked unprecedented
civil unrest with riots breaking out in Male, as angry
Maldivians took to the streets, targeting and burning
government buildings and electoral offices. Amnesty
International reported a wave of arbitrary arrests following
the civil riots.
A
Presidential Commission was set up to inquire into the death
of Naseem and the shootings at Maafushi Jail. On 27 January
2004, the President presented the findings of the
Commission, however significant sections of the report were
removed "for reasons of national security",
including the names of those responsible for the deaths.
There is a widely held belief that the President manipulated
the findings of the Commission to protect senior officers of
the NSS and Ministry of Defence and National Security.
Earlier
this month, the trials of six people, who are accused of
causing disturbances during the September 2003 civil riots,
commenced. The six are being tried under anti-terrorism
laws. Given that one of the accused, Ms Jennifer Latheef, is
the daughter of Mr Mohamed Latheef, the spokesperson for the
MDP in exile, some have expressed the view that the trials
are a politically motivated attempt to attack Mr Latheef.
A
Sham Human Rights Commission
In
a response to criticisms on the need for reform following
the September 2003 riots, the Human Rights Commission of the
Maldives was formed in December 2003, purportedly based on
the Paris Principles. However, concern has been expressed
about the independence and effectiveness of the Commission,
as the Commission members will be appointed by the
President, will report their findings directly to the
President and cannot investigate alleged offences that
occurred more than 12 months prior to the establishment of
the Commission.
It
is feared that the Human Rights Commission, which has
received funding from the United Nations Development
Program, will be used as a mere tool to legitimise the
President's rule.
International
Scrutiny Needed
The
recent riots gave a glimpse of the festering anger and
disillusionment of the people of the Maldives that is
simmering beneath the surface. Given the rising discontent
within the population and the growing political opposition
to Gayoom's regime, it is feared that President may take
drastic measure to cling to power.
The
deteriorating law and order situation and reported rising of
discontent within the ranks of the NSS will only add to the
President's woes. In the lead-up to the upcoming general
elections, scheduled for later this year, it will be vital
for the international community to closely monitor the
situation in the Maldives to ensure that the human rights of
Maldivians are protected.
Regulating
religion: Matter of faith?
Registration
of religious institutions has its pros and cons; the issue is safeguarding the
freedom to worship
RELIGIOUS
activities flourished in Romania after the fall of the totalitarian communist
regime in 1990. The Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief,
Abdelfattah Amor, who visited Romania in September of 2003, found no serious
violation of freedom of religion or belief or serious acts of religious
intolerance or violence. He even noted that most religious minorities maintain
good relationships with the central Government, including with the Minister of
State for Religious Affairs. Moreover, freedom of religion is enshrined in the
Constitution of Romania, and Romania has signed the major international human
rights instruments.
That
said, there are certain trends in the Romanian Government's treatment of
religious minorities that are troubling.
The
large majority of Romanians (86.7 percent) belong to the Romanian Orthodox
Church. The second largest group is composed of Roman Catholics (4.7). The
200,000 strong Greek Catholic Community represents only 0.9 percent of the
Romanian population today. A substantial diminution compared to 1.5 million,
before 1948. The Protestant Church also represents 3.2 percent of the
population. The rest of the population is distributed between smaller
Christian communities, Muslims, Jews, atheists, and other small religious
communities.
The
main areas of concern regarding freedom of religion in Romania are: the
regulation of religions and religious groups; the return of confiscated
property to religious communities; and instances of discrimination from
non-state actors against religious minorities.
The
legal framework governing religious institutions is complex and contradictory.
Outdated legislation, new decrees and decisions from the courts compete to
define the scope of religious activities. Although the Special Rapporteur does
not consider that Romanian laws have directly infringed upon freedom of
religion or belief, it is clear that they have the potential to restrict the
exercise of this freedom in ways that are incompatible with international law.
Romanian
legislation distinguishes between recognised and non-recognised religions. In
order to be recognised as a religion, groups must register with the State
Secretariat for Religious Affairs and present a list with the names, age,
identity card numbers, addresses, and signatures of their followers. The State
Secretary of Religions and the President must approve all registration
applications. Recognised faiths, for example, enjoy the right to establish
schools and teach religion in public schools, receive funds to build churches
and pay clergy salaries. They can also access religious programming on radio
and television, apply for broadcasting licenses for denominational
frequencies, and enjoy tax-exempt status.
Religious
groups that do not obtain the status of independent religions can exist
legally only as religious and charitable foundations or as cultural
associations. Religious groups registered as foundations or charitable
organisations are allowed to rent or build office space. They are not
permitted to build churches or other buildings designated as houses of worship
or to have their rites of baptism, marriage, or burial recognised.
As
noted by the Special Rapporteur, regulation of religious institutions through
a process of voluntary registration is not per se a violation of freedom of
religion. By granting advantages compared to secular associations,
registration may enhance the capacity of individuals to practice their faith.
It can also support the rights of individuals in case of abuse perpetrated in
religious associations. Conversely, regulation has the potential to infringe
on freedom of religion when it engenders threats to freedom of worship.
Registration
procedures have been streamlined but the criteria remain obscure and appeals
in courts are costly and not readily enforced by the Romanian administration.
Fears of unacceptable conditions for registration have also surfaced with the
drafting of a new bill on religions in 1999. The actual registration process
is also subject to allegations of irregularities linked to, for example, the
validity of the census of 2002. The recognition of the Jehova's Witnesses as a
religion by the Supreme Court and the subsequent implementation of the ruling
by the central state administration constitute a step forward.
In
the end, the Special Rapporteur recommends that the distinction between
recognised and non-recognised faiths be abolished. He also advises the
Romanian Government to use the opportunity of the drafting of a new bill on
religions to enhance the implementation of international obligations relating
to freedom of religion or belief.
The
regulation of religious institutions takes three forms in Europe:
registration; association status; and, the conclusion of agreements and
concordat, which in the case of the latter places religious legislation within
the remit of international law. Considering the special relationship of the
Orthodox Church with the State but also the fears of religious minorities,
Romania should ensure that the Orthodox Church does not enjoy a particular
status on account of its historical role.
In
this respect, Romania could consider setting up mechanisms to study
legislation concerning religious institutions in other European countries and
endorsing a system of registration or association status through the adoption
of new legislation. The Government must also refrain from adopting a special
agreement with the Orthodox Church and ensure that the Orthodox Church does
not exercise undue de facto influence on local governments to the detriment of
other denominations.
Another
issue of concern is the question of the restitution of religious property
confiscated under the previous regime, which has led to direct conflicts
between religious communities, particularly between the Orthodox Church and
the Greek Catholic Church. On this matter, the Special Rapporteur has
denounced the "hands-off" policy of the State in matters of
restitution of religious property which has left religious communities to
settle their dispute among themselves.
In
June 2002, the Parliament passed law 501 restituting religious properties
confiscated by the Communist regime. Law 501 finally legislated on a
contentious issue which had so far been the subject of ad hoc decree.
Prior to the passing of this law, some religious or communal property
had already been returned to former owners as a result of government decrees,
or with the agreement of local religious leaders. But, as noted by the US
Department of State, in many cases religious minorities had not succeeded in
regaining actual possession of the properties despite restitution by these
decrees.
Although
law 501 has clarified the process of restitution, it has encountered two major
difficulties. First, many properties returned by decree house state offices,
schools, hospitals, or cultural institutions. Thus, even if in practice, the
properties are restituted, the organisations that use them would require
relocation and religious communities would not enjoy the immediate benefit of
ownership change. Moreover, lawsuits and protests by current possessors have
delayed restitution of the property to the claimant owners.
Second,
the Orthodox Church has been unwilling to hand over property to the Greek
Catholic Church. The Orthodox Church, in turn, has stressed that, as a matter
of faith, religious sites cannot be ceded by other actors than the communities
of believers themselves, and has opposed the idea of taking turns to hold
religious services. In 1990, the Government of Romania adopted a decree that
called for the creation of a joint Orthodox and Greek Catholic Committee at
the national level to decide the fate of churches that had belonged to the
Greek Catholic Church before 1948.
However,
the Government has not enforced this decree, and the Orthodox Church has
consistently resisted efforts to resolve the issue in that forum. As a
consequence, the Committee has rarely met, and has not permitted a resolution
of the conflict. Rather, it has entrenched it, leading to the restitution of
only eight contested properties. For example, the courts have generally
refused to consider Greek Catholic lawsuits seeking restitution, citing the
1990 decree establishing the joint committee to resolve the issue. This
stalemate has occurred in spite of substantial concessions from the Greek
Catholic Church, which has reduced its claim from the initial property list of
2,600 seized properties to fewer than 300.
It
is clear that the peaceful issue of restitution will not be solved in the near
future without the intervention of the State. Presently, restitution,
especially in the case of contested property between the Orthodox Church and
the Greek Catholic Church, may lead to further tensions and may endanger
freedom of religion in the future. The Government must consider innovative
schemes of property ownership that would reconcile the claims of the different
parties and enhance the enjoyment of freedom of religion and freedom of
worship. (see box)
The
distinction between property rights and use rights does not however solve all
the problems linked to the denomination of particular religious sites. Two
questions must be answered: Would use rights be determined by a process of
negotiation between the parties? If so, how would the process differ from the
present one that has led to stalemate?
Given
the conflict between religious groups, it is clear that negotiation is
unlikely to lead to a fair settlement. In this regard, use rights on place of
worship must be given on the basis of periodical review of attendance.
In
addition, use rights on property owned by religious organisations could be
distributed through a process of competitive review.
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Managing
sacred space
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ONE
way of dealing with the issue of use of religious
sites could be to delink the actual ownership of the
disputed locations with the enjoyment of it. New
schemes should be established that consider giving
ownership to one legal entity and usufruct to
another or to different legal entities. The
Government could create an independent organisation
that would own places of worship and distribute use
rights to those places. Such an organisation could
be modelled on independent central banks or
electoral boards, which have been held as models of
good governance by the international community.
Recognised religions would be asked to remit
ownership of their places of worship to that
independent entity in exchange of permanent
maintenance by the entity. Conversely, the
independent organisation could also manage use
rights and rents on property owned by religious
communities which has been settled by state offices,
schools or hospitals.
The
benefit of multiple usufructs of places of worship
would be to allow different faiths that share
similarities in their practice to share the same
place of worship. At the same time, the distinction
between ownership and usufruct could allow religious
associations to benefit from adequate places of
worship even without recognition as a religion.
Finally, this scheme could help the various actors
reach agreements based on actual use and need.
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View
from Latin America & the Caribbean
What
concerns will human rights activists from the Latin American and Caribbean
region bring to the 60th CHR?
PATRICIO
RICE
FIRST,
let us hope that our colleagues will come to Geneva. There
is long standing disillusionment with the CHR among
activists that has its origin in the late seventies and
eighties when Latin Americans crowded the Serpentine lobby.
We seemed to achieve too little, too slowly. A faithful band
has continued, such as FEDEFAM which has now being pushing
for more than 20 years for an international instrument
against enforced disappearances. And we have many from
Colombia who make the annual pilgrimage to raise much-needed
international concern about their country. But Central
Americans and activists from the Southern Cone have largely
stayed home during the recent decade or more.
However,
now, I see a change. Democracy arrived in the region. That
absorbed energies and the focus was on the Inter American
system. But democratic governments failed dismally to
deliver on the social front. And the recent economic
collapses in several countries has pushed activists once
again to focus on the global arena. The tremendous success
of the World Social Forums after its inaugural gathering in
Porto Alegre Brazil in 2001 up to its recent gigantic
assembly in Mumbai, India, shows there is a renewed interest
among the grassroots in the international community.
Moreover the very good work done in the region under Special
Procedures by Theo Van Boven (on torture), Asma Jahangir (on
arbitrary executions), Hina Jilani (human rights defenders)
and the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (Guantanamo),
to name just a few, has regenerated that interest.
Then
there are CHR issues such as migrant workers, trafficking,
norms for transnational companies and discrimination on the
grounds of sexual orientation which find an echo in the
region. I believe that there will be an increase in input
relating to Latin American concerns and issues during the
60th CHR session.
However
to effectively lobby at the CHR, activists from GRULAC
countries really need an aggiornamento (a re-strategising).
In our region there is a perception that the United States
also rules the roost at the CHR and we tend to ignore the
rest of the world.
I
saw that reflected in a recent joint statement in defence of
Cuba signed among others by Nobel Peace friends Adolfo Perez
Esquivel and Rigoberto Menchu. We know the US with Bush is a
bull in its own backyard and so we must unite to defend Cuba
from aggression and the embargoes. But we cannot subscribe
to the longstanding Cuban foreign policy of siding with the
violator countries merely because of their support for Cuba.
As human rights defenders, we must never put our principles
in jeopardy and we might end up doing that unwittingly if we
look at the world only from a Latin American perspective.
It
is absolutely necessary to suggest to our Cuban friends a
coherent human rights policy both internally and externally.
Our solidarity with Cuba may be unconditional but our
adherence to human rights principles must be above
everything else. We need aggiornamento to build alliances,
particularly with human rights defenders from countries that
are "friends" of Cuba.
Moving
on to substantive issues, I believe there can be a very rich
input from the region in the matter of Social and Economic
Rights which could greatly enhance the work to be done. Many
countries have reaped the dire harvest of the application of
International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank (WB) structural
adjustment policies with their devastating consequences for
basic human rights.
However
the human rights issues underpinning those crises have yet
to be clarified. When Argentina last week paid over three
billion dollars to the the IMF in debt arrears, the Kirchner
Government brought social demands to the negotiating table
and that significantly strengthened his position. However
the Bretton Woods financial institutions totally ignore a
rights approach to debt payment and demand the unconditional
draining of much needed resources away from satisfying basic
needs to international finance resources. Unless that
vicious circle is broken, poverty will continue to spread
dramatically in Latin America and elsewhere.
There
is potential for further addressing those issues by the UN
human rights mechanisms.
The building blocks are in the right to development,
the right to food, housing and health and past studies on
the consequences of structural adjustment. However, we need
more input. I would like to see a broader study undertaken
of crises such as Venezuela (1991), Mexico and Argentina
(2001) because of their consequences for human rights in
those countries. An early warning system could also be
devised and specific recommendations made to international
financial institutions. Let us hope for a GRULAC initiative
in that direction in the 60th CHR.
In
the seventies, as a wave of US-sponsored military
dictatorships swarmed the region, human rights defenders
were able to seek recourse at the CHR. Now that US / IMF
sponsored social exclusion and poverty is sweeping the
region, the time has come once again for activists to
approach the CHR. In the Commission there is a broader arena
for debate and decision making than in the Inter American
system and we can build up that much-needed solidarity with
colleagues and friends from other regions.
Patricio
Rice is Senior Adviser, FEDEFAM & Permanent Assembly for
Human Rights (Argentina)
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PALAIS
Intrigue |
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Get Cracking
The
Commission got down to business on Friday 19 March
after the end of the high-level segment. Some
delegations, however, will probably need more time
to adjust to the charged atmosphere of Room XVII,
and will have to learn to stay on their toes. The US
delegate, for example, was cut off by the Chair bang
in the middle of a sentence as his allotted time ran
out. Just when he was warming to his theme. If the
delegation thought it would get some allowances from
the Western Group Chair, it was clearly mistaken.
Ambassador Smith's no-nonsense gavel strikes hard
and fast.
It's Hard Being a
Democracy
Speaking
of pet themes, the US is pushing what it considers a
brilliant idea - to invite the
"democracies" in the Commission to form a
Democracy Caucus. The privileged countries will then
attempt to "encourage membership for other
democracies", with the apparent aim of setting
off a chain reaction of sorts. If only the
delegation would realise how hard it will be to get
India, for example, to operate outside the complex -
and fascinating - machinations of the Asian Group.
Or, to "encourage" Chile and Costa Rica to
"discourage" Cuba from standing for
membership of the Commission. And how about South
Africa, which wouldn't hear a thing against Zimbabwe
last year? No action, remember?
A
State To Belong To
The
Israeli ambassador characteristically tore into the
Special Rapporteur for Palestine, John Dugard, after
Mr. Dugard's presentation of his report, even as the
Palestinian delegate waffled his way through a
thoroughly inadequate counter-response. With the
attention the Palestinian issue gets at the
Commission, one would think the Palestinians would
find a spokesperson who can hold his/her own against
Israel with reasoned, eloquent arguments, instead of
letting the rhetoric fly. Anyway, while Mr. Dugard
was not allowed to give a counter-reply to the
statements by the concerned countries (having
arrived in Geneva ahead of schedule, and having item
8 opened specially for his benefit), he made a
valiant attempt at tackling the accusations he was
sure would follow after his statement. "I am
not a UN official," he pointed out. "I am
an independent human rights expert… I owe
allegiance to only one State, the State of Human
Rights."
"I
have a bias, he added, "and that is towards
ensuring that both Israelis
and
Palestinians live in peace."
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EVENTS |
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International
Commission of Jurists (ICJ) parallel events
-
Monday March 22: The separation barrier/wall in light
of international law (with FIDH and Save the
Children) Room XXII, 1-3 pm
-
Thursday March 25: Fundamental Challenges regarding
Human Rights in Colombia (with the Colombian
Commission of Jurists. Franciscans International, the
Coordinacion Colombia-Europa-Estados Unidos, OIDHACO)
Room XXV, 1-3 pm
TRIAL
(TRack Impunity ALways www.trial-ch.org/en)
TRIAL
is an NGO created in Geneva in 2002, whose aim is to
fight against impunity of the perpetrators,
accomplices and instigators of genocide, war crimes,
crimes against humanity. TRIAL is organising a meeting
on Tuesday March 23 at Uni-Mail, 40 Bd. du Pont d'Arve,
Genève (Salle S160) at 18h.30.
Main
speaker: Prof. William Schabas, former Chairman of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone:
"Between Reconciliation and Justice: the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone".
(Prof. Schabas will speak in French). This is an open
meeting. |
Financing
the Human Right to Water
With
a growing world population and the already existing
lack of access to water and sanitation services to
everyone on the one side and ever shrinking public
budgets on the other, there is need for alternative
solutions in how to achieve the required investment. A
panel discussion of representative experts will meet
on:
Monday
22 March at the Palais des Nations, Room XXVII (Door
40)
1:00
- 3:00 pm
Introduction
and Moderation: Nils Rosemann,
Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena,
Attorney/Consultant
Panelists:
David
Boys, Public Service International (PSI), Utilities
and Pensions Officer Silvano Silvério da Costa,
ASSEMAE, President (Brazil)
Joseph
K. Ingram, World Bank, Special Representative to the
UN and the WTO
NN,
Veolia Water (formerly Vivendi Water, France)
(requested)
Henri
Smets, French Water Academy
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Amit
Agarwal
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Stephen
Kostas
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Tracy
Reynolds
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Baptiste
Anguis
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Charles
Lor
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Anna
Schenk
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Loredana
Brezan
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Antoine
Martel
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Ipshita
Sengupta
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Marna
Carroll
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Rineeta
Naik
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Patrick
Sheldon
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Sophie
Dupont
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Ravi
Nair
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Vishwanath
Pratap Sing
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Tessa
Khan
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Trupati
Patel
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Gareth
Sweeney
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Steve
Kosakoff
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Don
Rassler
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Jane
Wysocki
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Adrien-Claude
Zoller
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Webpage
Design: Shyam Sundar K. |
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