Aceh: Cessation of hostilities or of human rights?

The agreement between Jakarta and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) is fundamentally and structurally flawed, and the past few months have actually seen a narrowing of democratic space, say SAMSUL BAHRI and LESLEY MCCULLOCH

EXTRAJUDICIAL executions, disappearances, attacks by unknown persons on peace monitoring teams and their infrastructure, targeted harassment of human rights defenders. This is life in Aceh today, just as it has been for the past almost 30 years.  But today in Aceh, there is an internationally brokered Cessation Of Hostilities Agreement (COHA). One could therefore be forgiven for expecting the human rights situation in Aceh to have improved, but this has not been the case.            

The COHA between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Republic of Indonesia was signed on 9 December 2002. The main points of the document are a gradual process of demilitarization, an all-inclusive dialogue, and elections in 2004.  In addition, the agreement provides for a joint security committee (JSC) to monitor implementation and investigate violations.  But there are some fundamental and structural flaws within the agreement. The fine detail of some of these points could not be agreed upon in the negotiation phase, and so was neglected. The result? The COHA is having an identity crisis. Its personality as recognized by the Indonesian government is quite  different to that recognized by GAM. The three points over which the identity of the COHA is in crisis are the following:            

Demilitarization - GAM has offered a phased storage of  its weapons, the government has offered to shuffle troops from one village to another while at the same time sneaking more military personnel in by sea.            

All inclusive dialogue - this remains elusive. Moreover, the process through which this dialogue will be achieved has yet to be agreed. And the identity of the dialogue itself remains a mystery.            

Elections in 2004 - the Jakarta-based government interprets this to mean the regular general elections due in that year. But to GAM (and to most Acehnese), it means local elections to allow the people a democratic voice about a local issue.            

GAM was motivated to sign this less than perfect agreement in the hope it would open democratic space for the civil society movement in Aceh to pursue a peaceful and political solution to the decades old conflict.  Article 2(f) of the COHA makes provision for civil society to express their democratic rights or opinions without hindrance. But the common ground between what is written in the COHA and practical outcome is noticeable only by its absence. Since December 2003 there has in fact been a narrowing of the democratic political space in Aceh. Those who have dared to protest at the continuing violence, lack of justice, and to demand a platform for their voice to be heard have themselves become targets.            

At a demonstration in January 2003 four villagers were shot by the elite mobile police brigade when they attended a peaceful rally to request the government's full implementation of the  civilians’ role in the COHA.             

In addition, police have arrested a prominent member of the civilian movement Muhammad Nazar, chairman of the Aceh Referendum Information Center (SIRA). He spoke critically about the agreement at the January meeting. Now accused of spreading sedition against the government, the local chief of police has said he would like to see Nazar spend  five years in prison.            

The authorities have a growing list of those who they accuse of spreading hatred against the state, including Kautsar (former chairman of the Acehnese Democratic Resistance Front - FPDRA).  Kautsar and many others have gone into hiding to avoid the same fate as Nazar. The voices of these people and of those whom they represent are being effectively silenced by the local police and military, under orders from the government in Jakarta.            

On 30 November 2002, just days before the signing of the COHA,  Musliadi (coordinator of Kegempar) was abducted by six unidentified persons. The armed men were carrying standard issue weapons of the Indonesian Police. The authorities denied all knowledge of the whereabouts of Musliadi. On 3 December 2003, his body was discovered in a swamp just outside the provincial capital of Banda Aceh. There was evidence he had been tortured before being summarily executed. There has been no effort by the authorities to investigate what happened to Musliadi. No-one will be held accountable for his murder, nor for the thousands of civilians who have suffered a similar fate.              

On 26 March 2003, two more human rights defenders, Zulfikar and Muchlis, were abducted by the special intelligence unit of the Indonesian Military known as Satuan Gabungan Intelligence (SGI). Despite the fact that there were several eyewitnesses to this abduction, the Indonesian Police and other sectors of the security forces have refused to provide information and even denied knowledge of the incident. Both Muchlis and Zulfikar are members of the humanitarian NGO in Aceh. At the time of this writing, there is still no confirmed news of their whereabouts, and  grave concerns remain for their safety.            

According to the records of The Commission for Involuntary Disappearances and Victims of Violence in Aceh (Kontras Aceh), in the past year 30 human rights defenders have been attacked by the security forces (109 since 1999).  The summary killings and executions, arbitrary arrests/detentions, torture and intimidation are all typical tactics of terror employed by the Indonesian security forces.  Since the signing of the agreement  in Aceh, the right to freedom of expression and association has been continually denied. The JSC is an international monitoring team but is unable to intervene in such violations.            

The mandate of the JSC is only to investigate reported violations of the COHA, there are even reports that it has at times shown a reluctance to do this. Many Acehnese are asking what does it mean when there is no safe environment within which implementation of the COHA can take place; when even the international monitoring team cannot function effectively and is recalled to the relative safety of Banda Aceh as happened early April?            

Why does it appear that the international community has such a short memory? Surely it has as its point of reference the actions of the security forces in East Timor? With the COHA facing such a crisis, there is now more than ever, the need for the fine detail of the identity of the agreement to be determined. This process may be slow.            

In the meantime, the Indonesian government should show its real commitment to the pursuit of a peaceful solution to this conflict by releasing Nazar, Muchlis, Zulfikar and others whose voices they have sought to silence. And it should scrap the list of those wanted for speaking critically about this less than perfect COHA. Their voices must be among those who seek a real and sustainable peace in Aceh.