| Volume 6, Issue
5 |
14-20 April 2003 |
National Institutions
Philippines
HRC: Yet to get off the mark
THE
Philippine Commission on Human Rights is supported by
executive orders and constitutional provisions. The
Commission's budget is allocated by Congress and the
Commission receives funding on an annual basis. Regional
Commission offices are established throughout the
provinces and neighborhood offices are being established
at the grass roots level. Avenues of communication are
open between these outlying offices and the national
center.
The
Paris Principles require a national human rights
institution to be vested with the power to both protect
and promote human rights. The Paris Principles further
indicate that national human rights institutions should
have as broad of a mandate as possible. This mandate
must be clearly set forth in a constitution, or other
legislative text, which specifies the institution's
competence
The
Commission's mandate is clearly expressed in the 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article
XIII, Section 17. In addition, further clarification and
organisation is provided in Executive Order 163 and
Commission Resolution No. A96-005. While the Commission
is vested with the power to both protect and promote
human rights, its mandate is restricted to civil and
political rights.
Clearly,
the list of powers granted by the Constitution to the
Commission includes both the protection and promotion of
human rights. The Commission's ability to protect human
rights is found in the fact that Commission can
investigate human rights violations on either its own
initiative or on the complaint of any party.
In
addition, the Commission must provide for legal services
to the under-privileged. Also, the Commission has
visitorial powers over jails, prisons, and detention
centers. The promotion of human rights is found in
Commission's mandate regarding human rights education.
The Commission must promote human rights through
recommendations to Congress regarding pertinent
legislation and through monitoring the Philippine
government's compliance with international treaty
obligations.
From
a procedural standpoint, the Constitution grants the
Commission the ability to establish necessary
operational guidelines and appoint officers/employees as
needed. The Commission may also grant immunity from
prosecution to those people who possess testimony or
evidence needed to further an investigation.
On
its face, the Commission's mandate is robust. The fact
that the mandate is clearly set forth in the
Constitution and backed by other supporting acts is an
asset. The very existence of instruments which set out
the organisation and mandate of Commission serves as
national recognition of the Commission's role in the
protection and promotion of human rights. However, only
civil or political rights fall under the Commission's
mandate. The Constitution makes no mention of economic,
social, or cultural rights.
This
restriction is in violation of the Paris Principles
requirement that the Commission's mandate be as broad as
possible. The last enumerated power, the ability to
perform "such other duties and functions as may be
provided by law," could be perceived as a back door
through which the legislature could insert the
protection and promotion of economic, social, and
cultural rights. However, there is no indication that
economic, social, or cultural rights will be added to
the Commission's mandate.
The
restriction of the Commission's mandate to political and
civil rights was a deliberate choice made by the
drafters of the Constitution. The Commission was
instituted in 1987 and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights entered into force
for the Philippines in1976. It seems unlikely that
economic, social, and cultural rights were simply
overlooked when the Commission's mandate was being
drafted.
The
Paris Principles require that national human rights
institutions have an infrastructure which supports the
smooth conduct of its activities. The Philippine
Constitution sets out the Commission's basic
organisational infrastructure. The Commission is
hierarchical in nature, with the chairperson and
Commissioners at the head of the organisation. Special
projects and organisations within the Commission include
the Child Rights Center, Barangay Human Rights Action
Offices, and Regional Offices.
Philippine
civil society is very supportive of the Child Rights
Center. The Child Rights Center is recognised as a high
functioning and effective organisation. While the
Barangay Human Rights Action Offices are conceptually
sound, civil society finds them to be poorly executed,
trained, and supported. Regional Offices are recognised
as an important entity in human rights protection, but
they are perceived to be overworked, understaffed, and
under-funded.
The
Commission should examine the Child Rights Center and
consider allocating more staff, funds, and other
resources to support them in what is obviously
well-respected and effective work. The Barangay Human
Rights Action Offices program requires re-evaluation
with an eye toward training of officers and support from
Philippine civil society. Regional Offices are operating
with much zeal and dedication for the protection and
promotion of human rights. The Commission should
communicate with Regional Offices to tailor their
operations toward fulfilling the mandate handed down in
the Philippine Constitution.
The
Paris Principles require that a national human rights
institution have funding sufficient to ensure the smooth
conduct of its activities. In addition, the institution
should have its own staff and premises. The purpose of
this funding is to ensure that the institution is
independent from government and is not subject to
financial control which could affect its independence.
Section 17(4), Article XIII of the Philippine
Constitution requires that the Commission's approved
annual appropriations be automatically and regularly
released. This provision is repeated in E.O. 163,
Section 5.
There
are no review mechanisms in place to evaluate the
Commission's performance. In place of these mechanisms,
Congress seems to have turned to expenditure controls.
The General Appropriations Act imposes restrictions on
the Commission's decision making authority regarding
specific monetary allocations within its budget. In
addition, these expenditure controls are in violation of
the Philippine Constitution, Article XIII, Section 7(4).
This section explicitly states that the Commission's
approved annual appropriations must be
"automatically and regularly released."
The
Paris Principles indicate that a national human rights
institution should submit to the government proposals
and recommendations regarding legislative and
administrative provisions relating to the protection and
promotion of human rights. In addition, the institution
should ensure that national legislation, regulations,
and practices are in harmony with international human
rights instruments to which the State is a party. The
Philippine Constitution requires the Commission to
recommend to Congress effective measures to promote
human rights. The Commission is also required to monitor
the Philippine government's compliance with
international treaty obligations regarding human rights.
While
the Commission has specific offices which participate in
the national policy process, there is little outside
awareness of the Commission's work in this area.
Documents which are released have a limited circulation
and impact. The Commission should seek to increase
awareness among civil society of its current
participation in the national policy process. After
feedback has been gathered regarding current operations,
the Commission should gradually increase participation
to include reviewing Congressional bills on its own
initiative.
The
Paris Principles indicate a national human rights
institution should investigate and report upon potential
human rights violations at the request of government or
an interested party. Also, the institution may
investigate a potential violation on its own initiative,
with no need for a referral. The Philippine Constitution
and E.O. 163 mandate that the Commission investigate
potential human rights violations on its own initiative
or by referral from another interested party. The
Commission has not been granted the authority to
prosecute those cases which it investigates by either
the Philippine Constitution or E.O. 163. Currently,
prosecutorial powers are granted by the Department of
Justice to lawyers within the Commission on an
individual basis.
At
this time, the Commission should focus on increasing the
efficiency of current procedures. Expanding the current
mandate to include prosecutorial powers would not be
prudent. The Commission must resolve internal and
external issues before seeking to take on more duties.
The
Paris Principles indicate that a national human rights
institution shall assist in the formulation of human
rights education programs. In addition, the institution
shall take steps to increase public awareness of all
forms of discrimination. The Philippine Constitution and
E.O. 163 echo the Paris Principles. While discrimination
is not explicitly mentioned by either the Philippine
Constitution or E.O. 163, it seems clear that such
activities fall within the auspices of human rights
education. A variety of Executive Orders support the
Commission's activities in the area of human rights
education.
While
the Commission has implemented many human rights
education programs, there are currently no evaluation
procedures that gauge the impact of human rights
education programs upon participants.
The
Commission should begin testing the retention of
concepts covered by participants during human rights
education programs. NGOs, such as Amnesty International,
have such evaluation programs in place. The Commission
should turn to NGOs for assistance in this area.
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Need to get clued in...
THE
Paris Principles indicate that the individuals who
compose a national human rights institution may be
appointed by election or otherwise. The procedures
by which members of the national human rights
institution are chosen must ensure the pluralist
representation of civil society involved in the
promotion and protection of human rights. Specific
groups that should be represented include
non-governmental organisations involved in the
promotion and protection of human rights, trade
unions, concerned social and professional
organisations (such as associations of lawyers,
doctors, journalists, or scientists),
representatives of trends in philosophical or
religious thought, qualified experts and
universities, and government departments.
In
July 2002, Purificacion Valera-Quisumbing was
appointed chairperson of Commission. She has some
experience in human rights. However, she is the
exception. Many Commissioners are lacking in a
basic human rights background. In addition, the
appointment process is a power of the President.
NGOs perceive such appointments as political
rewards which lead to dependence upon the
executive. The appointment process should be
re-evaluated to alleviate this fear. Congressional
input, clear selection criteria, and compliance
with existing appointment requirements will help
Commission gain more independence in this area.
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