‘We are free, now we will build strong institutions’

Interview with JOSE RAMOS HORTA

A former radio and television journalist, JOSE RAMOS HORTA was appointed Minister for External Affairs in the first Transitional Government of East Timor. In November 1975, he was selected to leave East Timor and attempt to persuade the UN Security Council to intervene in the conflict between Indonesia and East Timor. After the invasion of Indonesian troops in the same year, he began a life in exile, basing himself largely in Australia and the United States. He was the permanent representative of FRETILIN at the UN from 1976 until 1989 and was a tireless advocate for a free and independent East Timor to governments, the media and at international fora. His work on behalf of the people of East Timor resulted in the joint award of the 1996 Nobel Peace prize with Bishop Belo. Since 2000 Jose Ramos-Horta has served as East Timor's Foreign Minister.

In an interview to Human Rights Features, Mr Ramos-Horta spoke about the prospects for his country, and his thoughts on international peace and justice processes, including justice for East Timor...

Human Rights Features (HRF): In the wake of recent violent riots in East Timor, where does the government of East Timor go to balance citizen's expectations with limited resources?

H.E. Mr. Jose Ramos Horta (JRH): First, let me start by saying that overall, the situation in East Timor is very peaceful and quite stable. I have been to at least 100 countries, quite a few of the conflict situations -- ongoing conflict situations or post-conflict situations -- and sometimes I'm amazed that we have these very low levels of criminal activity when you talk about common crimes. Particularly when you bear in mind employment and poverty rate - a recipe for violence - or when you bear in mind 25 years of oppression, of violence. So in view of that I'm amazed, I've been to Kosovo, Bosnia, Colombia, most of Southern Africa, Cambodia, parts of Indonesia, and I'm very happy to say that relatively speaking, East Timor is very unique in this regard.

To give you an example, of the 250,000 refugees that returned after violence of 1999, there were no more than half a dozen reported cases of violence against returning elements that were suspected of being involved in the violence of 1999.

The events of 4 December 2002, the riots that took place were a shock to every one, because we had been at peace for three years there had been two elections that had been very peaceful, not one single incident had been reported during those two elections, with incredible popular participation during those elections, political parties participation. So it came as a rude shock.

Since then, there has been no more violent demonstrations, that was actually the only one in three years that resulted in burning and looting.

The weakest part of the UN administration in East Timor that the UN cannot be too proud of, but at the same time without having to be blamed because I don't think they could do better anyway is the judiciary, the justice sector. That is the weakest. We have very few trained judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and you cannot train lawyers, judges in three years or in five. We have a culture of a very corrupt, inefficient judiciary of the previous 25 years. So it is extremely difficult for anyone governing East Timor [to say] that, yes, we are going to deliver a very effective, credible judiciary. We will, but it will take a few years. Right now our jails are full with untried cases. Many of the prisoners are there for petty crimes, and they are already there for much longer than any reasonable sentence that they would receive. Sometimes I tell my colleagues in the government, 'if I were a prisoner, I would sue the government for keeping me in jail for so long.' There are some actions taken now jointly by the Timorese government and the UN in trying to rectify this by bringing more foreign judges, and to set up a special committee that would review the files and simply release those who should be released. It doesn't take much effort, you read the police report -- why they are in jail and when they were in jail -- and simply make the decision. So that will redress a bit of the problems.

HRF: In September 2002, East Timor ratified the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court confirming the country's commitment to a global order based on the rule of law rather than...

JRH: I know what's coming...

[laughter]

HRF: In August 2002, East Timor signed an agreement that only a very few number of states have done. One of these Article 98 procedures whereby it exempts any US employees or nationals from ever being sent to the court in cooperation with East Timor. Can you explain how difficult that decision was and why East Timor did it?

JRH: Two reasons that compelled me to argue and defend our decision to sign - one it was a political and a strategic decision looking into the broader picture of US cooperation with the UN in general. Second, our own particular relationship with the US, or viewing the US role in the region from our own narrow interest.

Argument number one is this: I detected that the issue of the ICC, the objection to the ICC, had bipartisan sentiment in Washington. It was not only Republicans but it was Democrats. It was not something you could say, 'just wait a few years and the Democrats come and this will be the result.' I tell you no. I have friends from all sides in Washington. Then you ask the question: Do we want to contribute towards the US simply boycotting peacekeeping missions in the future, when you know that, not in the interest of East Timor we do it because of our dependence on the US in East Timor. We do not have one single US soldier in East Timor, the development assistance that the US provides to us is not terribly significant.

No, it's more my thinking that: a) if there is no response to US genuine concerns about being singled out anytime in the future, by a prosecutor or by a judge somewhere and they would simply pull out, as they threatened to pull out from Bosnia. And when you look at the whole history of peacekeeping, I might be wrong but off the top of my head, I can think of no peacekeeping that was viable without US involvement politically or logistic-wise or operation-wise.

The second reason is that you look at US intervention in Bosnia, and more, later in Kosovo. The US was reluctant to intervene in Bosnia and Kosovo. They were forced to do it by the sheer power of public opinion, but by intervening unilaterally or under the guise of NATO in Kosovo, one of these days up comes a judge in Serbia, or in Belgium, or in Spain, who would try to indict Bill Clinton or Madeleine Albright or Richard Holbrooke or anyone in NATO. So you want to kind of say they are paranoid, while the reality is that the US is targeted and sometimes victimized for the sins they commit during the cold war era, there were many other villains during the Cold War era such as the Russians, the French, the Cubans, and a few others and yet no one has thought of ... a judge in Belgium or a judge in Spain has not thought of indicting a Russian politician. Look at what the Belgians have done in Congo, or France. How many governments has France overthrown in Africa? The only thing you can say about the French is that they are a bit more efficient than the Americans, because when they try to overthrow a president they bring along in the plane with the paratroopers the new president. So they don't wait a few months of consultations and a people’s assembly, they bring a ready-made president in the plane, as it happened with the Central African Empire about 15 years ago. The Russians were equally efficient, when they went into Afghanistan in the late 1970's they brought along the new president. They picked him up in Prague. He was the Afghan ambassador in Prague, and they made him the new president. So these are only minor nuances, but they all were involved in overthrowing governments. The French are notorious for saving Mobutu. How many times did they not intervene in Zaire to save Mobutu? And yet no one thinks of ... so anyway.

I think locally about my country's interest, but I also try to think globally about how my actions as an individual can contribute to strengthen[ing] or weaken[ing] the whole ICC process. I told the American side that I will sign it not because you have persuaded me with your arguments but because of my own thinking. There are obviously enough guarantees in the Rome Statute that would prevent someone from politically motivated persecution of an American official, but the fact is that the US feels strongly about it, so what do you do? I was hoping that the UN, the Europeans would find a compromise with the Americans so that the US could agree. Another final argument is that, well, in the agreement that we have signed with the US, we can terminate the agreement with one year notification. So we can do it if and when we think we have done enough and exhausted our attempts to persuade the US to join the ICC. I think in the long run the US has to join it. It is the number one power in the world, it has a tradition of integrity in its judiciary, and it makes no sense that the US supports ad hoc tribunals like on former Yugoslavia and Rwanda but does not support the ICC. So we will try in a very modest way to persuade our friends in Washington that sooner or later they should accept it

..So you should as a headline put this: "The French are a bit more efficient than Americans"...

[laughter]

HRF: Don't worry, we'll have a box. Let me ask you this question, post-Kosovo there was an international independent commission co-chaired by Richard Goldsmith to review the events and one of the conclusions that the commission reaches is that states that are engaged in humanitarian intervention should abide by an even higher standard of international humanitarian law because if purpose is humanitarian than there should in fact be greater obligations of protecting civilians. One problem with that is what I think you have articulated is that if you increase the cost on certain states above and beyond what the norm is, just regular standards of international humanitarian law, then it will be much less likely that they will ever get involved. From both your opening statement to the Commission and your recent New York Times piece it seems you see a brighter future for humanitarian intervention...

JRH: Let me tell you the following: People have argued in the Iraqi case that the Security Council is the only source of international legitimacy for armed intervention. That may be so, but as a non-lawyer, as someone who has had direct experience of my country, my family being the victim of armed occupation, and being someone who is not terribly intelligent, I ask these very naïve questions: If you say the Security Council is the only source of legitimacy for armed intervention, I would ask: does it suggest that any other unilateral intervention is illegitimate, unethical even when that intervention leads to a stop in genocide?

First example, Cambodia under Khmer Rouge. As far as I remember, there was only one individual in the world, a prominent US Senator who then called for armed intervention, and that was Senator George McGovern. The Security Council did not even discuss the Khmer Rouge genocide. If anyone, in any case had any inclination to bring this matter to the Security Council it would have been vetoed by China. So, there was no way of the Security Council of intervening, assuming there was a general political will to intervene - none. Vietnam finally intervened unilaterally in 1979 putting an end to the Khmer Rouge rule. I tell you, when you visit the genocide museum at Phnom Penh, you cannot help but be angry that the world, humanity, did nothing to save the 3 million that perished before Vietnam's intervention. And I talk with many Cambodian survivors of the Khmer Rouge, and they remember with gratitude Vietnam's intervention. And yet when Vietnam intervened it was punished by certain powers that be for having intervened in [Cambodia], at the time for geopolitical reasons, Cold War reasons. Was it so immoral and unethical?

The Tanzania intervention, also in 1979 in Uganda, put an end to the Idi Amin grotesque rule. The Organization of African Unity and the Security Council didn't do anything. For reasons of state sovereignty and noninterference. Was it so immoral, so wrong, so illegitimate, the Tanzanian intervention? And that intervention was ordered by one of the greatest African statesmen, Julius Nyerere.

You can argue still further. Was it so right, so moral, that the world did nothing on Rwanda? There was a genocide, the Security Council did not act so it was right that you do not act because no one can act outside a Security Council mandate? So my question is - and I am like provoking at a debate - Is the Security Council necessarily the only valid source of legitimacy? But of course, I'm unprepared to say that if it's not the only, then what else. Well, I'm not answering that because I know that once you allow a precedent of unilateral interventions then...look at Kosovo. I supported NATO intervention in Kosovo. For me, as a human being, at the time my country was not free, I wrote an opinion piece in the International Herald Tribune calling Tony Blair a hypocrite because he and the US were not doing anything on East Timor at that point and yet Tony Blair was the leading advocate of intervention for Kosovo. But I praise Tony Blair, and I said, 'at least if they are not doing anything on East Timor, you know, a wrong does not justify another wrong, save the Kosovars.' And it would be the first time in NATO's 50 year history that they intervened to save an ethnic minority. So was the only thing you can say is that Bill Clinton was smarter than George Bush. He didn't go through the Security Council because he knew the Russians would veto. The Americans were persuaded to go back to the Security Council on Iraq and the French undermined the entire exercise of pressure on Iraq, the convincing and persuasive pressure, by saying we will veto no matter. So when a country, a mid-size power like France, which for reasons I don't know have a veto power, says its almost an encouragement to unilateral intervention.

HRF: Most, if not all, independent observers believe the trials military officers in Indonesia for gross human rights violations committed in East Timor have been a travesty. Some in the human rights community are concerned that the government of East Timor has had a muted response to the trial's failings. Can you clarify your government's assessment of the trials?

JRH: Obviously the ad hoc tribunal process has been a disappointment to many in the international community, and also to our own people. We are not hiding our dissatisfaction with the ad hoc tribunals, but we await the conclusion of the process before we make a final judgment. The trials are still ongoing and we will make a final judgment when they conclude. But I don't think we should see only the downside of it. Let's remember that these trials for gross human rights violations in Indonesia are the very first experiment in the whole of Asia. In the post-Marcos Philippines, or in the post-military rule in Thailand, or even in South Korea, there has not been an equivalent ad hoc tribunal to try military officers for crimes.

The Koreans put two ex-presidents on trial, one was sentenced to death another one to more than twenty years in prison and they were commuted, but there was not a systematic trial as such of everyone involved. So the Indonesian experiment is very unique, new in Asia. I, frankly, that's my personal opinion, am totally sympathetic with Indonesian difficulties in delivering justice. Why? The new govt that came after the dictatorship has to contend with so many forces, interests that want to roll back reform and the democracy movement. They have to contend with so many challenges within and without. The government and everyone is conscious that the military remains all too powerful in Indonesia. And we the people decide, conscious of that, we try to be sympathetic and not to make life even more difficult for the new president.

Let me give you another, look at the South Africa experience. Apartheid by definition was a crime against humanity. Ipso facto, everyone that served in the South Africa regime should be put on trial on an international tribunal. That did not happen in South Africa. So why shouldn't East Timor, and why the South Africans did not go for widespread trials following the international standards of justice? Well, because they were conscious that there was need for reconciliation, that there was a civil war, and to put the past behind. Very pragmatic considerations. And the crimes in South Africa went on for generations, were as serious or more than many situations I know, at least comparable with what happened in East Timor on the scale of violence. And for these reasons we are sympathetic to the Indonesian side.

The case of East Timor is different from South Africa, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, in the sense that all of these mentioned situations are internal in the sense that all the actors, good or bad, are in the country, they didn't leave, they are there, there is no international actor dimension to it. In our case, it is Indonesia. So, whenever we consider trials at an international tribunal we have to consider the Indonesian ramifications with the new Indonesia, because it is an Indonesia that in time is changing and making tremendous efforts towards building a democracy.

So we are stuck in a sense. We cannot try the Indonesians, so we set up a Serious Crimes Panel in East Timor and mostly we have been trying our own people, the small fish. The big fish are in Indonesia. The Serious Crimes Unit in East Timor has issued indictments for senior Indonesia military officers. We respect the integrity and independence of our own court. We have to wait and see the conclusion of the ad hoc tribunal in Jakarta. If the ad hoc tribunal in Jakarta in the next three weeks confounds the sceptics and deliver final justice that is minimally acceptable then it could also end the process of Serious Crimes Panel in East Timor. Otherwise, we have to look at alternatives. One thing I can say right now, I am not personally in favour of an international tribunal for East Timor, even in the face of the general scepticism about the Indonesian ad hoc tribunal.

HRF: Taking it more broadly because of what you said, what do you think about those who worry that having an International Criminal Court doesn't allow for this type of flexibility in other situations? It's interesting that this is both your perspective and the South Africa perspective even in the proceedings before the ICC was finally drafted, the idea that you have to give states greater flexibility to go for other mechanisms like amnesty or localized "imperfect" judicial methods because it's the only way you can get reconciliation of a certain sort or a less bloody more peaceful transition. So what do you think of the argument that the ICC by imposing itself on top of [insert hand gesture] what governments would otherwise would ideally want to do in certain situations denies that flexibility?

JRH: Well, I first look at the importance of the ICC, by saying only that if the ICC had become a reality soon or immediately after WWII, I would say that many of the serious crimes, genocide, serious crimes would not have happened. Because the perpetrators, the potential perpetrators, would have known that there was an international court watching over them. So I think the ICC remains extremely important, and justice after all should be more of a deterrence than a punishment, if leaders know there is an ICC waiting in the Hague, that there is a prosecutor watching, that countries are watching, then they will be far more careful in what they do.

So I do not believe that the ICC compromises, or makes it difficult, for national arrangements. The Rome Statute, in the first instance, gives the opportunity to the national courts to address the crimes that are described in the statute. So, if we have a strong independent judiciary that can try serious crimes, crimes against humanity, then obviously there is no need to go to ICC. Ideally, every country in the world has such a strong judiciary, strong safeguards... that ... but at the same time a lot of these South African truth and reconciliation [processes]... and an idea that I have been exploring in East Timor, this idea is gaining ground, [that these] are essentially mechanisms that we engineer in order to meet political or strategic considerations. Part justice but also part politics. A prime example is the South African case, they went for truth and reconciliation because they wanted to put the past behind, telling the truth and nothing but the truth, but at the same time, the truth also acts as the final punishment.

In the case of East Timor, we have a vital interest to preserve in terms of Indonesia. If we say we have an excellent state to state relation, we have established a diplomatic relation; we want to move forward, we also have to show courage and understanding in not pushing for an international tribunal. So it's largely political in our particular case. I have always said, sometimes philosophically, the greatest act of justice is our freedom. If the other side does not have the courage to face the truth then it is their problem. For us we thank God and the international community that we are free. Seeing the perpetrators of violence physically punished is secondary to me. Most importantly is that we are free, we are sovereign and that we will build institutions in the country, such as a strong and independent judiciary, a free and democratic media, that prevent this kind of crimes from ever again occurring in the country.

HRF: One issue that is being raised is the question of the status of ethnically non-East Timorese under the Constitution, and I'm aware there was at a certain point a citizenship bill that was going to clarify that status. What is the current status of the citizenship bill itself and does it effectively address the concern that non-citizens get certain constitutional protections?

JRH: I'm embarrassed to say that I cannot answer that question. It pales under international law. It has been, I think, adopted by the Parliament that stipulate who is East Timorese who is not, and if you do not fall into the category then come the issue of residence and obtaining nationality by marriage and so on. But besides all of that, frankly, I don't know what is the debate so far, because, as you know, we are still starting everything from zero and a lot of the laws are being drafted or being debated and       I personally, based on our own countries experience, our struggle for independence, when so many people helped us of different nationalities, and we came across so many individuals, minorities in so many countries, we are very familiar with .... So I hope that our laws do not discriminate and provide us a matter of morality. But also as a practical consideration provide enough legal Constitutional guarantees to individuals that do not qualify as East Timor citizens. But all of these are very much still fluid so I am really not so familiar.

HRF: I think the concern was about individuals who are maybe Indonesians, and either that they were returning from Indonesia, that they themselves were expelled during the pre-1999 and I think that is the concern.

JRH: Well, that is a whole different issue. For instance, would anyone realistically think that of the 200,000 Indonesians who are there, who can easily obtain false documents -- in Indonesia you can obtain any document you want, and how expeditious you want depends on how much you pay -- yeah, even you can get, you can pay for a PhD, you don't have to go to Harvard to get a PhD you can just pay for it. You can imagine how many thousands would produce documents that they were bona fide, legitimate residents of East Timor and not part of the illegal settlement that came with Indonesian occupation. If we were to have a carte blanche for any one who resided in East Timor after the illegal occupy ... can return, we might satisfy the of certain international NGOs, but at the same time we would be posing not only a serious political problems, by posing a backlash, but also it would be detrimental to the rights of indigenous peoples. So it's not a black and white issue. The government has to be very protective first of the East Timorese people, then those who legitimately acquire citizenship in East Timor or residence -- without simply opening the doors and say "anyone who was here can come." Well it's not going to happen like that realistically.

HRF: You have looked at the draft resolution on Timor-Leste?

JRH: The Chairman's statement? Some feedback is coming from different countries so... I haven't seen what is supposed to be distributed today or tomorrow. The original draft, I don't know who drafted it, was quite strong, but there has been some input from different countries, I know. We want... looking at the Chairman's statement, we want it to be as constructive as possible without ignoring the efforts Indonesia has made, but at the same time without glossing over some of the remaining issues. One is the ongoing ad hoc tribunal process, but that again as much as we might say we are not satisfied with the process so far, we have to await the final verdict of the ad hoc tribunal.