SRI LANKA

It Sounds Like Serendipity

But if peace finally comes to Sri Lanka, it will be more than just accidental good fortune...

EVEN as Nepal takes its first tentative steps towards resolving its problems - without a roadmap - a tiny teardrop-shaped island, at the edge of the subcontinent, is already dreaming of peace.

But first, it had to wake up. For 19 long years, Sri Lanka was embroiled in a conflict sparked by ancient prejudices, injustices - perceived as well as real - and the keenly felt effects of Sinhalese majoritarian policies based on cultural nationalism. More than 60,000 lives have been lost since the conflict between Tamil rebels and Sri Lankan military forces began in 1983. Countless were injured or maimed for life. An estimated two million landmines are strewn across the island. Between 800,000 and a million people have been displaced within Sri Lanka, and more than 65,000 people live in refugee camps in southern India.

In February 2002, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Government of Sri Lanka signed a cease-fire agreement. Many analysts believe that financial constraints and increased pressure on armed opposition groups worldwide following the 11 September 2001 terror attack on New York led the Tigers to consider diluting their demand for a separate state and contemplate an end to hostilities. Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe also suggested that overseas money-transfer networks aiding the LTTE were gradually being dismantled since September 2001, prompting LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran to agree to peace talks. The cash-strapped group was resorting to extortion and in the process making itself unpopular, the prime minister added. 

Yet another factor might have been a simple reality check. The hound-them-until-they-die approach was obviously not working, for either side. "It became clear the LTTE could not throw the Sri Lankan armed forces out of the North and East," said Wickremasinghe. "Neither could the armed forces crush the LTTE. It was a stalemate. We would have been fighting for 20 years more."  Moreover, the Sri Lankan army was getting increasingly war weary and plagued by large-scale desertions. The Sri Lankan economy, once the strongest in the region, had taken a hard knock.

For the Sri Lankan government and for the LTTE chief - a tactical genius - it was time to work out a strategy. Given the circumstances, the only workable plan seemed peace.

In the final analysis, it was the desire to give peace a genuine chance. On 10 April 2002, the LTTE chief appeared at a news conference, his first in 12 years, to declare that he was "seriously and sincerely committed" to holding talks with the government. The peace talks finally began in October 2002, with the LTTE agreeing to drop its demand for a separate State and settling for regional autonomy - a major concession. Since then, the talks have progressed, despite various hurdles and scepticism from many quarters. (see box below: Heart Stoppers...)

To be sure, the scars will remain. And there are still pitfalls to be overcome before lasting peace settles on the island. Several thorny issues have been laid on the table and more are expected to arise.

THE 'BABY BRIGADES'  

Poverty, the absence of schooling, and forcible recruitment are said to be the key reasons for children in Sri Lanka's north and east joining the LTTE and taking up arms. Save the Children Norway, a child rights group, estimates that the LTTE could have anywhere between 2,000 to 4,000 child combatants.  Moreover, the United Nations International Children's Education Fund (UNICEF) estimated that about three-quarters of the 400,000 school-age population in the conflict-affected regions lived as refugees. The drop-out rate in these regions was three times the average in other parts of the country. In 1998, the LTTE reneged on a promise to the UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Children Olara Otunnu that children under 18 would not be used as combatants.

The fifth round of peace talks held in Berlin on 8-9 February 2003 saw critical progress on the issue of child soldiers and their rehabilitation. The agreement stipulated that the recruited teenagers lay down their arms and be trained for civilian jobs. In the same month, UNICEF charged the LTTE with continuing child recruitment despite its stated promise. The LTTE had returned about 350 juvenile soldiers to their parents since November 2001, but UNICEF claimed it had a list of 730 other conscripted children who were still missing. Later, however, UNICEF officials met LTTE representatives to discuss plans for demobilisation of child soldiers. Under the plan, demobilised children would be first sent to a transit camp run by UNICEF, non-governmental organisations and LTTE representatives.

WOMEN  

Women's groups in Sri Lanka estimate that nearly 300,000 women were widowed in the course of the 19-year conflict and were compelled to adopt the role of breadwinners for their families. In addition to other problems, women also face gender-based discrimination and are exposed to gender-specific violence and exploitation. In 1993, the Representative of the Secretary-General reported that some women had been raped prior to being displaced. Human rights organisations have also reported allegations of rape by police, army and navy personnel of women suspected of being members of the LTTE and of women relatives of LTTE members. However, not a single member of the security forces has ever been found guilty of rape in custody despite the gravity of the crime - a fact that will have to be addressed as part of peacebuilding measures. In 2001, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women in its Concluding Comments on Sri Lanka noted with alarm "the high and severe incidences of rape and other forms of violence targeted against Tamil women by the police and security forces in the conflict areas."

On 7 March 2003, a high-level panel of women named by Sri Lanka's peace negotiators held its first meeting with a view to identifying the concerns of women and placing them on the agenda of the peace negotiators. The Sub-Committee on Gender Issues (SGI) is expected to frame gender guidelines for the various sub-committees and other mechanisms set up as part of the negotiations. It will also take up the issue of resettlement of refugees and aiding women traumatised by the conflict.

MINORITIES  

Muslims make up seven percent of the Sri Lankan population, and although they speak Tamil, have lived as a distinct community. They have had a tenuous relationship with the Tamils; on the other hand, sections of the Sinhalese community have perceived them to be as much a threat as the Tamils.  In the 1990s, thousands of Muslims were forced out at gunpoint by the LTTE from the northern provinces after being branded collaborators. For the past 12 years, they have been subjected to attacks by the LTTE. In late 1990, more than a hundred Muslims at prayer were gunned down and killed by the LTTE in the eastern provinces.  Thousands of Muslims still live in refugee camps in the north-west and the east.

The idea of a political administration run by the LTTE in the north and east of the country therefore prompted Muslim fears of being marginalised, leading Muslim leaders to demand a separate council in areas where they are a sizeable majority, particularly in the east. The importance of accommodating the concerns of the community within the framework of the peace talks has been recognised, with the leader of the largest Muslim political party having been part of the negotiations.

REFUGEES & IDPs

Some 65,000 refugees live in camps in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, most of whom are from Sri Lanka's embattled north. So far, about 80 families have returned, the majority of them from the largest camp. While most express a wish to return home, they have opted to wait for the outcome of the peace talks.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sri Lanka have been displaced on an ongoing, albeit intermittent, basis since the conflict began, the last two major waves being in the mid-1990s with the Sri Lanka army's re-occupation of the northern Jaffna peninsula and in 2000-2001 with the LTTE's unsuccessful attempt to recapture Jaffna. Many IDPs have been displaced multiple times, especially in Jaffna district. By far the greatest displacement has been within and from the Jaffna peninsula, accounting for some 350,000 of the total IDP population, including its entire Sinhalese and Muslim populations.

During a meeting of a sub-committee appointed by peace negotiators early this month, the government and the LTTE decided to establish a resettlement programme for the northwestern district of Mannar.  The two sides will appoint five "needs assessment teams", which will comprise two members from each side and a representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The teams have been given a March 31 deadline to come up with proposals and recommendations to allow the thousands of people displaced by the conflict to return, officials said.

A HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA

Apart from the above concerns, any post-conflict human rights agenda for Sri Lanka will have to include measures to eliminate the factors that led to the conflict in the first place. Ingrained prejudices will have to be tackled through awareness programmes, education and judicious use of the media. This will be of particular importance when it comes to resettlement of refugees and IDPs and the rehabilitation of other victims of the violence.

Steps must also be taken to address institutionalised discrimination. Legislation such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) - which allows for the long-term arrest and detention of civilians without charges or meaningful judicial oversight - and the Emergency Regulations was applied disproportionately against Tamils and the Sri Lankan government has ignored repeated calls by human rights organisations to repeal the laws.

In its Concluding Observations to Sri Lanka's seventh, eighth and ninth periodic reports, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD Committee) urged the Sri Lankan government "to conduct exhaustive and impartial investigations into allegations of human rights violations involving racial discrimination and bring to justice those responsible." In this regard, it may also prove useful to give substantial human rights monitoring authority to an independent organisation, such as the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), during any interim administration. The SLMM has played an important role in containing disruptions of the cease-fire, in stark contrast to the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka, which has failed to adequately monitor rights violations. An independent body could perform a useful function by monitoring the activities of both the LTTE and any Sri Lankan government representatives in the North and East.

Finally, in the attempt to offer increased powers to the Tamils, the rights of other minorities must not be overlooked. While the Muslim community's concerns have been factored into the peace agenda, the rights of other groups - such as the country's indigenous Veddas - must also be protected. Furthermore, a large number of plantation workers - Tamils of Indian origin - and their descendants are yet to be granted citizenship. Mistakes committed with regard to the Tamils must not be repeated with other minorities.

Much of this is conditional on the progress - and eventual success - of the negotiations. Nevertheless, the peace initiative in Sri Lanka is a lesson for the island's neighbours, big and small. That nightmares can be overcome; all it needs is courage to wake up and look at the possibilities.