Special Weekly Edition for the Duration of the 59th Session of the Commission on Human Rights

(Geneva, 17 March 2003 - 25 April 2003) 

ISSN: 1541-2482

About HRF

Content page

Previous Issues
HRF-58th CHR

Subscription

Feedback

 

Volume 6, Issue 1

17-23 March 2003

 

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

 

The Technical Assistance escape route

 

ON 19 April 2002, the members of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) voted in favour of a resolution that terminated one of its longest serving mandates - that of the Secretary-General's Special Representative on the situation of human rights in Equatorial Guinea. Pursuant to this resolution, at the 59th session of the CHR, the situation of human rights in Equatorial Guinea will be examined under the agenda item concerned with technical assistance programmes.

 

In 2003 the UN will return to Malabo, the Equatoguinean capital, with a big development agenda. Zéphirin Diabré, a senior official from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), will facilitate the implementation of a series of cooperation agreements with the government for the 2003-06 period. His upcoming visit is vital for the development of projects worth approximately US$ 95 million, to be co-financed with the Equatoguinean government and UNDP.

 

The government's engagement by the UNDP in Malabo marks the first return of development capital to Equatorial Guinea after the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) withdrew in protest in the mid-90s . Although it is clear that this funding can be put to good use, it will be a mistake on the part of the CHR if it allows the constructive criticism once provided by the Special Representative to be deflected by shifting a discussion of the nation's human rights practices to the technical assistance agenda item.

 

The recent report of Mr. Ambeyi Ligabo, Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression, after his recent visit to Equatorial Guinea is a case in point. The report states, inter alia, that that Ley Numero 6/1.997 de Presna, Imprenta y Medios Audiovisuales "grants extensive powers to the authorities to restrict the activities of the media" , that Ley Numero 1/1.999 excludes human rights NGOS from being officially registered, that "the population [] lives in fear of buying a newspaper" , and that the only two publications that seem to deal with political subjects are often confiscated by the authorities.

 

The Special Rapporteur's report notes that the effective exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression is limited by the fact that officials, law enforcement officers, members of the judiciary, lawyers and the public at large have only limited-if any-access to relevant legislative texts.

 

The report observes that there are several obstacles to the full exercise of political rights in Equatorial Guinea. For example, political opposition parties and independent observers frequently state that the electoral processes at the Presidential, legislative and municipal levels are unfair and fail to reflect the actual votes that were cast. Thus many opposition political parties have withdrawn from recent elections, claiming that election procedures are neither transparent nor egalitarian. The Special Rapporteur's report notes, "While blatant cases of violence [against members of opposition political parties] are reportedly rare, the atmosphere is not conducive to an electoral process run according to democratic rules and to the norms of relevant Equatorial Guinea laws." 

 

Many of the general criticisms contained in the Special Rapporteur's report are exemplified by the events of 2002.

 

On 9 June 2002, 68 of the 144 opposition members facing trial in Malabo were sentenced to prison terms of six to 20 years on charges of an "attempt on the life of the head of state, conspiracy and incitement to rebellion." The press was barred from covering the trial and Amnesty International unequivocally condemned the trial as one marked by "torture and heavy sentences." This criticism was echoed by the EU. Yet several other individuals continue to face the threat of detention for their alleged links with the banned opposition - the Fuerza Democratica Republicana (FDR), or the Democratic Republican Force.

 

Felipe Ondo Obiang and Guillermo Nguema Elá, two founding members of the clandestine opposition party, the FDR, as well as the leader of the registered Union Popular (UP), Emilio Ndong , were arrested in Malabo on 12 March 2002 and imprisoned in Bata. Within two weeks, 150 more people were detained.

 

On 9 June 2002, Felipe Ondó Obiang and Guillermo Nguema Elá were sentenced to 20 and 14 years' imprisonment respectively, while Plácido Mico Abogo, secretary general of the main legal opposition party, Convergencia para la Democracia Social (CPDS) or Convergence for Social Democracy, was sentenced to 14 years.  

 

According to Amnesty International, the "Trial of 144" was "marked by serious human rights violations and countless procedural irregularities, such as the use of confessions extracted under torture which were retracted by the accused when in court, the court's disregard of allegations of torture by defendants despite visible marks of torture on their bodies, the absence of adequate defence as lawyers for the defence had only one day to examine specific charges made against their clients, and the lack of independence of the court as bench of judges had been directly appointed by the executive authorities".

 

Despite these serious violations of the defendants' rights, the court convicted 64 of them (including three in absentia) to sentences ranging from six to 20 years' imprisonment. Several lawyers and observers, condemned the trial as a symbol of "the hypocrisy and perversion" of the court and an attempt to eliminate the opposition before the January 2003 Presidential elections.

 

On several occasions, Interior Minister Clement Engonga Nguema has publicly accused the leaders of the CPDS-one of the few opposition parties still active- of being the "legal arm of terrorist formations", which allegedly threatened the regime by plotting a coup. Several leaders of the co-called "satellite parties"- former opposition parties, but in reality taken over by the government party, the Partido Democrático de Guinea Ecuatorial (PDGE) - have publicly called for the prohibition of the "terrorist" opposition parties and for the detention of their leaders.

 

On 29 April 2002 Fabián Nsué Nguema Obono, a lawyer and leader of one of the factions within the political party, UP, was arrested on charges of "defaming the Head of State" and convicted to one year's imprisonment. His arrest followed the publication of a signed communiqué on the Internet, published by Laurentino Nsué Mibuy, another UP member in exile in Spain. The communiqué criticised the government for cancelling a salary increase for civil servants which had been announced at the beginning of the year. The same trial convicted Laurentino Nsué Mibuy, in absentia, of defamation and slander, and sentenced him to two years and four months in prison and to pay a hefty fine. 

 

In September 2002, the Interior Ministry issued an order barring presidential candidate and interim leader of the CPDS Celestino Bacale and several party colleagues from continuing their electoral campaign ahead of the January 2003 presidential elections. The CPDS campaign had so far only visited the towns of Niefang and Micomeseng - east of Bata - in Rio Muni, the mainland part of Equatorial Guinea where political meetings have been restricted to private houses of local party leaders.

 

The government justified the suspension of the CPDS campaign on the pretext that early campaigning went against the "campaigns' electoral character at a moment when the election campaign had not officially begun ." President Teodoro Obiang Nguema, however, continued organising public rallies in addition to his regular appearances in public media.  

 

In November 2002, the presidential elections scheduled for February 2003 were brought forward to 15 December 2002, "to ensure competitive, free, open and fair elections."  However, efforts to ensure free and fair polls remained elusive. The National Electoral Council established by the Interior Ministry to monitor the elections was dominated by members from the ruling Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE).

 

In several instances people were forced to show their ballots before putting them in the urns. According to the CPDS, in 90 percent of the voting stations, the vote was carried out in public, and people were obliged to take only one voting slip, "the one for Obiang." Opposition politicians, many of who are serving prison term or are in exile, remained conspicuous in their absence. 

 

These restrictions on the exercise of political rights occur within the context of a short and fraudulent history of elections in Equatorial Guinea. The first post-independence elections - in 1996 - were won by President Obiang with 98 percent of the votes in an unopposed poll. While the government declared the elections to be multi-party elections, systematic obstruction of the electoral campaigns of the other candidates, including arrests and torture, had left Mr Obiang the only candidate. 

 

Similarly, the March 1999 legislative elections were ridden with irregularities. The electorate was not allowed to vote unmonitored and several opposition observers were expelled from the poll stations.

 

The ruling PDGE won the elections, obtaining 75 of the 83 seats in parliament, while the CPDS and the UP obtained eight seats - which they refused to take.

 

According to the 2002 Annual Report of the French media watchdog Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF), Equatorial Guinea has one of the most repressive policies for the press media in Africa. Several journalists, political leaders and association heads have complained of increasing difficulties in accessing the Internet. Illegal phone tapping has increased and the country's sole Internet provider closely monitors almost all electronic communications.

 

In April 2002 the press was widely excluded from covering the trial of 144 political opponents accused of plotting against the government. According to the RSF, the available places in the courtroom were reserved primarily for journalists from the State press, making it very difficult for independent journalists. The few who had access to the trial faced insidious attacks from the presidential guards and members of the security forces on almost a daily basis.

 

Most notable publications, radio stations, and limited television service, are in the hands of the governing party, which is unwilling to loosen its grip. The opposition very rarely has access to the media. Self-censorship is the rule in the government press, to such an extent that a local journalist commented: "a comma in the wrong place can cause a journalist of the official press to have his salary suspended". 

 

The absence of an independent judiciary has further served to perpetuate President Obiang's regime. According to former Special Representative Gustavo Gallón Giraldo, "The country suffers from a lack of state of law where the administration of justice is not so much hampered as it is blatantly disregarded by the executive authorities."

 

That the opposition leaders were not invited to the National Conference in January 2003 on "Equatorial Guinea's juridical system and the state of law and order" proves President Obiang's unwillingness to address key problems of the Equatoguinean justice system. These problems include systematic violations of human rights by the government.

 

Concern for human rights in Equatorial Guinea has ranked extremely low on the agenda of the international community. Until the end-90s, there was a strong international pressure against the Malabo regime to implement democratic reforms and respect basic human rights. However, the pressure has since crumbled. At present Spain is the only country to maintain pressure against President Obiang by making the EU condemn both the elections and the trial against the opposition. It remains to be seen how long this pressure lasts.

 

Yet one could argue that persecution of prominent opposition figures - accused of having planned a military coup d'état aimed at removing the President - reached its apogee in 2002.  

 

For five years President Teodoro Obiang Nguema has managed to convince the world of his government's commitment to better human rights and more democracy,. He has done this by backing Western oil companies' claims that they have had a positive influence on Africa's fastest growing oil producer. Now President Obiang's regime has been handing out punishments as appalling as those meted out in the 1970s when he was defence minister under Francisco Maciás Nguema, his uncle against whom he led a bloody coup in 1979. 

 

Is this the right time to allow the Equatoguinean government to escape from scrutiny of human rights abuses by hiding behind the rhetoric of technical assistance?


 

 

| About SAHRDC | Online Resource Centre  | Publications | HRF Fortnightly | HRF Quarterly | Home |

 

Human Rights Features is produced by Human Rights Documentation Centre (HRDC)

Human Rights Features is registered in India under ISSN 1541-2482
Comments and suggestions are welcome. Please send all communication for this publication to

South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC)

B - 6/6, Safdarjung Enclave Extension, New Delhi - 110029, India

Tel/Fax: (+) 91-11-2619-2717, 2706, 1120

Email: hrdc_online@hotmail.com



All contents copyright © SAHRDC