TABLE OF CONTENTS

Robinson: Paying the price for being an outsider within the UN

The High Commissioner has set a high benchmark for her successor

            “SHE’S done a great job. She's made a contribution. She's put human rights on the map and she's put lots of energy, creativity and courage into very difficult work. ' It's the kind of work that every day you make some friend-- and some enemies"- UN Secretary General Kofi Annan while paying tribute to High Commissioner Mary Robinson.

            Since the announcement of her appointment on 12 June 1997, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson went to become the most prominent face in the United Nations, after the Secretary General Kofi Annan. Annan, called her selection "one of the most important appointments I will probably have the opportunity of making during my term". A former President of Ireland, Ms Robinson had the political standing and wide experience in human rights; she was an early advocate of liberalising Irish divorce and abortion legislation and campaigning for homosexual rights - to carry the task of the High Commissioner.

            The Clinton administration was a strong supporter of Ms Robinson and pressed hard for her appointment. Yet, at the end of her term, the needle of suspicion for opposing her second term points towards the Bush administration: certainly not for her anti-American stand, of which none can accuse the High Commissioner, but for being the goal-keeper of international human rights standards, irrespective of the predilections of Governments.

            In her inaugural address to the 58th Session of the Commission on Human Rights, High Commissioner Mary Robinson reflected, "I know that at times my voice may have been considered awkward but I must say my inner ear was always tuned to the Secretary-General's words of advice to me at the time of my appointment as High Commissioner: "stay an outsider within the United Nations".

            Mary Robinson was a true outsider in the UN system and it is for being the outsider that she has had to pay the price. As the conflict between the High Commissioner's office and US Government became evident, reports of United States' hostility to her second appointment, which will require confirmation of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in its next session, became public.

          "We wish her well in her future endeavors," US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said when asked by reporters for Washington's reaction to her decision not to seek another term as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Ms Robinson earned the annoyance of the Bush administration when she called for a halt to bombing in Afghanistan to allow humanitarian aid reach civilians, after her call for an inquiry into the massacre of the Taliban soldiers in Mazar-e-Sharif, her vocal stand against the treatment of Al-Qaeda prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and for raising alarm at a rise in discrimination against Arabs and Muslims in Western countries. Ms Robinson also consistently called for respect for human rights and the rule of law in the war against terror. The UN Secretary General who advised her to "stay an outsider within the United Nations" failed to make a further request to accept a second term, possibly cognisant of the Bush Administration's influence at the GA. High Commissioner Mary Robinson found herself in the limelight for speaking out on human rights issues or situations that required public censure and where diplomatese failed to deliver. Raising human rights concerns with Security Council members such as China, Russia, the United States and expressing concerns against the anti-terror law in the United Kingdom ensured that she stayed in the news, much to the discomfiture of the above-mentioned States.

Yet, the success of the High Commissioner possibly lies in the events that never made it to the newspaper or television screen: strengthening the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, transforming it from a policy organisation to something akin to an operational agency, and ensuring the independence of the OHCHR.

Price Waterhouse did an evaluation of the Centre for Human Rights - the previous incarnation of the OHCHR - and recommended the setting up of three branches: Activities and Programme Branch, Research and Right to Development and Support Services. It was during Mary Robinson's tenure that the OHCHR was fully operationalised. From being a policy institute primarily responsible for servicing the Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission, treaty bodies and Special Procedures, the OHCHR became equipped to deal with field offices. Today the OHCHR has field offices in 34 countries. While there are problems with thinly spread field offices with limited financial resources, field missions are now an integral part of the OHCHR's work. The OHCHR was not structured to manage field offices. However, the reality of human rights violations necessitated the establishment of field missions and the High Commissioner responded with alacrity.

Mary Robinson strengthened the institution of the Office of the High Commissioner. Through her personal commitment and integrity, she raised the morale of the staff.  Though the OHCHR continues to suffer from budgetary constraints, the High Commissioner raised more that 50% of her Annual Budget through the Annual Appeal. Such innovation has been typical of her leadership.

One of the important achievements of the High Commissioner's term has been the promotion of regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights, pursuant to the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights and the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights. The OHCHR has regional arrangement programmes in the Asian and Pacific, Africa, Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus and Latin American and Caribbean Region. In order to facilitate the implementation of the regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights, the High Commissioner appointed Honorary Regional Advisors. In 2001, the High Commissioner also appointed Regional Representatives.

Under the UN Secretary General's "A Programme for Reform" of 14 July 1997, the High Commissioner effectively used her profile to mainstream human rights within the United Nations system. Action 15 of the Programme for Reform, among others, stated,  "the High Commissioner will undertake an analysis of the technical assistance provided by the United Nations entities in areas related to human rights and formulate proposals for improving complementarity of action". Through the Common Country Assessment and United Nations Development Assistance Framework, Mary Robinson successfully instilled human rights concerns in UN agencies. Briefing the UN country staff during her missions was one of the significant tasks in this regard. 

The High Commissioner also took human rights issues beyond United Nations bodies. Through the media and from platforms such as the World Economic Forum, she used her profile to put human rights on the map. The OHCHR holds regular dialogue with the World Bank and recently signed an agreement with the Arab League for a Technical Cooperation programme. The Technical Cooperation programmes were viewed by member States of the UN as a way to get the Commission off their backs, so to speak. States, which were regularly censured by the CHR, sought technical cooperation projects with the sole aim of avoiding censure by the CHR. During Ms Robinson's tenure, however, the Technical Cooperation project gained some respectability. The Technical Cooperation projects are primarily developed in partnership with governments. But with some improvements, including taking the Technical Cooperation programmes beyond the governmental domain, i.e. to civil society, the Programmes could be made more effective.

The OHCHR nevertheless still faces challenges. The lack of resources and inadequate staff, the hiring of staff on short-term contracts has served to cripple efficiency. Action 16 of the Secretary General's Programme for Reform called upon the OHCHR "to review the human rights machinery and develop recommendations on possible ways to streamline and rationalize it". Action 16 further stated that "Actions under way in the context of the restructuring of the human rights programme to strengthen and coordinate the substantive and technical support to the legislative bodies, monitoring committees and special procedures will be given the highest priority. The establishment of common data banks of information, research and analysis to assist these bodies will be accelerated." The Special Procedures do not have adequate resources to respond to complaints it receives and there are no mechanisms to follow up complaints of grave human rights violations.

During Ms Robinson's tenure, the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues was established as a subsidiary organ of the ECOSOC. For indigenous peoples, who were denied entry to the League of Nations, the establishment of the Permanent Forum as a subsidiary organ of the ECOSOC is a historic step. While the High Commissioner showed commitment to indigenous issues, concerns have been expressed as to whether the High Commissioner was properly briefed by her staff as to indigenous peoples' demand for a separate Secretariat of the Permanent Forum to fulfill its mandate which goes beyond human rights. There was a lack of enthusiasm, if not covert opposition, on part of the OHCHR Secretariat, to the idea of a Separate Secretariat for the Permanent Forum.

Mary Robinson extended her term by one year in 2001 primarily because of the World Conference Against Racism. Given the complexity of the issues, her staff at the Secretariat of the WCAR showed ineptitude time and again throughout the preparatory process. While the failure of her staff was a cross the High Commissioner had to bear as the Secretary General of the Conference, Mary Robinson single-handedly rescued the World Conference Against Racism from total collapse. She had the courage to reject a flawed NGO document and at the same time highlighted the positive aspects of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, much to the annoyance of Washington, which walked out of the Conference.

Nonetheless, the United States opposition to a second term for Ms Robinson has raised the issue of whether the post of the High Commissioner should only have one term, in the light of the leverage of States to oppose a re-appointment. There is also the possibility of candidates who are "a feeble voice for the oppressed…  highly political and highly diplomatic - to the extent that it is silent on gross human rights violations," as Nobel Laureate José Ramos Horta puts it. The restriction of one term, adds Mr Horta, “does not necessarily address the issue of independence, integrity and courage of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, because life does not begin and end with the position as High Commissioner for Human Rights... And so what is proposed is only part of a solution to strengthen the independence, integrity of the office of the High Commissioner.  But above all, it requires the real courage and integrity of the individual, no matter whether he or she has only one term, or two or three terms, and it requires also that governments must understand that the moment you create such an institution, you have to cherish it, to respect it."

Sources close to Ms Robinson, rejecting the suggestion that the High Commissioner was interested in the post of United Nations Secretary General, state that if she were concerned about her personal ambition, she would have never confronted the mighty United States.

Compared to the lacklustre term of her predecessor, Jose Ayala Lasso, Ms Robinson leaves a high benchmark for her successor. The UN Secretary General needs to find someone who has political standing, and, like Mary Robinson, has "the integrity to stand up and speak publicly about human rights issues in all states".

She will be a hard act to follow.

TOP

Rights at risk as Western Europe begins rightward march

             “IN many places people are maltreated and denied protection on the grounds that they are not citizens but unwanted migrants….Such people have a special need for protection and are entitled to it."  - Kofi Annan, opening statement at the WCAR.

At its session in 2000, the Commission on Human Rights was up in arms at the electoral successes of Jorg Haider's Freedom Party in Austria.  Months later, the European Union sanctioned Austria as an expression of its rejection of the intolerance and xenophobia reflected in his platform and policies.  It now seems that the election result in Austria mirrored much more the tide of public opinion in Western Europe than one might have hoped.

In securing 28% of the vote in 1999, Austria's Freedom Party catered to fears that a flood of immigrants would follow the enlargement of the European Union to the East in 2003.  It appealed to a fear of "Uberfremdung" and existing xenophobia in the Austrian population. The Freedom Party's participation in government has brought about a rightward swing in Austrian politics, even after EU sanctions were imposed and then withdrawn.  Despite a waning in public support, the Freedom Party continues to move to the political right in an effort to influence its political allies.

Few European states have escaped a swing to the political right, if not in economic policy, then in immigration policy.

Fortress Europe is increasingly attracting reinforcements as  manifestations of intolerance and xenophobia highlight.

            In the recent past, centre-right governments have risen to power in Denmark, Italy, Spain and Portugal, with impressive local electoral successes for the right in the Netherlands.  While these parties have been elected largely on a wave of public dissatisfaction with the centre-left economic performance, their ascent to power has often been conditioned by the support of right-wing populist parties, which then succeeded in dictating the tone of politics regarding the immigration and integration of foreigners.

Even Norway's coalition government has seen the right-wing partner, the Progress Party, call for the repatriation of refugees and tighter immigration quotas. 

The people of France, Germany, Sweden, Ireland and the Netherlands will all go to the polls later this year.  In the run-up to elections, issues concerning discrimination in integration measures and against asylum-seekers, foreigners and citizens of foreign origin are tied up with the debate on implementation of immigration policy.

The World Conference in Durban underlined "the key role that political leaders and political parties can and ought to play in combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance" (WCAR Declaration, paragraph 83).  As European political leaders try to outdo each other with repressive immigration rhetoric and policies, the domestic human rights of vulnerable communities within Europe are at risk.  HUMAN RIGHTS FEATURES is concerned about the potential of this distinct regression on traditional positions of tolerance, acceptance and support for migrants, asylum-seekers, foreigners and citizens of foreign origin. Obviously, the events of 11 September--and the security laws that have emerged in response--have done little to encourage the confidence of affected minorities.

The current government in Italy includes the ex-Fascist National Alliance and the anti-immigrant Northern League, and is headed by a Prime Minister famed for derogatory remarks on Islam and its adherents.  The government recently charged Italy's navy with intercepting and inspecting vessels suspected of carrying immigrants and ordered the impounding and destroying boats of used for human trafficking.  The Northern league went further, suggesting that the army should be empowered to open fire on smugglers' boats.

The initiative eventually taken was condemned as "demagogy" by opposition MPs, yet opinion polls showed 70% support for the position, along with 60% of the population approving of Berlusconi's stance on the superiority of Western culture over Islamic culture.

With respect to law and order, Italian Minister of Justice Roberto Castelli objected to the proposal of a European-wide detention order and the related possibility of freezing the assets of suspects.  His objection was detailed on the grounds that this proposal entailed the possibility of prosecution of racism and xenophobia.  Mr Castelli argued that it was not acceptable that a public prosecutor could "arrest anyone anywhere simply on the accusation that this person was convinced of the superiority of his or her own race".

In Denmark, elections on 20 November - in the wake of 11 September - brought to power a right-leaning coalition government comprising the Liberal Party (LP), the Conservative People's Party (CCP) and the Danish People's Party (DPP).  The latter had rallied in its election manifesto for the removal Paragraph 266b from the Danish criminal code, which prohibits hate speech.  The LP and the CCP called for tighter immigration controls against what DPP leader Pia Kjaeersgaard called an "invasion" of foreigners.  The rightist Progress Party ran an anti-Islam platform and called for the expulsion of immigrants and asylum-seekers from Denmark, whose population includes less than five percent 'foreigners'.

In response to the election result, Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson expressed concern that the new Danish government would be "forced to prop itself up with anti-foreigner ideas" as "xenophobia had had a great impact on how the Danes chose to vote".  Commentators further noted that "there is a hypnotic concern with immigration issues in Denmark, which we haven't seen anywhere else except from Austria.

Denmark's elections manifested public protest against high taxation, which is perceived to be the result of social security benefits given to immigrants and asylum-seekers.  These benefits are now to be cut by 30%.  However, immigrants will be allowed to earn some money in addition to benefits.  Denmark's ethnic Minority Alliance condemned the proposed reduction in benefits as "nationalistic and inhumane" and for "creating an atmosphere of hate in society". 

The effect of the rise of the right on civil society in Denmark is reason for extreme concern.  In December 2001, the DPP successfully conditioned its support of the national budget on the limiting or discontinuation of funding for the Board of Ethnic Equality (BEE), the Danish Centre for Human Rights (DCHR), the Documentation and advisory service on racial discrimination (DASRD), the Danish Centre for Migration and Ethnic Studies and the Council of Ethnic Minorities.  All of these bodies are human rights institutions concerned with racism, xenophobia and related intolerance.

Until the withdrawal of its funding, the DASRD--an independent human rights NGO--had received 80% of its budget from the government and had effectively operated as an independent complaints mechanism for human rights violations, reporting on police hate speech, and racist remarks by members of the DPP.  The quality of the DASRD's work was recognised by the Minister for Refugees, Immigrants and Integration, Bertel Haarder, who acknowledged that state funding had not been discontinued for lack of quality of work.

Suggestions for a merger of the DCHR with several other governmental organisations to form a Danish Academy for International Affairs were rejected nationally and internationally.  Rejection came also from Mary Robinson saying that DCHR's independence would be compromised in the process.  Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen derided human rights experts and critics of the government as "judges of taste" wedded to political correctness and attempting to "repress the public debate with their expert tyranny", while the DPP's Soren Krarup called the human rights approach "the new God".  These attacks bear witness to an assault on the commitment of the government to human rights protection within its own borders.

When the government tried to preserve the DCHR's independence by proposing its merger with the similarly independent BEE, the DPP threatened withdrawing its support for the budget.  The DPP's eventual consent to the merger was conditioned on the replacement of the DCHR Director Morten Kjaerum and BEE Chairperson Bishop Kjeld Holm.  Both had previously voiced strong criticism on immigration issues.  On 5 March 2002, the government decided on the first merger option and on new leadership for the human rights institution.  A new human rights complaints commission--required by European Union membership--will be situated in the new Institute for Human Rights despite this institute's predominant focus on international rather than national issues.

As a result of the election, immigrants in Denmark are submitted to conditions which further curtail their civil liberties..  Applicants for permanent residence have to prove seven years--rather than three years as previously required--to stay in the country.  EU guidelines call for only five years.  In order for the foreign married partner of a Dane or a resident foreigner to come to Denmark, the Danish resident must be over 24 years old, must place a substantial security deposit, and must not be a recipient of welfare benefits.

In August 2001, the DPP was widely condemned for publishing the names of 5,000 immigrants who had recently received Danish citizenship and, most of whom, so DPP claimed, were not of European or American descent.  Fearing that the DPP would set the tone for immigration and asylum policies in Denmark, UNHCR asked for assurances that Denmark intended to stand by its international obligations relating to asylum-seekers.  At the same time, immigrant organisations alleged the government's promotion of "racial hatred".

Denmark -- the first signatory to the UN Refugee Convention--will hold the European Union presidency during the second half of 2002 when the EU is expected to negotiate draft directives on asylum.  Prime Minister Rasmussen announced his intention to support the Danish stance on immigration for all of the EU states.  That stance is that immigrants should not be allowed to progress as far as Europe while fleeing from persecution, and governments allowing them to pass through their countries on the way to Europe should be punished with trade sanctions.

As France goes to the polls later this year, Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front is expected to continue its traditionally strong showing.  Le Pen is expected to come third in this year's presidential campaign.  The successes of the National Front--which won around 15% of the vote in 1988 and 1995--are well known and need not be rehashed.

Perhaps more surprising will be the anticipated swing to the right in Dutch politics.  In recent local elections in Rotterdam, Pim Fortyn's right-leaning Liveable Netherlands Party won approximately 30% of the vote on an anti-immigration platform.  Mr. Fortyn, whose party is expected to enter into a coalition government in the state elections in May 2002, calls for a reduction of immigration from 40,000 to 10,000 people per year.  It also calls for zero Muslim immigration, for the enlargement of the police force and for the revocation of the Dutch constitution's anti-discrimination article.  Mr Fortyn was thrown out of his own party in 2001 for overtly offensive remarks about Muslims, whose religion he, an outspoken homosexual, rejects for outlawing homosexuality.  Political commentators worry that despite the Netherlands' low levels of unemployment and traditional distaste for the right, Mr Fortyn's flashy style and engaging xenophobic rhetoric may attract voters.

As we go to print, Germany's coalition government has reached agreement on easing immigration restrictions to encourage more skilled workers from abroad to work in Germany.  In addition to expediting asylum claims processing and setting the age limit for children joining their refugee parents at 12, the bill laudably extends the applicability of the UN Refugee Convention by offering protection from deportation of people persecuted on gender grounds or by non-state organisations.

The bill was expected to be rejected by Germany's Upper House, and the Christian Democratic Party maintains stringent opposition to its adoption.  The Christian Democrats prefer tighter, rather than looser immigration controls. 

Despite the compromise which will see the bill proceed to the Cabinet next week - and Gerhard Schroeder's eagerness that it not be an issue - immigration policy is likely to feature large in Germany's federal elections in September. Conservative candidate Bavarian premier Edmund Stoiber insists on restricting immigration and on conditioning immigrant entry on the prior assurance of available work.

Nine per cent of the Germany's population are foreign residents, of which almost one third are Turks.  Polls suggest that 25% of German voters are likely to support an anti-immigration party in the federal elections.

In addition, Germany's recently adopted national security legislation--passed in absence of any meaningful public consultation--is bound to impact foreigners as any information collected in the asylum-determination process can be passed on to foreign intelligence agencies.  Identification containing fingerprints is already mandatory for non-citizens.

Although 2002 is not an election year, the British government continues to grapple with its immigration policy.  Recent riots in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley will place issues of race, social exclusion and citizenship high atop the political agenda.

A government White Paper on immigration released in February 2002, detailed the Blair government's second review of the country's asylum policy. It called for combining a point system for immigration with an increase in the probationary period for recognising mixed British/non-British marriages from one to two years.  It also recommended English language testing for citizenship applicants, 'smart' identity cards for asylum-seekers (featuring fingerprints), increased deportations and detention of rejected asylum-seekers, and for a faster processing system of asylum claims.  It also called for reduced rights to appeal. The proposed measures have been rightly criticised for serving to "feed a wave of racism".  Immigrant communities specifically object to being encouraged to marry with their "settled communities" in Britain.

In addition, the introduction of a citizenship oath is currently being contemplated.  The oath would underline the responsibilities of citizenship, the immigrant's commitment to the fight against racism, and a vow of tolerance.  The holding of dual passports is also put to question. 

The Joint Council for Welfare of Immigrants condemned the proposed oath as "divisive" and as undermining Britain's multiculturalism.

The interplay between intolerance, racism and xenophobia, and immigration policies is looming large in Europe. 

As noted by EU Immigration Commissioner Antonio Vitorino, a directive issued by the EU regarding the misuse of asylum, economic migration, the need for an imported work force and human trafficking have largely been disregarded by EU member states.  European capitals are fiercely guarding their national competence in respect of immigration and asylum.

It is expected that a proposal for EU-wide migration politics, returned to Mr Vitorino for tightening by the concerned EU ministers in 2001, will not be discussed until Germany has concluded its elections in September 2002. 

The degree to which the issue of immigrants and asylum-seekers in the EU member states has been politicised and continues to be polemicised cannot be overestimated. The human rights of immigrants, asylum-seekers and nationals of foreign-descent seem to have taken the backseat, while restrictions imposed on them loom large.

To put this issue into perspective--at least the states of Europe are democratic.  The governments enjoy meaningful opposition and are monitored by an independent domestic and international press. It, therefore, is possible to criticise these increasingly unacceptable policies. 

However, European nations still have to commit to the protection of immigrants, asylum-seekers and foreigners within their borders.  When xenophobic parties secure a foothold in nations with traditions of tolerance and political moderation, questions must be asked. About the framing of legislation and policies that discriminate against peoples of different origins.  About the increasing support to parties that promote such conservative policies.

Unless the Western European countries stem the tide of discriminatory policies and legislation, they will lose the moral authority to speak against such discrimination elsewhere in the world.

TOP

Incapacitating the CHR: Asian bloc’s ongoing agenda

The Asian group’s recent intervention is the latest indication of its attempt to undo the work of the CHR

            THE intervention of the Japanese Ambassador Yusuaki Nogawa on 19 March 2002 under Agenda Item 3 - 'Organisation of the Work of the Session' - is the strongest indication to date of the Asian bloc's attempt to dismantle the work of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR).

Apart from policing NGOs through misinterpretation of ECOSOC resolution 1996/31 such as "circulating a list of NGOs which have been denied consultative status at the ECOSOC, the Asian bloc recommended "biennialization and clustering of agenda items, reduction of the number and length of resolutions through inter-alia, biennialization of as many thematic resolutions as possible, and discontinuation of resolutions which are no longer warranted by existing circumstances, in addition to strict observance of speaking time limits."

In view of the results of the Open Ended Working Group on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights, the Asian Group's statement appears to be yet another attempt to weaken the CHR and its mechanisms.

            At the 53rd Session of the Commission on Human Rights in 1997, a draft resolution on the Rationalization of the Work of the Special Procedures was circulated - without a sponsor - among a few diplomats. This resolution was ostensibly drafted following the submission of a report on Pakistan by the Special Rapporteur on Torture (E/CN.4/1997/7/Add.2). Fortunately, some States and lobbied strongly against the text.  As a result, the draft resolution was not tabled formally, nor did any delegation claim its authorship.

At the 54th Session, the contents of the draft resolution on Rationalization of the Work of the Commission at the 53rd Session were adopted using a seemingly innocuous method - through a decision (1998/122) of the Commission on Human Rights on 'Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights'.

The Commission on Human Rights also passed another apparently innocuous resolution titled 'Restructuring the Agenda of the Commission on Human Rights through Resolution (E/CN.4/RES/1998/84)' and introduced the 'Rationalization of the Work of the Commission' as a separate agenda item for the next session.

            After the report of the Bureau on Enhancing Effectiveness of the Commission on Human Rights was submitted at the 55th Session (E/CN.4/1999/104), the "Like Minded Group" (LMG) - composed of Asian countries such as Bhutan, China, India, Iran, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Vietnam - presented its views on the "Rationalization of the Work of the Commission" in the document contained in E/CN.4/1999/120.

            In its decision 2000/109, the Commission decided to "approve and implement comprehensively and in its entirety" the report of its inter-sessional open-ended Working Group on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights. The report had the most negative effects on the Sub-Commission.

            Ambassador Nogowa in his intervention at this session stated: "Most importantly, the Asian Group continues to place the highest priority on creating an atmosphere of dialogue, cooperation, consultation, understanding, and consensus building to enhance the effectiveness of the Commission and to avoid politicisation of its work. The Asian Group would like these considerations to govern the work of the Commission, including under Agenda Item 9".

            The reference to Agenda Item 9 makes the intention of the Asian Group clear: they would like no reference to be made with regard to their countries. Avoiding politicisation of the work of the CHR has been a constant refrain of the Asian Governments. Yet, in the name of enhancing the effectiveness of the Commission on Human Rights, the Sub-Commission, consisting of independent experts, has been reduced to an ineffective body.

The result of the adoption of the decision 2000/109 is that while the Sub-Commission can continue to debate country situations not being dealt with by the Commission, and while it should also be allowed to discuss urgent matters involving serious violations of human rights in any country, it cannot adopt country-specific resolutions and must refrain from negotiating and adopting thematic resolutions that contain references to specific countries. It was the LMG countries led by the Asian Bloc that suggested under Recommendation 19 that "[t]he proposal to forward a compilation of debates in the Sub-Commission to the CHR should be rejected and the Sub-Commission's debate on country situations should completely abolished".

            The report of the Chairperson of the Sub-Commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights to this Session of the CHR states, "The ability to prepare draft resolutions on country situations was a very effective means of encouraging constructive dialogue and negotiation between the Sub-Commission and Governments responsible for human rights violations. That approach resulted not in a large number of adopted country-specific resolutions, but rather in a series of statements by the Chairperson accompanied by concrete commitments, voiced and put on the public record, by various Governments to improve the human rights situations within their respective nations.

            The Chairperson of the Sub-Commission further states, "The inability to pursue country work openly and diligently has significantly hampered the Sub-Commission's capacity to promote and protect human rights around the world.  One predictable consequence of the Commission's decision to discourage the Sub-Commission from adopting country resolutions has been a decline in NGO participation in the debate on item 2.  Only 21 NGOs spoke in 2001 under item 2, compared with 29 in 2000 and 33 in 1999. Thus, in just two years there has been nearly a 40 per cent decrease in NGO participation under agenda item 2.  NGOs are the lifeblood of the human rights movement and of the Sub-Commission's work.  Such a decline can diminish the Sub-Commission's impact."

            In its resolution 2001/60 of 24 April 2001, the Commission on Human Rights requested States "when nominating and electing members and alternates to the Sub-Commission, to be conscious of the strong concern to ensure that the body is independent and is seen to be so".  If the Asian bloc were genuinely concerned and serious about avoiding politicisation of the work of the CHR, an independent expert body such as the Sub-Commission should have been allowed to adopt country resolutions and to refer to a country in thematic resolutions. For the Asian Government avoiding politicisation of the work of the CHR will mean that the CHR should not adopt country resolutions and refer to a country in a thematic resolution.      

The problem with Asian GONGOs

            Ambassador Nogowa's statement was a direct attack on NGO freedom. He stated "Despite the Asian Group having raised these issues on several occasions, there have been instances where NGO accreditation procedures have not been fully complied with and sometimes even exploited or misused to advance interests outside the scope of human rights. … cases of NGOs misleading fellow NGO representatives into unwittingly subscribing to spurious documents for circulation in the Commission have been recognised in past sessions."

            If any NGO carry out any activity against the Charter of the United Nations, the ECOSOC resolution 1996/31 provides for withdrawal of Consultative Status. Many Asian States have also complained to the NGO Committee in New York in the past.

            NGOs are all for improving the functioning of the Commission on Human Rights.  However the proposal of the Asian Governments is not the best way to improve the efficiency of the Commission on Human Rights. Some soul-searching and peer pressure could improve the efficiency exponentially. Cases of Government-Organised NGOs (GONGOs) misleading the NGO representatives into unwittingly subscribing to spurious documents for circulation in the Commission have been recognised in the last one and half decades. More than the NGOs, it is the governmental representatives who are misled by these GONGOs. Before the introduction of current limit of six statements by each NGO, it was the GONGOs that used to make interventions on each agenda item condemning particular countries. Most NGOs make limited interventions in the areas of work or issues under its mandate. If Asian countries - India and Pakistan in particular - stopped bringing along GONGOs at the expense of the tax payers, to engage in Indo-Pak shadow boxing, the Commission's efficiency would increase substantially. Pakistan and India are not alone. Countries from across the world bring GONGOs. Other governments have been using GONGOs to weaken the credibility of the NGOs, trivialising serious human rights situations in the process. It is time countries such as Japan put peer pressure on the Asian governments that bring GONGOs to the Commission meetings.

            Ambassador Nogowa further states: "Whenever there is clear evidence of the misuse of accreditation procedures or rules of procedure by any NGO or its representative, the matter should be addressed and redressed by an inter-governmental body such as the NGO Committee in New York. Such action would not preclude consideration by the Bureau to take steps within the Rules of Procedure during the course of the session. In this regard, with a view to enhancing transparency and the credibility of the NGOs at the Commission, the Secretariat, in consultation with the NGO Committee, should every year circulate a list of NGOs which have been denied consultative Status at the ECOSOC".

            The ECOSOC resolution 1996/31 does not provide that a list of NGOs who have been denied ECOSOC status should be published. Rather under para 59 of the resolution, an organisation whose consultative status or whose listing on the Roster is withdrawn may be entitled to reapply for consultative status or for inclusion on the Roster not sooner than three years after the effective date of such withdrawal. While independent NGOs from Asia have great difficulty in obtaining ECOSOC Status, GONGOs face no such difficulty. If Asian governments seek to amend the ECOSOC resolution 1996/31 to ensure such transparency, the objections of the concerned States must be provided in writing and be circulated to the Commission on Human Rights so as to ensure full transparency.

Circumventing rules to police the Special Procedures

            The Asian Bloc states, "Concerning the interactive debates with Special Rapporteurs and other mandate holders, the Asian Group is of the view that such debates should follow the same pattern as in the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly and should only be a debate between States and mandate holders."

            This attempt to exclude the NGOs in the debate exposes the hollowness of the Asian bloc's proclamation that it "welcomes and encourages the participation of NGOs in the work of the Commission". This is a deliberate attempt to curtail freedom of expression. While NGOs have the right to participate in the proceedings of the subsidiary bodies of the ECOSOC and the World Conferences organised by the United Nations under ECOSOC resolution 1996/31, they have no such rights at the Third Committee. It is unclear as to how the practice of the Third Committee can be replicated given the Consultative Status of the NGOs with ECOSOC and given the interaction of the Special Rapporteurs with the NGOs. Generally, the concerned Special Rapporteurs or representatives present the report to the Commission and various delegations, including NGOs, make interventions on the agenda item under discussion. What the Asian Group is suggesting is the circumvention of ECOSOC resolution 1996/31 and a halt to dialogue with NGOs either through oral interventions or parallel meetings at the Commission.

Time Saving

            The Asian Group also states: "Joint statements should be encouraged, and limits to the number and duration of statements should be fastidiously observed as means of saving time".

            Statistics relating to the 57th Session of the Commission on Human Rights provide that Asian States which are less than 25% of member States of United Nations make 33.5% of all statements against 22.5% by African States, 21.5% by Latin American States, and 9% percent by Eastern European States. Consequently, Asian States spend 12 hours and 39 minutes against 3 hours and 16 minutes by Eastern European States. Moreover, a lot of time is taken up by voting, statements by dignitaries and other events. Furthermore, it is the Asian Governments that exercise the right of reply more often than any other blocs.

            The defensive attitude of the Asian countries arises out of an indefensible human rights record. It was the Asian group that had raised the issue of Asian values and cultural particularities before the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights. The issue is raised regularly at the Annual Workshops on Regional Arrangement for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights where these countries maintain that they cannot develop a regional human rights mechanism in the region. Indeed, little can be expected of a region that does not even have a common vision on human rights, such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. The Asian Group stubbornly - and absurdly - continues to see NGOs and Special Procedures mechanisms as threats rather than as partners and tools for the protection and promotion of human rights.

            It is regrettable that some of the Asian countries who were the driving force behind the development of investigatory human rights mechanisms against the former apartheid regime in South Africa and occupation policies of Israel continue to attempt to undermine the universally applicable special procedures, and try their best to avoid international scrutiny at the CHR.

The principal aim of Asian Governments is to ensure that no reference is made to their country situation. Ensuring an efficient and effective Commission on Human Rights is evidently not on their agenda. It is precisely for this reason that the Asian Group specifically refers to Item 9 - 'Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in any part of the world, including: (a) Question of human rights in Cyprus;(b) Procedure established in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolutions 1503 (XLVIII) and 2000/3'. If it were possible, the Asian States would also do away with the 1503 Confidential Procedure so as to put a stop to confidential scrutiny, and would try to dismantle the Commission on Human Rights and its monitoring mechanisms.

Statements such as the one made by the Asian group on 19 March 2002 are nothing but an attempt to destroy the monitoring mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights.

  TOP

Durban minus five: The setback that was WCAR

The final document contains redundant text and empty rhetoric, and fails to build on existing standards

            LAST year's World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) began, proceeded, and ended on a sour note. The conference's final ceremony was nothing like recent international meetings - such as the Rome Conference on the International Criminal Court - in which participants shared a feeling of jubilation, a palpable sense that humanity had been advanced by the conference's conclusion.

Instead, the WCAR became a vehicle for the baser side of human emotions and state politics. When the conference "ended," many NGOs had already returned home and the text itself would not be finalised until further closed-door meetings in Geneva and State capitals.

A sense of the disappointment and acrimony is reflected in closing statements by governments, which are annexed to the conference's Final Report (A/CONF.189/12). In the end, the fact that the conference had hobbled to a conclusion, rather than completely collapsed, was one of its few accomplishments.

The WCAR's final document reflects the fact that governments and NGOs became sidetracked by inflammatory text on the Middle East and the downward spiral of the reparations dispute. 

Engrossed in these other matters, delegates were left with insufficient time to consider other pressing issues of racial discrimination.

As a result, the document contains numerous instances of overly redundant text, empty rhetoric, and proclamations that either stymie or regress the development of international standards on racial discrimination. 

            In terms of redundant text and empty rhetoric, it is worth noting that the final document is two hundred and nineteen paragraphs long. The following excerpts exemplify the type of redundancy that appears throughout.

"Urges States parties to adopt legislation implementing the obligations they have assumed to prosecute and punish persons who have committed or ordered to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Additional Protocol I thereto and of other serious violations of the laws and customs of war, in particular in relation to the principle of non-discrimination" (para. 87).

"Urges States that have not yet done so to consider acceding to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977, as well as to other treaties of international humanitarian law, and to enact, with the highest priority, appropriate legislation, taking the measures required to give full effect to their obligations under international humanitarian law, in particular in relation to the rules prohibiting discrimination" (para. 168).

"Urges States to give due consideration to the observations and recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.  To that effect, States should consider setting up appropriate national monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to ensure that all appropriate steps are taken to follow up on these observations and recommendations" (para. 76)

"Urges States to continue cooperating with the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and other human rights treaty monitoring bodies in order to promote, including by means of a constructive and transparent dialogue, the effective implementation of the instruments concerned and proper consideration of the recommendations adopted by these bodies with regard to complaints of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance" (para 177).

Evaluated against prevailing international standards, the final document has many problems.  The document seldom makes reference to existing international standards or principles. Instead, the text uses language at a level of abstraction that is unhelpful or damaging to the development and implementation of international law. In the area of health, WHO standard-setting principles are ignored. 

In the area of racial discrimination and employment, notably including treatment of migrant workers, the document evinces no appreciation of widely accepted ILO standards. On the Middle East, the helpful work of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination is ignored. 

            In fact, reference to CERD's jurisprudence is virtually absent from the entire text.

One has to question the utility of this type of conference if it does not rely on current international standards as a baseline from which to develop and elaborate principles and rules. Worse yet, at almost every turn, the text contains language that erroneously limits or qualifies international obligations.

For example, the phrase "where appropriate" occurs 15 times in the document; the phrase "as appropriate" occurs 17 times, and the modification of obligations with phrases such as "where necessary" occurs throughout.

These rhetorical devices are disconcerting for two reasons. First, it would have been helpful if all the money and effort spent on the WCAR could have gone some way to determining, according to international standards, when particular international obligations are necessary, what conditions make governmental action or inaction appropriate or inappropriate.

Perhaps these are areas that can be elaborated in standard-setting procedures subsequent to the WCAR, but the conference should have undertaken much more of the burden of defining those standards.

Second, these qualifications risk undercutting progressive international legal developments. Delegates presumably propose these qualifications in order to achieve quick consensus on draft language. As a political matter, who might disagree that a particular governmental action should be taken "when appropriate" or "as necessary"?

Yet, without using international standards as a baseline in the text, such qualifications can undermine or retard standard-setting developments that have previously been achieved.

Such qualifications can provide for wider governmental discretion than appropriate and often amount to "opt out" clauses, or loopholes, in existing international obligations. Especially in areas which have well-articulated standards, such broad discretionary provisions tend to dilute current international law.

The WCAR had the opportunity to promote human rights in a number of important areas, but the result was mixed. In some areas, the conference had considerable success.

This is perhaps most evident in the WCAR's having elevated the importance of particular issues - such as the treatment of the Roma and concern for racial hatred on the Internet - on the international agenda.

The WCAR's "acknowledge[ment] that slavery and the slave trade are a crime against humanity and should always have been so" struck a delicate balance by (a) not retroactively applying an international legal rule (especially an international criminal prohibition) to a period in which the rule did not exist while (b) acknowledging the historic and contemporary practice as horrific and morally outrageous and one which today unquestionably constitutes a crime against humanity.

At the same time, the WCAR also snubbed millions of victims of racial discrimination. 

Consider, for example, some of the words you won't find in the final document: "caste"; "sexual orientation"; "apology"; "World Conference on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples".

            Indeed, one of the most shameful results of the WCAR is the document's not addressing - indeed, not even mentioning - caste-based discrimination. This historic failure occurred despite the fact that (1) UN independent experts (including the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Special Rapporteur on Racism) have declared that the international legal prohibition against racial discrimination includes caste-based discrimination and (2) the conference was mandated to deal not just with racism narrowly, but with "racism, racial discrimination … and related intolerance."

This particular debacle, however, cannot be blamed on governments alone. HUMAN RIGHTS FEATURES has elsewhere discussed a range of problems in NGOs' "lobbying" tactics on the caste issue.

The WCAR also failed the victims of racial discrimination with regard to addressing the abuses of national and multinational companies.

First, the text is overly timid. Government delegates decided not to promote or reflect the existence of international obligations on companies directly.

The final text often urges or calls upon states to abide by certain international obligations directly but only "encourages the private sector" to follow particular practices.

In contrast, it is useful to recall that the ILO's Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy states: "All the parties concerned by this Declaration… should respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the corresponding International Covenants adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations."

Similarly, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises now includes a provision stating that enterprises should "[r]espect the human rights of those affected by their activities consistent with the host government's international obligations and commitments."

Second, the text gives short shrift to serious human rights violations by private companies. The Programme of Action's section on "the private sector" is startlingly only one paragraph long; it appears as paragraph 215 almost like an afterthought in the document.

Finally, the crux of paragraph 215, though it addresses racism and companies explicitly, worryingly does so only for multinational companies. The paragraph "[u]rges States to take measures, including, where appropriate, legislative measures, to ensure that transnational corporations and other foreign enterprises operating within their national territories conform to precepts and practices of non-racism and non-discrimination".  Why states should not be urged to do the same for national companies is inexplicable.

This failure to address national companies alongside multinational companies defies the common sense approach taken in the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/WG.2/WP.1, Annex).

            In light of the above discussion, one has to wonder whether to invest resources in a so-called Durban Plus Five conference.

In general, these types of follow-up human rights conferences (such as ‘Plus Fives’) are unhelpful, or at least not worth the material investment.

            Given the nature of the WCAR experience and the state of the final text, which would serve as a basis for a follow-up conference, a heavy presumption should rest against holding Durban Plus Five.

Instead, States should focus on implementing and enforcing existing international standards on racism, and cooperating with those mechanisms that supervise State compliance.

TOP

It’s only words: WCAR text silent on State obligations

            THE World Conference Against Racism's (WCAR) Declaration and Programme of Action recognises many of the sources of historic and contemporary racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and other related intolerance. The text identifies disadvantaged groups and provides States with suggestions for possible reforms.  The document, however, most often fails to either reflect or promote international standards obligating States to implement reform.  The text also fails to emphasise the need for international cooperation and oversight in attacking racism and discrimination.

Africans and People of African Descent

            The Programme of Action fails to specifically reflect or develop obligations on States with regard to some of the most pressing issues facing the African Diaspora. For example, the document does not explicitly prohibit institutional racism. It encourages States to identify those aspects of public and private life that inhibit equal access and protection (para. 11); yet, the document does not highlight the underlying issues that often allow for the continuation of discriminatory practices.

            These factors can undermine the impact of policy initiatives proposed in the Programme of Action. Such factors may include biased criminal sentencing and geographically districted school systems. While the document does provide some specific remedies for the plight of the African Diaspora, such as capacity-building measures (para. 6) and affirmative action programmes (para. 8(c)), these solutions would not attack many of the most discriminatory institutions and practices. The Programme of Action should have required States to engage in comprehensive data collection on the negative effects that policies and institutional structures can have on the African Diaspora. Moreover, States should have been obligated to alter existing policies and practices if they inhibit equal access and protection.

            The Programme of Action also fails to adequately address the prevalence of hate crimes. While generally calling for punishment of hate crimes in paragraph 84, this issue deserves specific attention with respect to the African Diaspora. The history and frequency of such crimes should have led to language recognising the current prevalence of such crimes and demanded that each State take specific measures to combat such criminal activity. These measures could include law enforcement and judicial training as well as research and specific strategies directed at finding and prosecuting perpetrators. 

            Paragraph 8(c) of the Programme of Action suggests affirmative action programmes as a solution to inequalities in heath care, housing, education and employment. The document's language is not strong enough to produce the necessary action. The document recognises the prevalence of discrimination and inequality in virtually every aspect of life; it should have accordingly demanded policies reversing this trend. Minimally, policies that should have been explicitly required include affirmative action measures in education and public employment.  States should also persuade and provide incentives for the private sector to actively seek underrepresented employees. The document does not establish specific international standards and goals for the States to work towards. The text should have called for equal access to public services, employment and education proportionate to the group's representation in the population.

            Additionally, the Programme of Action does not adequately recognise issues related to poverty and the conditions of many Africans and people of African descent. Because contemporary conditions are the result of centuries of racist practices, the document should have demanded more concrete action from every State to eradicate the problem. The document urges financial and development institutions to assist Africans and people of African descent; however, States should also allocate funds specifically for health and housing aid, as well as food assistance programmes.

            The Programme of Action also fails to adequately protect the interests of women and children of African descent. Many women and children experience poverty because discriminatory law enforcement and penal sentencing practices have taken males from their homes and communities. States should provide special care and protection for the children of the African Diaspora and their mothers through day care and nutrition programmes.

            The document does not specifically address the fact that in some countries, people of African descent receive lower wages than their fellow workers in comparable positions. Because many employers can disguise wage discrimination by attributing discrepancies to subjective factors, the international community must provide specific standards enforceable by States. National documentation of employment trends and watchdog organisations that monitor individual business practices should be a requisite.

            Generally, the Programme of Action fails to provide substantive policy suggestions for the assistance of developing African nations. While the document does request increased assistance from international financial organizations (para. 83(a)), it presents no comprehensive political agenda. The international community must establish a substantial aid package, necessarily including debt relief. The international community could establish consulting bodies to assist developing African nations in allocating funds, improving education and health care, and economic development. Moreover, developed nations must be required to share technological and health care information with these developing nations.

Asians and People of Asian Descent

            The Programme of Action contains one statement indicating the need to protect the rights of Asians and people of Asian descent (para. 45) while the Declaration recognises current and historic subjugation of these persons (see, e.g., paras 36-37). The Programme of Action provides no specific guidance to States in dealing with the Asian Diaspora. Colonialism, indentured servitude and forced migrations have also victimised Asians and people of Asian descent. The document provides only cursory consideration of this fact. In nations where they suffer systemic hardships, they should accordingly benefit from aid and affirmative action Programmes. The Asian Diaspora should receive protection from hate crimes and States should take special law enforcement steps to enhance the safety of the group.

            Many Asian nations do not enjoy economic prosperity. Instead, poverty and poor health plague these nations. The international community cannot ignore the hunger and disease that dominate various parts of Asia. The Programme of Action should have included provisions on distributing aid to suffering nations. The international community should coordinate efforts to improve the health care and educational systems in Asian countries. Asian countries should also receive support in developing economic stability.

People of Mixed Descent

            This group receives only slight recognition in paragraph 56 of the Declaration. The document sets forth no specific policies or requirements for the protection of this group. Unfortunately people of mixed descent face racism and other forms of intolerance from various sectors of society. Often this group is least integrated into society and least able to express their cultural background. The Programme of Action should have called for immediate recognition of these groups and should work with them in the process of self-definition (as suggested for indigenous peoples, para. 42). Moreover, these groups should also benefit from affirmative action and other assistance programmes. States must partake in information and education campaigns to combat the negative stereotypes concerning people of mixed descent. States should also work to empower the group politically by seeking their involvement in decisions that affect their communities. Governments must allow this group a distinct community voice and identity.

Indigenous peoples

            The document "declare[s] that the use of the term 'indigenous peoples' in the Declaration and Programme of Action … is in the context of, and without prejudice to the outcome of, ongoing international negotiations on texts that specifically deal with this issue, and cannot be construed as having any implications as to rights under international law" (para. 24).  This proviso conflicts with the positive policy provisions made by the document and the advances made in previous world conferences against racism in which the term "indigenous peoples" was used. With the WCAR language, the document puts indigenous groups in a precarious position. Their rights are not recognized as inherent; any positive steps can seemingly be reversed and negated simply through governmental, or political, discretion.

            The document makes no mention of the need for integration of or assistance to indigenous peoples. In many countries, such as the United States and Mexico, indigenous peoples often live in isolated communities and do not enjoy the economic and social treasures that prevail in mainstream society. The Programme of Action should have required States to facilitate employment opportunities for indigenous peoples, if such communities so desire, and housing assistance.

            Moreover, the Programme of Action does not specifically address the cultural stereotypes that reflect and encourage discrimination against indigenous peoples. States should undertake informational and educational campaigns to reverse the negative effects that such stereotyping has on community morale, cultural expression and societal integration. The public school curriculum and the mass media are two possible means of conveying messages celebrating the heritage and recognising the contributions of indigenous peoples.

            The text does not mention the deteriorating psychological health of many indigenous groups. High rates of suicide, alcoholism and domestic violence prevail among indigenous peoples, yet the document does not indicate recognition of the need for adequate mental health care. 

            The Programme of Action should have reflected or promoted the States' obligations to include indigenous peoples in the management of their own educational systems and their own lands.

Women

            The Programme of Action addresses the precarious position of women and the specific need to protect them from aggravated forms of discrimination. It appropriately calls for the incorporation of a gender perspective when implementing all policies combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and other forms of intolerance (para. 51). However, while addressing the issue of sexual violence as a weapon of war (para. 54(a)), the document fails to address sexual violence against minority women that does not derive from armed conflict.  When spurned by racial motivations, these acts may also be labeled as crimes against humanity. 

            In States where such criminal activity is prevalent, there should be recourse available to international forums when efforts of national authorities have proven to be nonexistent, inefficient or insufficient. Moreover, NGOs should be facilitated to play an active role in monitoring racially motivated sexual offenses.

            Issues of employment discrimination against women on the basis of race are not specifically highlighted in the Programme of Action. The Programme of Action should have required States to collect data on employment patterns and to provide a forum to accept complaints from victimised women when their national system fails to protect them.

            Paragraph 53 of the Programme of Action calls for the political empowerment of women. This statement is welcomed but lacks the language needed to compel action. The Programme of Action should have required educational and informational campaigns directed specifically at women and girls, informing them of their political rights and encouraging their participation in political activities. 

Children/Youth

            The Programme of Action requests that "the best interests of the child" serve "as a primary consideration" in all relevant international actions (para. 55). This language does not set a clear standard of action or provide any concrete guidance to States. Moreover, this language allows for excessive discretion. Although some discretion is necessary in delicate situations involving children, the international community must not allow political bargaining and racially motivated policies especially in this arena. The Programme of Action should have established objective criteria or demand that each nation establish objective criteria to deal with situations involving the care of children.

            The Declaration only briefly mentions the issue of child labour (para. 74). However, this cursory treatment ignores the expansion of national and multinational companies that increasingly employ children. The Programme of Action should have established clear health and fitness requirements for the labour of children and should have demanded an international oversight board to hold companies to a clear and objective standard.

Migrants

            The Programme of Action says very little about racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and other related intolerances in the immigration processes. Paragraph 81 prohibits discrimination in granting work visas and work permits, but does not emphasise the racism faced by migrants when they arrive in a new country. The Programme of Action should have called on NGOs to monitor the processing of migrants and to apply pressure on governments that allow discriminatory practices. Moreover, many immigration policies reflect racist attitudes.  The Programme of Action should have prohibited policies that expressly deny immigration from particular countries or from specific regions of the world. The Declaration recognises the right of all States to create their own immigration policies (para. 47); nevertheless, there should be internationally mandated objective standards for nations to use to form policies, and these standards require elaboration.

            The Programme of Action should have provided standards for dealing with internally displaced persons.  This group requires strong international protections.  States should engage in family reunification programs to assist internally displaced persons and States must be obligated to provide the group full equality before the law.  All nations must provide these people with adequate social services and adopt policies to facilitate integration into society.

Refugees & Asylum Seekers

            The Programme of Action calls for States to comply with the existing international law governing the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers (para. 34).  However, the document does not address some specific issues that refugees and asylum seekers face. For example, the Programme of Action should have prohibited blanket rejections of individuals and groups of individuals from particular countries or areas of the world. Often, such policies derive from racial stereotyping and a desire for racial exclusion. Second, the document should have created objective standards for the efficient processing of incoming refugees and asylum seekers. The international community should not tolerate purely arbitrary decision-making. States should comply with established international standards that discourage racist or discriminatory processing of individuals. Moreover, these victimised individuals must have a forum for complaint in the international community - and an institutional forum with enforcement power. NGOs can and should play an important role in monitoring policies and practices within nations.

HIV/AIDS

            The sections of the Declaration and Programme of Action addressing the care of HIV and AIDS victims lack persuasive language.  The document establishes no clear policies or even a goal for States to work towards.  The Programme of Action simply urges States to provide health care to HIV and AIDS patients (paras. 101 and 110(e)).  It does not reflect or elaborate substantive obligations of States and establishes no international standards for care.  The document should have demanded the creation of programmes on a national level to aid individuals who have been denied care because of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia or other related intolerances.  Also, these individuals should have redress in the international community and should be given the opportunity to receive the care they need immediately and in other nations if necessary. The text should have also created a clear standard of minimum care for each nation. These standards should be based on the resources and technology available to each State.  The international community should continually facilitate the exchange of developing health care technologies and strategies designed to help HIV and AIDS patients.

Trafficking

            The issue of trafficking receives considerable attention in the document.  However, the Programme of Action fails to provide concrete policies for some of the necessary steps in solving this problem.  For example, the Programme of Action should have required government-to-government cooperation between receiving and sending nations.  These governments should communicate and coordinate law enforcement tactics.  The document also fails to provide a course of action for receiving nations.  The document should have addressed the goals of repatriation or resettlement and should have demanded the assistance of an international body to achieve these goals.

Moreover, the document does not specifically address the trafficking of women for sex and sexual employment.  This is a specific issue that deserves the attention of the document and deserves particularly diligent protection from the international community. The document should have candidly and squarely addressed the role of corrupt civil servants in the process of trafficking and the need to deal with this source of the problem through vigorous criminal enforcement measures.

Education Without Discrimination

            Paragraph 122 of the Programme of Action asks States to refrain from imposing racial segregation in education.  This language is not strong and specific enough to eliminate the institutional racism that can lead to segregation.  Many schools and school districts are attended by neighbouring children.  In many areas, such as the United States, there is a sharp racial divide in housing patterns.  Therefore, although State-segregated education has been abolished in the United States, the design of the school system often results in racial segregation.  The Programme of Action should have required States to identify the factors that can lead to segregated education and attempt to reverse these patterns.

            Paragraph 123(c) requires that all children get an "education of good quality."  Unfortunately, this term has no clear content.  The document should have created an objective standard particular to the needs and resources of each State.  These objective standards could include average reading and math levels that a percentage of children must attain.  All States must also be required to collect data on those children that are not meeting the standards.  If the data reflects a racial bias, the State must engage in policies to reverse these trends.  Children and their parents should have strong and available forums for complaint. 

Politicians and Political Parties

            The Programme of Action calls for voluntary codes of conduct and disciplinary measures for politicians and parties that use racial discrimination as a political platform (para. 115).  However, without an independent and empowered judiciary or an independent oversight board, these policies could never be adequately implemented.  Moreover, if the political majorities advocate a racist sentiment, they will not demand compliance with the document's proposals.  Therefore, it may be necessary to have multilateral or transnational groups that can investigate without directly interfering with the democratic institutions of a nation. 

Globalisation

            The Declaration and Programme of Action does not adopt a strong stance against developed nations and the multinational companies that are the driving forces of globalisation.  These parties can facilitate the rise of injustice and racism.  The document should have demanded the creation of an international body to oversee globalisation activities and to assist developing nations in making highly informed decisions when dealing with multinational companies.  Moreover, there should be international laws and audits to prevent and punish gross manifestations of racism and discrimination in these processes. NGOs and the international community must provide the governments of developing nations with long-term strategies and consulting services. The Programme of Action mistakenly does not speak to the fact that globalisation can often diminish the resources of a developing nation without providing long-term benefits or compensation.

Reparations

            This issue of reparations as a general remedial response to racial discrimination hardly appears in the Programme of Action.  In its diluted form, paragraphs 165-6 state that victims shall have adequate remedies and reparations. The text provides no international standards. 

            In a nation with a weak judiciary or an ambivalent political attitude, "adequate remedies" could be read far too narrowly.  In fact, this type of language does not indicate any meaningful actions States would be obliged to adopt. The Programme of Action should have established clear guidelines of the types of remedies available for the different types of harms.

TOP

"Human rights transcend national boundaries"

  Interview with Nobel Laureate Jose Ramos Horta

REGULARS at the Commission on Human Rights would recall seeing Nobel Laureate JOSÉ RAMOS HORTA in the NGO gallery not too long ago, watching the proceedings, and waiting for the day an East Timor delegation would take its place among the States. On Wednesday, 20 March 2002, the Senior Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation in the Second Transitional Government of East Timor addressed the 58th Session of the Commission on Human Rights as the representative of a nation "on the verge of independence".

In an interview with Suhas Chakma, José Ramos Horta elaborated on the challenges for his country, his pledge to accede to human rights treaties, and finally, the need to ensure the integrity and independence of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Suhas Chakma: East Timor is a country born at the beginning of the 21st century. What are the major human rights challenges you face at the moment given the fact that it was born out of violence committed by the Indonesian security forces and the vigilante groups?

José Ramos Horta: Violence perpetrated in East Timor for over a quarter of a century was primarily originated from the Indonesian army, and the intelligence and security forces, but there were also East Timorese elements, individually or organised groups, that committed violence.  So we cannot pass judgement on the Indonesian side alone. The Timorese side, including the resistance, must also answer the questions when it comes to violence.

            So, the Commission on Reception, Truth and Reconciliation that has just been established has a mandate to look into past violence, not only committed by the Indonesia and the pro-Indonesian elements but also committed by the resistance forces.  We believe that the truth has to be established first and foremost before justice can be really administered.  If we do not address the issue of truth - and truth means wherever, whoever committed violations must come forward and admit and ask for forgiveness - and when these violations do not amount to serious crimes, like crimes against humanity and war crimes, then these problems are addressed at a community level.  When they are, they amount to genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, rape, torture, then it will be addressed by the courts.  So these are some of the fundamental challenges in the field of human rights, but then in the medium and long-term, we believe the best way to end violence in East Timor once and for all is to promote a culture of tolerance and a culture of peace.  That is the only way.  But that will take quite some time. 

SC: One of the allegations of the human rights community with regard to truth commissions is that such commissions ultimately fail to establish individual responsibility for violations.  Given the fact that your truth commission is innovating in a different way, trying to resolve crimes that do not amount to crimes against humanity at a local level.  Given the fact that there are also going to be judgements on what constitutes crimes against humanity or war crimes or genocide - who are these people involved in the truth commission?  Have you sought any assistance from the United Nations or involved experts who have expertise in these issues?

JRH: Yes we do have five East Timorese commissioners who sit in this Commission.  They are assisted by, as far as I know, if I'm not mistaken, by two internationals and the two I know are very credible with a long history of involvement in East Timor.  One is Mr. Pat Walsh, formerly with the Australian Council for Overseas Aid and Mr. Patrick Burgess who is with the UN human rights unit in East Timor.  In the process of setting up the Truth and Reconciliation Commission we have expert advice from members of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  We have people who have prior experience in Guatemala, El Salvador to advise us on how to set up a best, a better mechanism for East Timor. 

SC:  You have mentioned in your intervention at the Commission that you are going to ratify almost all of the key international human rights treaties.  We have seen in the past, countries like Nepal - which had a pro-democracy movement and a successful democracy movement - ratify international treaties, but they didn't live up to the expectations of the people. What measures is your government going to take in this regard?

JRH:  Long, long before, for many years before independence, I was always sceptical about putting too much emphasis on ratification of international human rights treaties without also enabling both the State and civil society to fulfil their obligations.  Acceding to an international human rights treaty can be almost a procedural exercise - quite mechanical - requires only a political and administrative arrangement. 

But to implement it all levels, in letter and spirit, requires the involvement of the civil society, that should be the watchdog, the pressure point on the government, it requires the full commitment and engagement by the government.  In our case, and I can speak only for ourselves in our case, I believe that our government, the state institutions, are more than prepared to fulfil the obligations prescribed in the treaties. 

SC:  One of the main problems with the Asian governments is the fact that they have not ratified the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, or they have expressed reservations to Article 14 of the CERD or Article 22 of the CAT.  Is your government going to accept the jurisdictions of the treaty bodies over the decisions taken in your national courts?

JRH: The moment we accede to these treaties, and that implies obligations, we understand the consequence of them, the implications, we will fully co-operate with international systems, with the treaty bodies.  Human rights transcend boundaries; governments cannot say that certain aspects of human rights are matters of domestic jurisdiction.  The international community has an obligation, a duty and a right to scrutinise the policies, the actions of governments when it comes to their obligations under the treaties.  So, for us the doors of East Timor will be wide open for the treaty bodies, the NGO community to monitor, if and when necessary, to criticise and recommend ways how we can improve our performance. 

SC:  How do you describe the experience of the East Timorese with KOMNAS-HAM?

JRH:  The Indonesian Commission on Human Rights was started off with very little credibility because it was a body that was appointed by the dictator.  However, some individual members proved to be people of integrity and courage - and I praise them and commend them for their courage and integrity.  And like any other institution, the institutions can be perfect on paper, one model can be better than the other, but it all boils down to leadership--it all boils down to the individuals who are in those institutions.  And so the Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights in the case of East Timor did some fairly positive jobs, and I commend them for that. 

SC:  Does your government have any plans to set up a national human rights institution that complies with the Paris Principles, one that is more independent than KOMNAS-HAM?

JRH:  What we did, what we have preferred, instead of national commission on human rights, is actually an ombudsman system - an individual with high moral integrity, with national standing, in lieu of a national commission on human rights.  A national commission on human rights in our case can be too cumbersome.

We do not have enough people qualified with resources, so we opted for a much simpler institution, and that is the ombudsman. The ombudsman has also its disadvantages.  But if we have an ombudsman who is an individual of national standing, someone like Bishop Carlos Bello--someone with the standing of a Desmond Tutu, of a Nelson Mandela--he can be far more effective at promoting human rights than a national commission who is made up of half a dozen individuals, none of which has any real national standing, even if they are democratically elected, even if their powers come from an assembly.

SC:  One of the problems that NGOs face across the Asian region, not so much in the Pacific, is the restrictions on their activities.  Even regional organisations operating out of Bangkok cannot criticise the Thai government for fear of the Thai government putting restrictions on them.  Is there any plan by the East Timorese government to facilitate or welcome any such regional organisations in the region?

JRH:  I will not comment on the policies and practice of other governments with regard to their relationship with the NGOs, but in the case of East Timor, I can say that the NGO community played a crucial role in East Timor's independence.  We owe them a lot.  We have learned a lot from the NGO community over the years.  And as far as I am concerned, and as long as I am in the government, I will speak out most forcefully in facilitating the work of NGOs in East Timor, both nationally but also regionally and internationally.

SC: The Asian region is one of the regions without a regional human rights mechanism. The High Commissioner's Office has been organising a series of annual workshops on Regional Arrangements for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights in the Asian and Pacific Region.  Is your government interested in regional arrangements?  And what do you think of the idea of regional human rights mechanisms in Asia?  

JRH:  Being a newcomer as a sovereign State, we will be guided by other countries with more experience.  We will be working closely with the Office of the High Commissioner.  If the Office of the High Commissioner and our neighbours and friends, feel that a regional body is an answer to the problems that the region faces in the field of human rights, then we will support it.  I personally believe that as in every other field, each region of the world must create its own institutions.  If we have economic and security arrangements--regional economic security arrangements - why wouldn't we have a regional arrangement to promote and protect the human rights? 

However, that requires also good faith and good political will, because otherwise, these regional human rights mechanisms might end up being totally ineffective.  So, we have to really see whether the conditions in Asia - conditions in Southeast Asia or East Asia - are right for a sub-regional or regional human rights body. 

SC:  Apart from being the Foreign Minister of East Timor, you have been active in the human rights movement for dozens of years, and have trained activists across the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere. The High Commissioner for Human Rights has decided not to seek a second term, and there is a feeling that she had to resign because of her outspokenness on a range of human rights issues.  One of the recommendations that has been coming up from the NGO community is that possibly the High Commissioner should have one term so that he or she doesn't have to be subject to further re-elections, so that he or she could do the job effectively.  What are your views on that?

JRH: That is one possibility, but it does not necessarily address the issue of independence, integrity and courage of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, because life does not begin and end with the position as High Commissioner for Human Rights. The person who is there for a period of five years, presumably will move on to other high level functions in the multilateral system or at a national level in his or her home country.  And so what is proposed is only part of a solution to strengthen the independence, integrity of the office of the High Commissioner. 

But above all, it requires the real courage and integrity of the individual, no matter whether he or she has only one term, or two or three terms, and it requires also that governments must understand that the moment you create such an institution, you have to cherish it, to respect it.

If we create an office like the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and we expect that office to be a feeble voice for the oppressed, if we expect that office to be highly political and highly diplomatic - to to the extent that it is silent on gross human rights violations - then [it is] better not create it at all, because it discredits the whole international community.

SC:  Thank you

TOP

Post-Sept 11: Arbitrary detentions blight land of the free

             WITHIN weeks of the attacks against the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the United States government began a massive dragnet search targeting non-citizens from North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. Approximately 1,200 people were imprisoned as part of the government's campaign. 

            For the hundreds of people detained and their family members, the government's practice seemed a betrayal of the promise that America would be the land of freedom and opportunity.

As the months have rolled on, people remain detained, sometimes in maximum security confinement, with no clear understanding of why they are being held.  For these people, lost in the byzantine and often lawless world of the immigration system after September 11, the land of freedom has become a land of nightmares. 

            While many aspects of the government's tactics in the aftermath of the attacks raise deeply troubling questions, perhaps the two most critical issues are the blatant racial discrimination the government has practiced throughout its campaign, and its detention of many of those held without any legal authority. 

Racial Discrimination

            Any visit to the prisons holding the people detained in the post-attack dragnet makes readily apparent what the government has repeatedly denied -- that it has targeted people whose appearance suggests that they are Muslim or Arab. 

            While some of the detainees are citizens of Canada, Britain, Australia, or other non-Muslim-majority countries, their common skin colour leaves little doubt that racial criteria have been employed. 

For example, one man had been detained for over two months in the maximum security ward of the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York.  He was born in Britain, but of Middle Eastern descent.  To him, the reason for his detention was clear:  "I'm from Britain, I'm not even religious.  The only reason I am here is because of the colour of my skin." 

            While it is true that those detained have generally committed some kind of minor criminal or immigration violation, this does not suffice to explain the government's detention policy.  Prior to September 11th, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) did not generally enforce many of the laws now being used to hold the post-September detainees, and even in the rare cases where the government did enforce these laws, it was quite unusual for the INS to actually detain people for such violations while their cases were pending.

              Indeed, most of the violators are people who allegedly overstayed their visitor's visas, failed to take enough courses to maintain their status as full-time students, worked in violation of the terms of their visas (sometimes out of necessity), or committed similar minor immigration violations. 

            While people from other parts of the world continue to commit such violations on a routine basis with few if any consequences, others who appear to be Muslims from North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia have been imprisoned for months based on such minor infractions. 

            Unfortunately, the discriminatory enforcement of the immigration laws is only one of several disturbing government policies that have been put in place since the attacks.

            In November, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) undertook to question about 5,000 young men on visitor's visas from a set of "Middle Eastern and other countries" with alleged links to the al Qaeda network or terrorism more generally.  The government chose to focus on people from the Middle East despite its own claims that the Al Qaeda network has links to countries spanning the globe, from Chechen Russia to Indonesia and the Philippines.

Similarly, when the Attorney General announced an "absconder initiative" to arrest and deport people with outstanding deportation orders, the INS again focused on people from the Middle East -- this time under the guise of targeting "countries in which there has been an active Al Qaeda presence or activity." 

Ironically, the only people known to have actually been linked to Al Qaeda and charged with crimes relating to terrorism since September 11th are an American (John Walker Lindh), a Frenchman (Zacarias Moussaui, who was already detained on September 11th), and a British citizen of mixed Caucasian and Afro-Caribbean ancestry (Richard Reid, the "shoe-bomber" who allegedly attempted to blow up a plane several weeks after the initial attacks).  

            Article 5 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), to which the United States is a party, calls on all states to "guarantee the right of everyone without distinction as to race, colour, or nationality or ethnic origin, to equality before the law," including "equal treatment before the tribunal and all other organs administering justice."

 Similarly, Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which the United States ratified in 1992, prohibits discrimination "on any ground such as a race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."

Arbitrary Arrest and Detention

            The government has also violated international norms regarding arbitrary arrest and detention.  In particular, the government has engaged in the blatantly illegal practice of detaining people caught in its dragnet even when the legal authority to hold them has evaporated.

            One common form of abuse concerns the detention of immigrants while their cases remain pending.  Under the immigration laws, the INS has the right to make an initial custody determination, after which the immigrant may request a review of that determination by an immigration judge.  If the judge disagrees with the INS's determination to keep the immigrant in custody, he or she has the power to order the immigrant's release on bond.

             However, many detainees arrested in the aftermath of the attacks reported that the INS repeatedly refused their requests to appear before a judge in the weeks after they were detained. 

While some detainees appeared before a judge within several days, others were forced to wait weeks and even months before receiving any kind of hearing before an immigration judge. 

In still other cases, even after an immigration judge had ordered the immigrant released, the INS simply refused to obey the judge's order, choosing instead to hold the detainee even after friends or relatives appeared at the jail to pay the bond.

Perhaps the most disturbing abuse of the government's detention power has occurred in cases where the government continued to imprison immigrants even after their cases were completed.

            In dozens of cases, the government has refused to allow detainees to return to their home countries even after a judge has ordered that they be deported or allowed to depart. 

Frequently, these immigrants have abandoned their right to stay and forfeited their appeals in order to escape imprisonment, only to find themselves detained for months after the immigration process has concluded.

            Again, the government has simply disregarded judges' orders mandating the release and/or return of immigrants, choosing instead to continue detention despite the absence of any legal authority for doing so.  

            International human rights principles strictly forbid the arbitrary detention of individuals.  In particular, section 1 of article 9 of the ICCPR proscribes arbitrary detention.

That provision stipulates that "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of the person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention."  To implement this directive, Article 9(4) states that anyone "who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court in order that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful." 

            Detention without legal authority, and in particular detention in contravention of a judge's binding order, clearly constitutes "arbitrary detention" under these standards.   

Conclusion

            The United States government's misguided campaign against these immigrants in response to the terrorist attacks has caused both substantial human suffering and set a dangerous precedent for lawless government action against non-citizens.

             Although in the last several weeks the government has begun to allow detainees whose immigration cases have concluded to depart in significant numbers, dozens of detainees remain imprisoned for no valid legal reason. 

In addition, the government's racially discriminatory policies may well continue to result in the disproportionate arrest and detention of people from North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. 

            Despite the massive human cost, it does not appear that the government's draconian tactics have led to significant advances in the campaign against terrorism.

            That the abandonment of time- honored human rights principles has failed to yield tangible results in law enforcement is not surprising; history teaches that such tactics often engender mistrust and fear in communities whose assistance is needed in order to enhance security.

            The United States should reform its policies with respect to these immigrants to bring its practices into accord with international standards concerning both racial discrimination and arbitrary detention. 

            Hopefully, the memory of the needless pain and suffering of those caught in this dragnet will serve to prevent similar injustices in the future.

TOP

Due process out of the way in Damascus

Syria has shown increasing willingness to engage on human rights issues; however the political climate remains fundamentally suspicious and repressive

           ON 20 March 2002, Mamun al-Hamsi -- a Syrian parliamentarian -- was sentenced to six months imprisonment for defaming the Government of Syria.  Mamun al-Hamsi was arrested in August 2001, after commencing a hunger strike to draw attention to official corruption in Damascus, the excessive powers of security forces and the continuation of the Emergency Law. Mamun al-Hamsi was charged with "attempting to change the constitution by illegal means." 

At his trial, prosecutors were not required to put forward a case, nor where Mamun al-Hamsi's lawyers allowed to provide a defence.  As later explained by Anwar al-Buni, Mamun al-Hamsi's lawyer the sentence would not be appealed because it was "no more than a political decision."

Detained alongside Mamun al-Hamsi in incommunicado detention in 'Adra prison are nine other civil society activists. They include Aref Dalila, a prominent economist, and Riyadh al-Turk, the 71-year-old Secretary-General of the Syrian Communist Party, who was formerly a long-term political prisoner.  Riyadh al-Turk was arrested on 1 September 2001 after making a derogatory remark about the late President Hafiz Assad.  All ten political dissidents were charged with "crimes of state security": representing a retreat from recent moves towards political liberalisation. 

While Mamun al-Hamsi and fellow arrested parliamentarian Riyadh Seif faced trial in a civil court, the other eight men will be tried in the Supreme State Security Court. 

The failure of Syria to guarantee the rights to freedom of expression and association aside, the processes of the administration of justice in Syria demand immediate attention.

The truth is that the procedure surrounding the treatment of these dissidents is not unusual in Syria, where due process in criminal trials has essentially been suspended for 37 years.

Syria has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Syrian Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure guarantee several internationally recognised human rights and freedoms.  Among other rights, the Constitution upholds the right to access to a lawyer (Article 28) and the right to security of the person (Article 25), while Article 71(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for confidential access to a lawyer.

However, Legislative Decree No. 51 of 9 March 1963 declared a State of Emergency in Syria and has effectively suspended these basic safeguards.  As a result, thousands of suspected political opponents have been arbitrarily arrested, detained and held in incommunicado detention. 

They are generally held without charge and many will never face trial. 

Among other provisions, Syrian criminal procedure must comply with Article 9 and 10 of the ICCPR, which set out safeguards for arrest and detention.

The Syrian authorities justify the derogation from its obligations under the ICCPR in light of the long-standing state of emergency.  This justification is disingenuous for a number of reasons.  First -- as the Human Rights Committee emphasised in its General Comment 5 in 1981 -- "measures taken under article 4 are of an exceptional and temporary nature and may only last as long as the life of the nation concerned is threatened".  A 37-year long state of emergency simply isn't an emergency. 

Second, Syria has failed to notify the United Nations' Secretary-General as required by Article 4(3) of the ICCPR. Further, in its Concluding Observations to its recent consideration of Syria's second periodic report, the Human Rights Committee reiterated its concern that some of the provisions of the Legislative Decree on the state of emergency were too vague, imprecise and seemed incompatible with Article 4 of the ICCPR (CCPR/CO/71/SYR, 24 April 2001, paragraph 7). 

Accordingly, Syria is bound to respect the procedural criminal safeguards provided in the ICCPR, and in its own statute books.  It doesn't.

An unknown number of people are held in pre-trial detention and have been arbitrarily arrested and detained, as described by the Human Rights Committee "only to be released without judicial procedures having been initiated and, in many cases, after many years in detention" (paragraph 14). The Human Rights Committee has expressed its particular concern at the treatment of human rights defenders and of journalists, and has called on the Syrian authorities to protect their activities (paragraph 23). 

The irregularities in the trial of al-Hamsi are unusual for a trial held in a civil criminal court.  Ordinarily such blatant disregard for the principles of fair trial are reserved for the Supreme State Security Court (SSSC), which tries political and national security cases.    Under SSSC procedures, trials are closed to the public, access to lawyers is limited, if not denied and convictions are often based on forced confessions.

Despite the procedural unfairness of the trial, the fact that Mamun Hamsi was tried in a civil court which was open to diplomats and the regional press is positive. 

            Thus far, the rule of President Bashar Al-Assad has unquestionably been an improvement on that of his father. 

Syria has shown an increasing willingness to engage on human rights issues, and a sense of greater personal freedom is clear on the streets of Damascus. However fundamentally the political climate in Syria remains characterised by suspicion and repression.  The failure of procedural safeguards in criminal trials only exacerbates concerns about civil and political rights in Syria.

The Arab Programme on Human Rights Activists reports that on 19 March 2002, Aref Dalila and four other detained dissidents commenced a hunger strike in protest at being denied a trial, access to their lawyers and medical attention.

Their prospects of attaining these basic rights in modern-day Syria seem slim.

TOP

Brazil’s show of compliance: For the English to see

Impunity for torture persists in Brazil; a State campaign against the practice disregards recommendations made by the Special Rapporteur and has ended up being a show, para ingles ver, says JAMES LOUIS CAVALLARO*

             ON 11 April 2001, before a plenary session of the Commission on Human Rights, Sir Nigel Rodley, then Special Rapporteur on Torture, presented the report of his mission to investigate torture in Brazil.  Based on an intensive visit of more than three weeks that included juvenile and adult detention centers, prisons and police lockups, scores of interviews with victims, witnesses, civil society and governmental representatives, the report concluded that, "Torture and similar ill-treatment are meted out on a widespread and systematic basis in most of the parts of the country visited by the Special Rapporteur and, as far as indirect testimonies presented to the Special Rapporteur from reliable sources suggests, in most other parts of the country" (E/CN.4/2001/66/Add.2, paragraph 166). 

            The Brazilian government did not attack the Special Rapporteur nor did it question the results or the methods employed by Rodley in reaching his conclusion.  Instead, in replying, the Ministry of Foreign Relations thanked the Special Rapporteur for his analysis, emphasized the interest of the Brazilian state in resolving the problem of torture and promised measures to address the problem.  Meanwhile, back in Brazil, the media provided ample coverage to the release of the report creating significant pressure for the government to respond with concrete measures. 

            The following month, the Committee Against Torture reviewed Brazil's initial report-due in 1990 yet submitted only in 2000-in sessions followed, for the first time by a diverse delegation of Brazilian civil society.  The CAT's conclusions emphasised many of the same points highlighted by the Special Rapporteur, including the recurrent nature of torture and impunity, abysmal detention conditions and the lack of mechanisms to allow detainees to register complaints (A/56/44, paragraph 119).  During the sessions before the CAT, Marcos Pinta Gama, Brazil's Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, elaborated on the vague promise presented in response to the report of Sir Nigel Rodley a month earlier.  He pledged before the CAT that his government would enact in the coming months a national campaign against torture, in conjunction with the National Human Rights Movement, a loosely structured network of human rights groups in Brazil.

            In fact, in late October 2001, the federal government launched what it termed a national campaign against torture, consisting primarily of a network of statewide telephone hotlines run by non-governmental organisations, as well as a series of televised spots seeking to raise awareness about the problem of torture and to encourage citizens to report incidents of torture to appropriate authorities.

            These sessions of the Commission will mark the first anniversary of the release of the diagnosis of the Special Rapporteur and the conclusions and recommendations of the CAT.  While at first blush, the launching of a self-proclaimed anti-torture campaign should be welcomed, it is fair to ask to what extent the analysis, conclusions and recommendations have been considered and implemented by the Brazilian government in the campaign.  Unfortunately, on probing beneath the surface one finds that the almost without exception, the concrete recommendations developed by the Special Rapporteur and the CAT Committee have been disregarded in the design and execution of the government's campaign. 

Conclusions of the Special Rapporteur

            Sir Nigel Rodley reached a series of concrete conclusions regarding the nature of the practice of torture in Brazil. To begin with, Rodley underscored the vast gap between Brazilian law as written (which guarantees, through its 1988 Constitution, a broad range of fundamental rights) and as applied.  A particular focus for the Special Rapporteur was the 1997 Torture Law, which criminalised the practice of torture as required by the CAT.  He concluded that this law was particularly ineffective, noting that, "The torture law is virtually ignored, prosecutors and judges prefer to use the traditional, inadequate, notions of abuse of authority and causing bodily harm" (E/CN.4/2001/66/Add.2, paragraph 161). 

            The Special Rapporteur cited the lack of adequate training for custodial staff, emphasizing that "The training and professionalism of police and other personnel responsible for custody is often inadequate, some to the point of non-existence. A culture of brutality and, often, corruption is widespread."  He further apportioned blame to the judicial system, which, he underscored, "has been blamed for its inefficiency, in particular slowness, lack of independence, corruption and for problems relating to lack of resources and trained staff, as well as the pervasive practice of impunity for the powerful" (E/CN.4/2001/66/Add.2, paragraph 155). 

            Given the fact that the Brazilian government welcomed Sir Nigel Rodley's report as a contribution to its own efforts to eliminate torture, one would expect that special attention would have been paid to the Special Rapporteur's recommendations. In all, 29 of the 30 recommendations in the report were directed at the Brazilian government. The measures may be divided into two rough groups: those that focus on prevention of torture and those that seek to assure successful prosecution of those who commit torture. 

On the first point, the Special Rapporteur emphasised the need to present detainees to magistrates within 24 hours; the need to maintain detailed registries of all detentions and changes in detention centers; the importance of guaranteeing contact with family members; the need to assure the presence of attorneys in interrogation sessions; the importance of filming such sessions; and the urgency of guaranteeing the exclusion of any confession extracted through torture.

            To assure more efficient prosecution, the Special Rapporteur recommended that the police no longer oversee investigations of the police themselves; that prosecutors use the Torture Law, rather than the lesser-included crime of battery against police torturers,

            While the national campaign against torture includes in its design some elements that could respond to the needs addressed by Rodley, such as training for prosecutors and judges, its fundamental focus on raising awareness about torture and creating hotlines to receive complaints is misguided.  The problems that lead to torture are twofold in Brazil: on the one hand, authorities do not respect the legal guarantees that detainees enjoy in theory and resort to physical abuse as a means of interrogation and control.  On the other hand, those who commit torture are rarely investigated and even more rarely convicted.  Thus, the need for the types of custodial guarantees emphasized by Rodley (access to attorney, to one's family, videotaping of interrogations sessions) and the need to ensure successful prosecution.

            It is precisely on this second point that the government campaign misses the mark most clearly.  Those in Brazil who defend the rights of detainees are aware of the prevalence of torture, which, despite efforts to intimidate prisoners, is often denounced to rights groups, media sources and official bodies.  Indeed, in the course of just three weeks in Brazil and during follow-up research in Geneva, Sir Nigel Rodley and his staff documented 348 separate instances of torture, included in the appendix to the main report on Brazil.  By contrast, in its official report to the CAT, the Brazilian government reported that in the first two years since the passage of the Torture Law, not a single final conviction of a state officer for the commission of torture had been registered.  During the CAT sessions, the government informed the Committee of the existence of 16 initial prosecutions for torture in four years, most of which had not reached final conviction.

            Since the implementation of the campaign, the hotlines have indeed recorded hundreds of denunciations of torture.  Yet the number of officials convicted for torture continues to be insignificant.

            It should be obvious to the government that the problem is not the lack of reports of torture but rather, the absence of thorough investigations (which are carried out, in the vast majority of the cases, by the police themselves), the lack of prosecutorial interest in filing torture charges against police officers, and the judiciary's failure to afford weight to the testimony of criminal suspects who are usually the victims of torture. Why, then, the misguided focus? The most likely explanation involves the internal forces within Brazil - police officers, law-and-order politicians - and their lobbies - opposed to the kinds of changes that Sir Nigel Rodley recommends. 

            By contrast, the development of a media campaign and the creation of a hotline face significantly less resistance.  And to those not sufficiently versed in the structures and history of torture in Brazil, the promotion of the publicity and hotline campaign at the international level may serve to reduce the pressure to take controversial measures within Brazil.  In Portuguese, measures that are designed for show rather than to address problems are said to be taken para ingles ver, or for the "English(man) to see". Could it be that the anti-torture campaign targeted the Englishman Sir Nigel Rodley, rather than the endemic problem of torture in Brazil?

*James Louis Cavallaro is Executive Director of Global Justice Center in Brazil

TOP

Letting Western Sahara settle its future

The Commission should not allow the forfeiture of the territory’s right to self-determination

            ON 6 April 2001, the Commission on Human Rights adopted resolution 2000/1 entitled 'The Question of Western Sahara'.  Reaffirming the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination, the resolution urged the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro (Polisario) to cooperate in the implementation of the Settlement Plan agreed by the parties in 1997.  Events of the past year will mean that the resolution on Western Sahara this year will require redrafting.

The self-determination of peoples is a key principle upon which the United Nations was founded.  Article 1(2) of the Charter provides this as one of the purposes of the United Nations, and it is reinforced as a human right in Article 1 of both International Covenants.  The quest for self-determination was at the forefront of the United Nations' work in the 1960s with decolonisation, particularly in Africa. 

Settlement plan & Morocco’s Obstructionism

In 1960, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which affirmed that “all peoples enjoy the right of self-determination.”

As the departure of Spain from Western Sahara was followed by Moroccan occupation in 1975, the Sahrawi people have never enjoyed the self-determination promised to them by the Charter.

Since the 1960s, the Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly have called for self-determination for Western Sahara.  Following a prolonged armed conflict over the territory, in 1997 the United Nations brokered a ceasefire between Morocco and Polisario in Western Sahara.  The Settlement Plan provided for a referendum to be held in Western Sahara granting the people the choice of integration with Morocco or independence. 

The referendum was earlier meant to be held in January 1992. Moroccan obstructionism meant that it wasn't held, and now may never be.

In late 2001, the Personal Envoy of the Secretary General to Western Sahara, James Baker proposed the reversal of 25 years of UN policy and urged the Security Council to drop the idea of a referendum, at least in the short term. His 'third way', which was endorsed by Kofi Annan in his latest report on the issue to the Security Council (S/2002/178) envisages Western Saharan autonomy within the Kingdom of Morocco.  The Draft Framework (S/2002/613) provides for the devolution of some powers to the people of Western Sahara with final status to be determined by a referendum five years later. 

Unsurprisingly the plan was welcomed by Morocco, and outrightly rejected by Polisario and its traditional backer, Algeria.  In effect, the Draft Framework recognises the Moroccan annexation of Western Sahara, and kills any real hope of self-determination for the Sahrawi people.

The status of Western Sahara was considered by the International Court of Justice in 1975.  In an Advisory Opinion, the Court concluded that while some tribes in Western Sahara had historical ties to neighbouring Morocco and Mauritania, there were insufficient links to establish 'any tie of territorial sovereignty' between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or Mauritania. 

Moreover, it found no 'legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application… of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the people of the territory.' 

Four years after the Advisory Opinion, Mauritania withdrew from the southern portion of Western Sahara.  Morocco simply occupied the south as well.

Moroccan and Polisario forces fought intermittently from 1975 until 1991, when a UN peacekeeping force, MINURSO was deployed to the region.  The ceasefire was predicated on the holding of a referendum on independence.  The structure of the referendum was agreed at the time:  the voter list would be based on an updated version of the Spanish census tabulated in 1974. 

Voters lists

Voter identification however has provided an apparent obstacle to self-determination. MINURSO was charged with assessing the eligibility of voters, however disagreements about the formulae used have suspended voter identification on several occasions.  The initial identification process was completed in December 1999, with a provisional list of 86,386 being published in early 2000.  However, a total of 131,038 appeals have been lodged by individuals denied status as voters. MINURSO's 230 personnel cannot possibly deal with an appeals process on this scale.

It is no secret that the reason for the delays is Morocco's insistence on stacking the voter lists with people who will vote for integration.  In the face of an already ten-year delay in holding the referendum and the overwhelming administrative task of processing the appeals, James Baker suggested the Draft Framework.

The Moroccan delegate to the Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonization) of the General Assembly applauded the proposal in light of the impossibility of agreeing on appropriate voters.  The impossibility is of Morocco's creation.

Vested Interests

Morocco fears that, in exercising their right to self-determination, the people of Western Sahara will opt for independence.  It is loathe to let Western Sahara go, as are certain members of the international community.  Since the Cold War, Morocco has played an important strategic role in a volatile region.  France and the United States have both blocked efforts in the Security Council to sanction Morocco, fearing the loss of an ally - a pro-Western monarchy that has staked its political future on incorporating the 'southern provinces'. 

As they did with Australia's dealings in the Timor Gap, economics may also play a part.

Another reason to deny the people of Western Sahara self-determination is the exploitation of natural resources.  Since the 1960s, exploration data by numerous oil companies has revealed the territory to be rich in oil. 

Buoyed by the potential UN-approved integration of Western Sahara, in October 2001, the Moroccan authorities issued licenses to Total Elf Fina and Kerr McGee for the exploration of oil resources in the territorial waters of Western Sahara. 

On 29 January this year, the Under Secretary General for Legal Affairs to the United Nations, Hans Corell wrote to the President of the Security Council, reaffirming that the question of Western Sahara is an issue of decolonisation. 

The advice reiterates that Morocco does not have sovereignty over the territory and that such licences are invalid. 

The mineral exploitation of Western Sahara is contrary to the principle of the right to self-determination.  Paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the ICCPR emphasises that the right to self-determination includes the ability of peoples to 'dispose of their natural wealth and resources'. 

In General Comment 12 of 13 March 1984 on the right to self-determination, the Human Rights Committee further emphasised the duty on all State Parties to take positive action to facilitate the realisation of this right.

Following the agreement on the Settlement Plan, the General Assembly also specifically resolved that 'the exploitation and plundering of colonial and non-governing territories by foreign economic interests, in violation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations is a grave threat to the integrity and prosperity of those territories' (A/Res/46/64, 11 December 1991).  The role of the international community in upholding these standards is clear.

Undeniable right

The poor state of human rights in Western Sahara is a creature of the denial of self-determination.  As stressed by the Human Rights Committee in General Comment 12, 'the right to self-determination is of particular importance because its realization is an essential condition for the effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights' (paragraph 1).

The human rights abuses associated with the denial of self-determination have been well documented by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. 

Over the 1970s, hundreds of Sahrawis disappeared while struggling for self-determination. In 1991, over 300 were released after 16 years of incommunicado detention. 

The Moroccan authorities have yet to conduct a public inquiry into the disappearances, although in July 2000, it did begin distributing preliminary compensation payments to some victims. 

In the territory today, freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association are severely restricted. Moreover, UNHCR estimates that some 165,000 Sahrawi people are living in refugee camps in the Algerian desert, where many of them have lived for 26 years.  The international community must also be mindful of the lives of these people, most of whom are simply waiting for an opportunity to vote.

The human rights challenges in Western Sahara do not solely lie with the Moroccan authorities however.  Polisario has repeatedly failed to uphold basic principles of international humanitarian law, especially in respect to the repatriation of prisoners-of-war.  On 17 January 2002, 115 of the 1,477 Moroccan POWs were repatriated under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross. While the gesture was welcomed by Kofi Annan, he has emphasised that the extent of the action is insufficient and long overdue, under both the ceasefire agreement and the Geneva Conventions. 

The right to self-determination in international law is absolute.  It need not mean independence for Western Sahara, but has to involve a decision on the people’s behalf.  The right cannot simply be put in the ‘too hard’ basket and traded away by a document such as the Draft Framework.

It is clear that voter registration in Western Sahara will continue to pose problems for proceeding with a referendum.  However the token concession of a 'referendum five years following' the granting of some autonomy within Morocco, is meaningless without action against Morocco's intransigence on this issue.  It would seem increasingly likely that the right to self-determination of the people of Western Sahara is going to be abandoned. 

The international community of the 1960s would not have agreed to a political settlement with the then colonial powers, and would have accepted nothing short of decolonisation. 

By their very nature, rights are not subject to settlement. This Commission should not settle either.

TOP

Time for Rapporteur on Racism to look beyond West

            IN 2002, with the issue of racism still very much at the forefront of its consideration, the Commission on Human Rights will have the opportunity to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance. Since its creation, the post has been held by Mr Maurice Glele Ahanhanzo of Benin. While Human Rights Features welcomes this extension, there are misgivings about the current limitations expressly and impliedly placed on the scope of the Special Rapporteur's work.

            The mandate of the Special Rapporteur was established in 1993 (E/CN.4/RES/1993/20) in light of a debate largely concerned with negrophobia. Indeed, as has been noted by the Special Rapporteur, preambular paragraph eight of the resolution read: 'Concerned that, in many parts of the world, despite all efforts, racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and acts of violence resulting therefrom persist, among them manifestations occurring particularly in developed countries'. It further called on him to place special emphasis on the treatment of migrant workers and other vulnerable groups. While the operative paragraphs concerning the mandate of the Special Rapporteur expressed no limitation on the purview of his work, preambular paragraph eight was interpreted by the Special Rapporteur as largely defining the scope of his work (E/CN.4/1994/66, paragraphs 13 and 14).

            The Special Rapporteur's reports have reflected this understanding, as have the missions that he has undertaken. In his latest report (E/CN.4/2002/24), the Special Rapporteur focuses on: the impact of the 11 September attacks on Muslims, Arabs and Asian origin people in the USA; anti-Semitism; neo-Nazi activities and the situation of the Roma. Previous reports have included a focus on negrophobia and the treatment of migrant workers in Europe. Racism in Asia, Africa and Latin America is mentioned only in passing - either in response to outbursts of racist violence or communications from NGOs. In terms of his detailed analysis of country situations, since the creation of the mandate, the Special Rapporteur has visited: USA, Germany, France, UK, Brazil, South Africa, Hungary, Romania and the Czech Republic (to consider the treatment of the Roma), Australia and Canada.  In 1996, the Special Rapporteur visited Colombia and Kuwait: these are the only missions that he has taken outside 'European' countries.

            The emphasis of the Special Rapporteur on racism in the developed world has been reinforced by successive resolutions of the Commission. Last year, as has been the Commission's practice, the resolution listed contemporary forms of racism as 'discrimination against, inter alia, Africans, people of African descent, Arabs and Muslims and incidents of xenophobia, Negrophobia, anti-Semitism and related intolerance' (E/CN.4/RES/2001/5, paragraph 33). This specification undermines the Commission's credibility as a forum for the discussion of racism.

            Increasingly, the Special Rapporteur has received complaints of racism in Latin America, Africa and Asia that have not involved whites. However the reports have not come close to reflecting the extent of racism in these regions. Indeed, the only times that the Special Rapporteur's reports have considered racism outside a European context has been in response to well-publicised outbursts of racist violence, for example in Indonesia in 1999 and in Côte d'Ivoire in 2001. While the Special Rapporteur was right in drawing attention to these incidents, the issue of racism in both countries had been simmering for decades, as it festers currently in other nations. In his 1999 report, the Special Rapporteur acknowledged the limits upon the scope of his work, noting that 'in order to amplify his analysis of the situation in different parts of the world… the Special Rapporteur intends to visit Asia and Eastern Europe' (E/CN.4/1999/15, paragraph 10). A year later he expressed an intention to visit Peru, and "perhaps India"; however subsequent reports have not mentioned these potential visits (E/CN.4/2000/16, paragraph 4). It should be noted that the Special Rapporteur does pursue reports of racism in Asia, Africa and Latin America, when they are drawn to his attention. Civil society has to be vigilant in using this procedure in order to better reflect the universal nature of racial discrimination.

            Despite its shortcomings, Durban showed us the international face of racism. While not sufficiently reflected in the final text and hampered by in-fighting during debates, it demonstrated that racism occurs in every country, in every region of the world.  The work of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination reflects the international nature of racism; the Special Rapporteur's work does not.

            The Commission has changed since the creation of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Racism. No longer is it necessary for the Special Rapporteur to focus on migrant workers, in light of a specific mandate on this vulnerable group. Increasingly, NGOs and certain states are highlighting racism outside the West. The work of the Special Rapporteur should reflect these changes. Each year, the Commission's debate on racism is wide-ranging, and yet the resolution that it adopts is narrow in scope. The problem of racism is too important and widespread to be limited in this way.

            Human Rights Features calls for the scope of the Special Rapporteur’s mandate to be expressly broadened by the resolution. The resolution should not explicitly or implicitly limit the Rapporteur's work to particular forms of racism. Instead it should ask that his work reflect the very global nature of this phenomenon, call on him to undertake missions to all regions of the world and specifically request the Special Rapporteur to consider contemporary racism in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

To date, the purview of this very important procedure has excluded far too many victims of racism.

TOP

QUOTES OF THE WEEK

"Victims of human rights violations and human rights defenders in every part of the world have greatly benefited from her [Mary Robinson's] commitment, her compassion and her courage.  She is a most valuable ally of civil society organizations and an inspiring force for governments committed to the promotion and protection of human rights."

- Professor Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, State Secretary for Human Rights, Brazil, 21 March 2002

"The task ahead is no doubt colossal and the path to follow remains long and arduous.  We shall, however, not tire in our efforts to overcome the obstacles that confront us in achieving the goals and objectives we have set out for ourselves to put Afghanistan back on the road to peace and progress.  Consequently, the urgent needs of the Afghan people in all areas equally call for concerted international action."

- Abdullah Abdullah, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan,  19 March 2002

"Last year's session saw more votes, more amendments, more procedural manoeuvres and more rights of reply than any in recent memory.  Increasingly, resolutions are being proposed that call for duplication of existing efforts, or task the Commission with work more appropriate to other forums.  These trends undermine the credibility of the commission while doing nothing to advanced the protection of human rights.

When we contrast this with the increasing--and welcome--activism of a number of regional organizations, it becomes clear that the relevance of the Commission itself risks being at stake".

  - Bill Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada,  19 March 2002

"Tough action and repression alone do not however constitute a satisfactory response to the threat posed by modern terrorism.  We will only be able to curb it through a policy of prevention, if we manage to take a new joint approach to effectively fighting its many different causes.  This includes new strategies against hunger, poverty and the lack of opportunities as well as a socially just management of economic globalization……..Human rights are not a luxury, not an exotic issue that can be pushed to the side when security policy is back at the top of the agenda."

- Joschka Fischer, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany,  20 March 2002

"The political origin and the selective and discriminatory character of many of the resolutions about individual countries cannot generate cooperation.  In this same hall, since the very first day of the Commission, we have heard even calls for presenting resolutions, questioning the elections in Zimbabwe, concerns about Nigeria, China, Sudan, etc., etc., etc.  It is here where the double standards begin when none of these Crusaders of our era has questioned nor sent observers to the elections in Miami, neither have they accepted a High Commissioner's Office on Human Rights to follow up, closely, in the western paradise, the permanent repressions and discriminations that Third World immigrants and those people fighting the globalization of poverty and injustice are suffering."

- Jorge Ivan Mora Godoy, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cuba,  20 March 2002

"The challenge to states is not to promote security at the expense of human rights but rather to ensure full respect for human rights for all, even institutions where national security is at stake.  In the words of the UN Secretary General "There is no trade-off between effective action against terrorism and the protection of human rights."  We are concerned by some of the measures adopted by India, the United States, China, the United Kingdom and Egypt--although this is not an exhaustive list."

- Loubna Freih, Amnesty International,  20 March 2002

"Acts of terrorism do not constitute human rights violations.  They are in many circumstances unjustifiable crimes, whatever the consideration of a political philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or other nature that may be invoked to justify them."

- Joaquin Perez-Villanueva Y Tovar, Head of the Delegation of Spain speaking on behalf of the European Union,  20 March 2002

"It is essential, in this period of rapidly widening gap between the rich and the poor (the so-called 'North' and 'South') that the rich countries of the world increase their development assistance, especially to the poorest countries, many of which are in Africa.  If all the rich countries were to live up to their pledge to devote 0.7% of GNP to development aid, current Overseas Development Assistance would double to a hundred billion dollars overnight."

- Dr. José Ramos Horta, Senior Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of East Timor,  20 March 2002

"Any strategy on eradicating terrorism must address the root causes of terrorism.  The tragedy of September 11 illustrated the threat from terrorism in a globalized yet unequal world--it threw into bold relief new dimensions of international insecurity and stability:  it demonstrated the force of fanaticism--it revealed the breeding ground for this contemporary evil.  These are some of the formidable challenges the world must confront.  It should address conflicts and disputes which lie at the root of the anger, frustration and despair which breed the foot soldiers of terrorism--to eradicate poverty which promotes and exacerbates conflicts, and offers the recruits for terrorism…"

- Munir Akram, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Pakistan, 20 March 2002

"Terrorism is a threat to the most fundamental human rights.  Finding common approaches to countering terrorism serves the cause of human rights.  Some have suggested that it is not possible to effectively eliminate terrorism while respecting human rights.  This suggestion is fundamentally flawed.  The only long-term guarantor of security is through ensuring respect for human rights and humanitarian law.  The essence of human rights is that human life and dignity must not be compromised and that certain acts, whether carried out by State or non-State actors, are never justified no matter what the ends."

- Mary Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 20 March 2002

TOP