HUMAN RIGHTS FEATURESSPECIAL WEEKLY EDITION FOR THE DURATION OF THE 58TH SESSION OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (GENEVA, 18 MARCH 2002 - 26 APRIL 2002) (Voice
of the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Network) (A
joint initiative of SAHRDC and HRDC) B-6/6
Safdarjung Enclave Extension, New Delhi 110 029, India Tel:
+91-11-619 2717, 619 2706, 619 1120; Fax: 619 1120 E-mail:
hrdc_online@hotmail.com In Geneva contact: (Mobile) 79-589 6671
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ISSUE 5 |
15-21 April 2002 |
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Interview
with H.E. Kryzstof Jakubowski KRYZSTOF JAKUBOWSKI is chairing one of the most
difficult CHR sessions ever. First, the decision from New York barring
evening sessions upset the prepared timetable. And before the first
week was over, the situation in the Middle East took a turn for the
worse, throwing the Commission into further disarray. Mr Jakubowski
however is now hopeful that measures such as the clustering of items
will see the Commission through all the items on its agenda. In an
interview with ANDREA COOMBER, he assures NGOs that the cutting off of
NGO speakers this year is not a precedent, and discusses possibilities
for the organisation of work in the future. Andrea Coomber (AC): Excellency, in his address to
the Commission on Human Rights, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan
referred to this session of the Commission as "perhaps one of the
most important ever held". How
would you characterise this session? H.E. Kryzstof
Jakubowski (KJ): This is really a very important session because of a number of factors:
because of the international situation, especially the very difficult
situation in the Middle East, with wide violations of human rights in
the Palestinian Territories and in Israel as well.
Human sufferings on such a scale have a lot of impact on the
minds of people here at the Commission and have an influence
definitely. And this is
the primary responsibility of this body to do whatever we can to
strengthen and promote human rights.
This is what the Commission is for.
So, no doubt this question has already taken so much time and
attention, in our deliberations here. Secondly, as you know very well the decision by the
Secretariat in New York cut our working time here significantly and we
cannot now proceed beyond six. Just
to explain what it means, the Commission prepared a timetable
according to the ECOSOC resolution - which means approval by ECOSOC -
and we took, of course, into consideration the quite substantial
number of evening meetings. And
we distributed our work accordingly. And we proceeded through the first week of the Commission
accordingly. Then all of a sudden the decision came, and we found
ourselves on the one hand, facing big problems like the Middle East,
on the other hand with far less time to finalise, to complete our
work. Almost an impossible situation. Why
it is important, why I think the Secretary-General said what he said,
and why not long ago the High Commissioner talked of the importance of
this Commission to your paper, is because in this difficult situation,
[we are] facing such Himalayan heights of problems. We have to still
clearly see what is the main purpose of the Commission on Human
Rights, not only in the current situation but have also to look to the
future. We are dealing
with difficult human rights situations the world over and from that
point of view it is critical that the Commission finalise its work on
time. Because if not, we
will contemplate different situations of what to do on the 26th of
April. To suspend the
session? To have
unfinished business? And then what? We would be in the limbo. With the
Commission suspended, the Bureau would not be in the position to
conduct any inter-sessional activities, which are important as you
know. Other
possibilities: to adjourn, without dealing with, acting on a number of
items? What to do with
those items? To start the
next Commission with those items? Or maybe to forget about them?
Under those items we have a number of important decisions to be
taken concerning mechanisms of the Commission, concerning the mandates
of Rapporteurs, for instance. So
this is a complex, big complex of difficult issues.
Once again, the importance of the Commission is because of
merit of issues we have to deal with and because of difficult
circumstances in which we have to deal with those difficult issues.
So, double difficulties. AC: There
is an appreciation among the NGOs and the State delegations that this
has been a very difficult session in terms of workload.
It would seem that the majority of delegations accept the
clustering of items as a response to these problems.
Presumably, there are not going to be the resources for night
sessions next year either. Has
the Bureau considered what it might do next year in terms of the
agenda and organisation of work?
And did you raise additional budgetary support with the
Secretary-General in your meeting with him this morning? KJ:
First, measures taken this year: Of course I am fully
aware of a lot of dissatisfaction, even anger especially among civil
society and also Rapporteurs on what we decided. But for me as the Chair and for the Bureau, one thing was and
still is of utmost, primary importance: to finish the Commission.
So I am fully aware of how painful it was for them, and it was
equally painful for us, for me personally, when I had to stop debate
abruptly on point nine to leave a number of NGOs without the
possibility to speak. It
was dramatic, and believe me, very painful for me as well, personally.
But at the same time, it was imperative to start the next day
under new arrangements from item 10.
It meant to finish nine on that day - the only way out.
I
hope that once the motions are done a little bit more rational
approach also will prevail among civil society, and they will
understand that it was not against them.
More than that, we have spent a lot of time within the Bureau
talking about possibilities we have, what we should do.
And at the beginning, there were different proposals. From the
states' point of view the easiest thing was to cut the speaking time
of civil society and that is it, we would be home and dry.
But the prevailing position of the Bureau, and I would say at
the end of the day the consensus position, was to do all we can to
ensure the fullest possible, in the circumstances, participation of
the civil society at the Commission.
So in the meantime, as always, we have had a lot of rumours, a lot of
exchanges, a lot of tough words even, based on the lack of maybe
understanding, on the other hand on the lack of information, because
we had to keep things within the Bureau.
If you want to be open, we would now be in a very difficult
situation. We would probably still be discussing the agenda at the
plenary. So we took this
entire barrage on the Bureau, on myself to a point.
We knew we had to still withstand this pressure and come out
with a sensible proposal. Now,
I think, yesterday, the day before yesterday and today, it is clear
the system is working. We are moving fast, efficiently.
Even with voting, we are making history.
For the first time the Human Rights Commission votes
electronically, and this is a transparent system. Everybody knows
instantly the results. There
is no roll call. There is
no losing time. So, I
think that it is better for everybody. So now, what we are going to do: after the session,
we had a much better position to sit down quietly as a Bureau and to
think what to do. I believe it is not possible to repeat this kind of
exercise like this year because it was only possible under pressure.
It is a psychological thing. And under this pressure, we were able to
persuade colleagues, delegations to accept this painful package of
proposals. It is not going to be possible to repeat this kind of
exercise. At the same time, we have to live with budgetary
constraints. I brought that to the attention of the
Secretary-General this morning. He fully endorsed the activities of
the Bureau and our approach to put the Commission first--our
responsibility to continue to finalise the business on time. And he's
appreciative of our approach and efficiency, in fact. Of course I said
that from our point of view, it should not be seen as a precedent. And
my feeling is that the Secretary-General would be in favour of a
compromise solution. Because it is not possible to repeat it, it is
not possible to repeat what was last year. Rationally thinking, we
have to look for a compromise and find a right balance between the two
situations. I think it is possible. Who knows maybe we shall look how
to better use the time, which is given to dignitaries. A few days ago,
I think it was at the Monterrey conference; dignitaries - many of them
prime ministers, heads of State - had seven minutes each to speak. So
maybe this is one of the ways. At the same time, if we look at the actual gains, we should
not be overwhelmed. Fifty of them, five minutes each, gained 250
minutes - 4 hours - in the span of the Commission, it isn't much
really. What is much more important from the experience of this year,
is how to better organise ourselves. Clustering helps a lot as you
see. Shorter statements, yes, maybe not that short because sometimes
it is ridiculous: a country which joins the statement of the European
Union for instance, and is an observer country, has something like a
minute and a half to express themselves. This
is not a serious approach. It can be only in emergency situations. We
now know that we can better organise the Commission. We can still gain
much by being more punctual, to start on time, things like that. Maybe
we'll also try to further encourage NGOs for instance to make joint
statements. This is
important. They are complaining about the possibility to speak, I hope
all of them will speak on 11. If that happens, we have something like
almost 100 NGOs on the list of speakers - one hundred.
And maybe jokingly, but right now they have a better
possibility to be heard during the day. Two years ago, I chaired a lot
of night meetings, because I was vice chair, so I know how it is -
very few people around. AC:
You have said on a number of occasions at the Commission, in
fact you've constantly emphasised, that the methods of work adopted at
this session of the Commission, specifically the reduction of speaking
times and the cutting off of NGOs are not to set a precedent. KJ:
Yes. AC:
Is the Commission going to take a decision to the effect that this
year's proceedings do not set a precedent? KJ: Yes.
It is now a considered view of the Bureau that this kind of sentence
should be included in the report. We must also think of ourselves and
create ourselves a better position to negotiate, if you wish, with the
headquarters about what to do and how to deal with it. I think we will
try to prepare something in the inter-sessional time, for ECOSOC,
before the summer session of ECOSOC. I
think I would have to consult with the administration in New York to
look really what could be realistically available for us next year.
And we have a biennial budget approved, but, at the same time, in view
of the evolving international situation, we never know how much money
is going to be spent on emergency issues out of this budget. So we
have to wait a bit and think. Now I'm not even prepared to think about
it, because we're all under emotions, and possibly our ability to be
cool and precise is probably crippled. AC:
Excellency, there were difficulties in the submission of the
report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing's mission to the
Palestinian Occupied Territories. What was the problem? KJ:
My understanding is at least this is what the Chair
at that time told me; he presented his report as a part of his report
under 10. So it was presented. This
is a fact. Why it was not
presented earlier, under 8? Because we started discussing the problem
and there was no unanimous position within the Bureau at that time,
not because of the contents of the report, but mainly because of the
modalities, or way in which Mr Kothari reached the area and prepared
the report. But
we didn't have time to continue the discussion. And that was one of
the main reasons. Because when we started, I think the next day, the
High Commissioner presented the report to the Commission and we found
ourselves in totally different business, much more important business.
And then it was my, the Bureau's preoccupation to put before the
Commission a unified proposal accepted by the Bureau. And we spent a
huge amount of time on that. So
we didn't have time to discuss the Kothari issue at all at that time.
So we had two issues: Special Sitting and organisation of work. And we
still have a lot of business left, and we have to deal with that,
including the business of mandates, of the expiration of mandate of
Special Rapporteurs, things like that. It is urgent, and we have to
take it up next week. That was simply functional. We didn't have time. Now Rapporteurs: I am fully aware of a lot of bad
feelings, tough feelings among them. And they criticise us for this
cut [in speaking time]. They now have five minutes to present their
report. First of all, this is not a Chair decision, it is a Bureau
decision. The dominating
approach within the Bureau, what matters first and foremost is the
report itself. Because this is the result of the work of the Special
Rapporteurs. It is not possible; it is not possible to repeat what is
in the report during even a ten-minute statement. But
it was the considered view of the Bureau that in this exceptional
circumstance it is possible for the Rapporteur to highlight the main
themes of the report during a five-minute statement. We can disagree.
We can agree. But this decision was not meant to limit the
ability of Special Rapporteurs to work, to gather information and to
present information to the Commission. That is in the paper, printed,
with the signature, a number, document and so on and so forth. It was difficult for the Bureau to accept that we, in the circumstances, have inflicted so much harm on the Rapporteurs. And I know it is painful, but for all of us. I hope that next year in this compromise solution, we could be back to the longer limits for Rapporteurs. |
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Burma
at
crossroads, but still waiting for Godot “IT remains the case that the military regime still
maintains tight control over all aspects of life in Burma and that the
people suffer in terms of the economic, social and cultural opportunities
available to them," Australian Ambassador to Burma, Trevor Wilson,
said during a conference held in February 2002. Since
1962, Burma has been ruled by military regimes. In the 1990 elections, the
National League for Democracy (NLD) won 60 percent of the vote and more
than 80 percent of the seats. The military junta nevertheless refused to
acknowledge the choice of the Burmese people. The democratic transfer of
power did not take place, and NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi was arrested. Talks
stagnation SINCE October 2000, Aung San Suu Kyi and the military
government - now rechristened the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)
- have been holding secret talks facilitated by the UN Secretary General's
Special Envoy, Razali Ismail. Eighteen
months on, however, the dialogue is still at the 'confidence-building'
stage. The progress of the talks, if any, remains confidential. The SPDC policy, meanwhile, remains unchanged, and
the political climate in Burma hostile. In response to "the
systematic policy of the Government of Myanmar of persecuting the
democratic opposition", the UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in
its resolution (E/CN.4/RES/2001/15) adopted during its 57th session, urged
the military government "to extend the talks initiated with Aung San
Suu Kyi… to a genuine and substantive dialogue", and to
"accelerate the process of transition to democracy, in particular
through the transfer of power to democratically elected
representatives". The junta's willingness to engage with the
international community by permitting the newly appointed UN Special
Rapporteur Sergio Pinheiro to visit Burma can be considered a step in the
right direction. The Special Rapporteur's three-day visit in April 2001
was the first of its kind to be permitted in the last six years. Following
his subsequent fact-finding mission from 9 to 17 October 2001, Mr Pinheiro
submitted an oral statement at the 56th session of the General Assembly on
9 November 2001. He welcomed some improvements with regard to the
political consultations with the NLD, the permission given to legal
parties to open or reopen offices, the continued international monitoring
of prison conditions, and the dialogue with the United Nations. However,
he also denounced the fact that "unnecessary and discriminatory
stringent restrictions continue to hamper the exercise by political
parties of the fundamental human rights to freedom of assembly,
association, expression, information and movement: legally-registered
parties need prior permission from the SPDC to open party offices". The
Special Rapporteur's report indicates that the SPDC is yet to make a
concerted effort to pave the way for the establishment of democracy. A
number of observers perceive the initiation of the so-called 'covert
dialogue' as a political strategy: an artifice of a commitment by the
military junta to the international community that a return to democracy
is possible, and to therefore deflect the criticism of democracy
activists. On
30 November 2001, the General Assembly adopted a unanimous resolution on
the human rights situation in Burma. In his report to the 58th session of the CHR, the UN
Secretary General provides a clear analysis of the state of affairs in
Rangoon: "On the one hand, a number of positive developments have
taken place since January 2001, which have helped to build confidence
between the Government and the NLD/Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. On the other,
these efforts have not progressed as quickly as many had hoped or
expected. Therefore, much more needs to be done over the next 12 months to
make the process irreversible. Specifically, as my Special Envoy has
suggested, there is a clear need to move the national reconciliation
process from the present confidence-building stage to begin dialogue on
substantive political issues." Among other matters, the number of political
prisoners still in detention, as well as the endemic nature of forced
labour, must be given the consideration they deserve by the military
government. Both Special Envoy Ismail and Special Rapporteur Pinheiro have
identified the need to address these two issues in order to facilitate the
transition to democracy. Political
prisoners "ONLY the full release of all political
prisoners in Myanmar can effectively pave a way to a dialogue, national
reconciliation and democratisation based on the rule of law," said
Special Rapporteur Pinheiro in his address to the General Assembly in
November 2001. According
to the Special Rapporteur, a political prisoner is "anyone who is
held in connection with real or suspected political opinions, affiliation
or activities." By this definition, an estimated 1500 to 1600
political prisoners are still detained in Burma. Most
of the detainees, held without charge, were arrested in 1998 following
their participation in an opposition effort to form a parallel Parliament.
Also arrested were those accused under article 5(j) of Burma's Emergency
Provision Act of "undermining state security". They face prison
terms of seven years or more. There has been some progress on that front since the
Special Rapporteur's visit in October 2001. A number of political
prisoners, including NLD Members of Parliament have been released.
Political arrests have declined. Special Envoy Ismail has also welcomed
the efforts made by the military government to release political
prisoners. More than 220 have been freed since his visit in 2001. Nevertheless,
it is still a cause for concern. A large number of political prisoners are
still in detention, held in jail or in 'guest houses' at various military
bases. More than 600 members of the NLD remain incarcerated. Noting
the slow pace of release of political prisoners and the substantial number
of such prisoners, the Special Rapporteur has stressed the importance of
finding a way to speed up the process. The idea of amnesty has been
identified as one way of addressing the issue. Opposition
leader Aung San Suu Kyi herself is still being held in a 'guest house' and
denied her rights. The
release of political prisoners is crucial to the confidence-building
process and real progress will depend on the lifting of the restrictions
on Aung San Suu Kyi. Forced
labour ANOTHER issue that will test the will of the junta to
establish democracy is forced labour. In 2000, the ILO found that the
government had not taken effective action to deal with the
"widespread and systematic" use of forced labour in the country.
For
the first time in its history, it called on all ILO members to take
appropriate sanctions to ensure that the government would not be able to
benefit from its international relations to perpetuate or extend the
system of forced labour. The
government at first rejected the ILO's actions and statements;
nevertheless, in September 2001, the junta permitted a high-level ILO
delegation to investigate the state of forced labour in Burma. The
ILO observed a continuation of the practice of forced labour, despite the
junta's apparent sincerity in its dealings with the ILO delegation. Of
major concern is the deep involvement of country's military authorities in
the use of forced labour, including forced portering for the army, forced
labour on roads and railroads, forced supply of construction materials and
sexual slavery of young women. As
it expressed “profound concern” over forced labour in Burma, in
November 2001 the ILO called for a permanent presence in Burma. In
February 2002, the ILO's Technical Cooperation Mission to Burma returned
to Europe empty-handed. Following the impossibility of a meeting with Aung
San Suu Kyi, the Mission also expressed its 'grave concern and its strong
protest'. A
significant step was taken on Tuesday 19 March 2002 in an agreement
reached between ILO representatives and a military delegation. The parties
agreed to the appointment of an ILO Liaison Officer located in Burma from
June 2002. Hopefully this permanent presence will encourage the junta to
take effective measures to stop the use of forced labour. The
visit of the EU delegation to Rangoon mid-March 2002, for the first time
since January 2001, is another development in Myanmar's hitherto limited
international relations. Nevertheless, these gestures must not hide the
reality of the situation. As recently as 27 March 2002, the military
government declared that handing the power to a civilian government is not
on its present agenda, but rather that it will do it “when the time
comes”. After
eighteen months of apparently little progress in the talks between the
junta and the opposition, it is time for the international community to
monitor the possible transition to democracy more closely. Silent
obstacle to peace IF the talks are to be successful, they need to be
held in a transparent manner and to be completed within a specific time
frame. Moreover,
the involvement of ethnic minority representatives is fundamental to
ensuring that minorities can effectively voice their concerns and have a
sense of ownership of the democratic process. When the military intervened
in 1962, it was taking advantage of the deteriorating law and order
problems resulting from Burma's failure to address the concerns of ethnic
minorities. If the aspirations of ethnic minorities are not adequately
tackled, an agreement between NLD and SPDC is unlikely to bring lasting
peace and security in Burma. In fact, the return to the insurgency in a
post SPDC-government would be disastrous. Arguably
addressing the concerns of Burma's ethnic minorities - establishing a
meaningful federal state - is the most fundamental challenge facing the
nation. Eventually the junta
- with all its suppression and human rights abuses - will fall: the ethnic
minorities will remain and must be incorporated into Burma's future. |
What
Cuba needs: A HR revolution, not a resolution
Human Rights
Features is
the first to acknowledge the abysmal state of human rights in Cuba. The
island State has a totalitarian government that violates the civil and
political rights of its citizens as a matter of policy. The
Constitution recognises the right to freedom of expression, association
and assembly, but these guarantees are subjected to the "aims of
the society" such that in practice, they don't exist.
The press is heavily regulated. The government severely restricts
freedom of movement. Human
rights defenders, journalists and political opponents are routinely
arrested and detained. Trials fail to meet international standards of
fairness and independence. At the international level, the Cuban authorities
have failed to ratify some key international human rights instruments,
primarily, the two International Covenants.
The government is notoriously uncooperative with the mechanisms
of the Commission on Human Rights.
In 1999, the authorities allowed the Special
Rapporteur on violence against women to visit the country, the first
visit of its kind. While
the report submitted by Radhika Coomaraswamy to the 56th session was
balanced--indeed complimentary of the Cuban authorities on many
accounts--it was rejected outright by the Cuban delegation.
It has since failed to engage with the Commission's mechanisms
altogether. In terms of the running of the Commission, the Cuban
delegation are masters of obstructionism.
They use their knowledge of the rules of procedure to wreak havoc
on the mechanism through time wasting, and a proliferation of
meaningless, destructive resolutions. All of this said, the current draft resolution on
Cuba that has been passed forward from the back seats, as the Cuban
delegation would term it, makes a mockery of the serious human rights
work undertaken by the Commission. Much tougher than resolutions
directly sponsored by the US in the recent past, the draft calls for the
High Commissioner to send an envoy to Cuba to investigate human rights
violations. The envoy would
then report to the 59th session of the Commission. The resolution is being proposed by some members of
the Group of Latin American and Caribbean countries, namely (not
surprisingly) Guatemala,
Uruguay, Argentina, Peru and the other Central American countries. The resolution fails to take account of promising
messages coming out of Havana. Most
significant, is the recent approval for former US President Carter to
visit the country. The terms of his mission provide that the former
President will be able to meet with a wide range of Cuban society,
including political opponents of President Castro. The human rights situation in Cuba is a cause for
concern. However the draft
resolution being circulated is a disproportionate response to the
problem. It is a politically motivated text, which threatens to
undermine the credibility of the work of the Commission. |
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Brazil:
Dangerous place for rights activists JAMES
LOUIS CAVALLARO THE Brazilian government proudly boasts of advances
in human rights over the past decade, including the ratification of a
number of treaties, the creation of a national human rights program
(1996), and the development of a national campaign against torture last
fall. Brazil
has supported a number of important initiatives at the Commission, has
invited several special rapporteurs and special representatives, and is
likely to vote in favour of this year's resolution on human rights
defenders. However,
despite its efforts to promote a positive image internationally, the
Brazilian government has done very little to respond to the chronic
rights violations that plague the country or to protect those who
denounce abuses of fundamental rights. In
fact, the defence of human rights in Brazil is a dangerous undertaking.
In virtually every context in which human rights defenders
operate-whether rural conflicts, the fight against urban police
brutality and the violence of organised criminal elements, the defence
of the environment and of indigenous peoples, or on parliamentary human
rights commissions-they face harassment, intimidation by unwarranted
lawsuits, death threats, physical attacks and even murder. A
report to be released on 16 April documents 19 instances of targeted
killings of human rights defenders, causing 23 deaths, as well as 37
other incidents including attempted murder, death threats and other
forms of harassment over the past five years. In
the overwhelming majority of these cases, authorities have failed to
investigate thoroughly; in none of the cases of death threats were any
of those responsible identified and prosecuted successfully. Even
in those matters in which international bodies, such as the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have formally requested
measures to protect the lives of human rights defenders, as in the case
of Roberto Monte and Plácido Medeiros in Rio Grande do Norte state in
December 2001, the government has failed to respond fully and has not
acted to prosecute those responsible for the death threats. While
the Brazilian government does not impose any formal restrictions on
human rights defence, an investigation published by the daily Folha de
S. Paulo last year demonstrated that intelligence forces within the Army
had been engaging in surveillance of rights groups and social movements,
classified in leaked documents as potential threats to national
sovereignty. In
addition to Brazilian social movements such as the landless workers, and
rights groups, including the Church's Pastoral Land Commission,
international organisations subject to surveillance included the
International Federation for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch. More
shocking still is the government's inaction with regard to the Scuderie
Detetive LeCoq, a criminal organisation linked to dozens of murders of
street children, criminal suspects and persons with information
incriminating the organisation. Despite
the involvement of its members in killings, organized crime,
embezzlement and other crimes, the Scuderie Detetive LeCoq continues to
operate as a legally registered entity under Brazilian law. The Scuderie
has managed to avoid sanction (and has protected its members from
prosecution) due to its powerful network of members that include police,
prosecutors, judges, businessmen, legislators and a former minister of
defence. The
government's intimidatory surveillance of social movements and rights
groups, and its consistent failure to prosecute those who threaten or
kill rights defenders - or even to cancel the legal registry of their
organisations - has led to predictably adverse consequences for those
who defend fundamental rights in Brazil. In
addition to those already killed, dozens face death threats, bogus and
intimidatory civil and criminal suits. |
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The values
debate: Singapore’s stuck for ideas IN its intervention under Item 11 last week,
Singapore - not particularly known for its martial traditions - once
again defended its denial of a right to conscientious objection to
military service. Rejecting the Croatian draft resolution on the issue,
the Singaporeans stated that the text "ignores different countries'
unique cultural, social, economic and political circumstances by
attempting to summarily impose a standard on the whole world… the
co-sponsors are attempting to foist their value systems indiscriminately
on others". The intervention essentially rehashes the tired old Asian values speech that Lee Kuan Yew popularised a decade ago. It holds that due to its historical development, Singapore is somehow exempt from international human rights standards. While recourse to Asian values gained currency among the authoritarian governments of the region prior to the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, increasingly it is only the Singaporean delegation that clings to a shibboleth that its neighbours have jettisoned. Other Asian delegations accept the universality of human rights norms; rather than reject the standards, they claim compliance with them. Whether it is conscientious objection or its use of the death penalty or its national security laws, Singapore constantly repudiates the universality, indivisibility and inter-relatedness of human rights. Its poor record on treaty ratification, failure to engage with civil society and intransigence on the universality of international human rights standards demonstrate that Singapore is an island really at sea. |
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Rusty Soviet
legacy erodes rights in Georgia A law
enforcement system that dates back to the Soviet era is still in place;
torture and ill-treatment are the most commonly used methods of inducing
confessions from detainees A GEORGIA-BASED journalist gives the following
account of a woman whose son, Giorgi, was tortured in custody. "One
evening in June 1996, Giorgi was invited out to a restaurant by his
neighbour. On the way back, the neighbour stopped his car to pick up
some luggage. This was somewhere in the vicinity of a penitentiary
establishment (the Geguti Colony). While Giorgi was waiting in the car,
a sentinel asked him what he was doing there. At this point, as he was
explaining, some policemen appeared on the scene. Somehow, Giorgi found
himself being arrested for burglary. While he was in custody, he was
also charged with a murder that had taken place 17 days before he was
picked up. The murder victim was a taxi-driver and since he was
apparently a relative of the former Interior Minister (Kakha Targamadze),
Giorgi's mother thinks that they simply needed to find a culprit
quickly." Three others were also arrested in connection with
the murder, according to the journalist. One of them was disabled, one
escaped from custody and the third went mad after torture and was sent
to a psychiatric ward. The fourth, Giorgi, had seemingly foolproof
alibis. He was at a funeral on the day of the murder, a fact verified by
notarised witnesses. However, the investigators obtained their own
statements - from the third-floor resident of a nearby building who
apparently saw Giorgi in a car near the scene of the crime, and from
petrol-pump attendants who later said they had given no such statement. Giorgi was tortured for more than a year. He was hung up by his legs and pricked with a sharp object. The wounds got infected and his legs swelled up. He was beaten up badly. And still has traces of cigarette burns on his body. According to the journalist who reported Giorgi's
mother's account, such events are common. The pinning of false cases
"is a formula all too often employed by the law enforcement bodies
- arrest someone, pin a crime on him and bash him about until he either
signs a confession or is disqualified from testimony by illness." The Tbilisi-based Former Political Prisoners for
Human Rights (FPPHR) has recorded a number of incidents of arbitrary
arrests and torture in Georgia's prisons and penitentiary
establishments. The main aim of Georgian law enforcement, it points out,
is to make a suspect confess using all measures possible. With law enforcement agency employees being paid
salaries two to three times lower than a subsistence wage - and
sometimes not being paid for months - FPPHR points out, the only way
they can augment their salaries is by using "tested old tricks and
methods." These include coercing detainees into making confessions
after which the detainee is allowed to sign as a witness on payment of a
certain sum of money. If the detainee refuses to pay, the confession is
certified as that of a defendant. The
coercion may include torture involving the use of electric shocks and
poisonous gas. According to the US State Department report on human
rights practices for 2001, abuses continued to occur in two detention
centres - the Kutaisi facility, where Giorgi was held, and at Isolator
Five, which is in the basement of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Isolator Five was meant to be officially closed as a condition of
membership in the Council of Europe; however, rights groups maintain
that the facility is still in use under a different name. Often,
the report points out, incarceration in this facility was sufficient to
induce confessions or extortion. Prison conditions are abysmal and the prison
mortality rate is said to be high. Observers claim that deaths of
prisoners without families usually go unreported. International human rights organisations also
continue to receive allegations of torture and ill-treatment by the
police but report that there are no known cases of successful
prosecutions following the reported violations. Turning
over a new code - and spoiling it GEORGIA gained admittance to the Council of Europe on
27 April 1999. Among its submissions to the Council of Europe - a
requirement of the accession process - was the draft of a new criminal
procedure code. The
new code was drafted following consultation with defence lawyers working
in the area of criminal law and signed by President Eduard Shevardnadze
in February 1998. Human Rights Watch (HRW) noted that it contained
numerous safeguards and procedures intended to ensure the rights of
those involved in criminal investigations. The
new code came into force on 15 May 1999, replacing the 1961 Soviet-era
code, and raising hope among the human rights community that it would
reduce the incidence of torture and unfair trials and provide remedies
in case of abuse. The
code was also cited by the Georgian government as a measure of its
willingness to clean up its act before joining the Council of Europe. However,
HRW points out, even before the new code came into effect, the Georgian
parliament adopted the first of a series of amendments on 13 May 1999.
Further amendments were made in July 1999. Taken
together, the HRW report adds, "these amendments altered or
replaced nearly half of the new code." Government
officials said the amendments were not substantive, that they were
merely corrections to technical mistakes in the draft. According to HRW
however, the amendments eroded defendants' rights, failing to provide
detainees with access to courts. Further, the new code had allowed those
under criminal investigation to submit a complaint of abuse by law
enforcement officials to a court for review. But the amendments to the
code "effectively abolished the newly recognised right to obtain
such judicial review before it could even be implemented." Promises…
THE Georgian Constitution prohibits the practice of
torture and arbitrary arrests. According to Article 18, the freedom of a
person is inviolable. Arrests and other kinds of restrictions of
personal freedoms are prohibited without the decision of the court. The
physical or moral coercion of a detained individual is inadmissible. Georgia has acceded to an array of international
human rights instruments. Among others, it is a party to the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT), as well as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) that expressly prohibits the use of torture. In
its Concluding Observations on Georgia’s second periodic report in
2001, the Committee Against Torture also referred to the amendments to
the new criminal procedure code. These amendments, the Committee said,
compromised "some of the human rights protections previously
provided for in the Code, particularly the right of judicial review of
complaints of ill-treatment". It
also expressed concern at the government's "failure to provide in
every instance prompt, impartial and full investigations into the
numerous allegations of torture, as well as insufficient efforts to
prosecute alleged offenders in non-compliance with articles 12 and 13 of
the Convention, resulting in a state of impunity of alleged
offenders". (A/56/44,
paras.77-82) Georgia
is also a party to the European Convention on the Prevention of Torture
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. A
delegation of the Council of Europe Committee for the Prevention of
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) carried
out its first periodic visit to Georgia in May 2001, visiting detention
centres, police departments, psychiatric hospitals and military
detention facilities. The information gathered by the CPT is
confidential. However, some of the concerns regarding the state of human
rights in the country are reflected in the report of the Committee on
the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the
Council of Europe. Recommendation
1533 of September 2001 on the 'Honouring of obligations and commitments
by Georgia' concluded that "Georgia is far from honouring its
obligations and commitments as a member state of the Council of
Europe". It
recommended that the Committee of Ministers pursue cooperation with
Georgia on implementing the recommendations made by the CPT following
its May 2001 visit. It
also urged cooperation on issues such as legal expertise on the new
draft laws on the police, the draft law amending the law on the
prosecutor's office and the draft law on development of alternative
punishment. Finally,
it recommended cooperation on legal expertise on "relevant new
legislation, including the amended Code of Criminal Procedure." Time
for a shake-up
GEORGIA, as FPPHR points out, is yet to shake off the
Soviet-era antagonism that characterises relations between law
enforcement agencies and society. The police are seen as a coercive
force, capable of inflicting harm, rather than as an institution meant
to uphold citizens' rights and provide security. The impunity enjoyed by
law enforcement officials encourages the systematic infringement of
detainees' rights. Law enforcement personnel, on the other hand, must
contend with low wages and poor living and working conditions, prompting
recourse to extortion and corruption. A reform of the system is therefore crucial.
Institutional mechanisms such as the ombudsperson, or Public Defender,
have been active and effective in individual cases of police harassment
and impunity. However, there has been little by way of systemic reform. The
list of treaties acceded to by Georgia is impressive. It must now show
what its signature is worth. |
|
Towards
a more
deep-rooted mechanism The
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues must have a secretariat of its own
THE first session of the Permanent Forum will be held
in New York on 13-24 May 2002. The opening session will be inaugurated by
United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights Mary Robinson said in an interview to Human Rights Features
earlier. The establishment of the Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues (PFII) by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
through its resolution 2000/22 is a historic milestone for indigenous
peoples at the United Nations. A subsidiary body of the ECOSOC, the PFII
will be the premier body on indigenous issues within the United Nations
system. The establishment of any higher body, that is, at the level of
ECOSOC, or functional commissions, would require amendment of the United
Nations Charter. With regard to having a platform for indigenous peoples'
issues, therefore, the PFII is as good as it gets. The ability of the UN
to address the effects of colonialism, discrimination and domination of
indigenous peoples will largely hinge on the effectiveness of the PFII. Mandate
THE PFII has a broad mandate that goes beyond human
rights. ECOSOC Resolution 2000/22 on the Permanent Forum provides that
"the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues shall serve as an advisory
body to the Council with a mandate to discuss indigenous issues within the
mandate of the Council relating to economic and social development,
culture, the environment, education, health and human rights." The ECOSOC resolution provides that one of the
functions of the PFII is to "[p]rovide expert advice and
recommendations on indigenous issues to the Council, as well as to
programmes, funds and agencies of the United Nations, through the
Council", and to "[r]aise awareness and promote the integration
and coordination of activities relating to indigenous issues within the
United Nations system". The PFII has a key role to play in providing expert
advice and in standard setting. The mandate of the experts will extend
beyond the "programmes, funds and agencies of the United
Nations" and will include multilateral organisations such as the
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, which are not part of United
Nations, yet are engaged in developing international policies on
indigenous peoples because of the serious negative impact of their
programmes and projects on indigenous peoples. On such matters, the PFII may be guided by General
Comment of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights on Article 22 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. The Committee states that "[r]ecommendations in
accordance with article 22 may be made to any ‘organs of the United
Nations, their subsidiary organs and specialized agencies concerned with
furnishing technical assistance’". The Committee considers that
this provision should be interpreted so as to include virtually all United
Nations organs and agencies involved in any aspect of international
development cooperation. It would therefore be appropriate for
recommendations in accordance with article 22 to be addressed, inter alia,
to the Secretary-General, subsidiary organs of the Council such as the
Commission on Human Rights, the Commission on Social Development and the
Commission on the Status of Women, other bodies such as UNDP, UNICEF and
CDP, agencies such as the World Bank and IMF, and any of the other
specialized agencies such as ILO, FAO, UNESCO and WHO." Another
key task of the PFII is to "prepare and disseminate information on
indigenous issues". Hundreds of indigenous peoples' groups, from the
Yanomamis in Brazil to indigenous communities across the Greater Mekong
region of Asia, remain largely unaware of the developments on indigenous
issues at the international level. The
involvement of indigenous peoples in processes such as the nomination of
indigenous peoples' representatives to the PFII is crucial. A separate
secretariat staffed by qualified representatives of indigenous groups is
therefore key to the success of the initiative. The PFII is also responsible for the integration of indigenous peoples' rights in the United Nations system. Apart from submission of an annual report and its recommendations through the ECOSOC, it is unclear how the integration and coordination can be promoted in the absence of a separate secretariat for the PFII. Nonetheless, the PFII could play an effective role in ensuring that United Nations programmes reach out to indigenous peoples. Partnership AT the same time, the PFII could establish a
partnership with national human rights institutions (NHRIs). Many
countries across the world from Mexico to Nepal have established national
human rights commissions. The Paris Principles on National Human Rights
Institutions provide the guidelines for the establishment of NHRIs. One of
the recommendations of the Paris Principles is "to ensure that the
composition of the membership of National Human Rights Institutions
reflects the diversity of the country and population, and to ensure that
members of groups which are victims of or vulnerable to racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance have adequate access to
these institutions". In the spirit of this recommendation, the
Aboriginal Torres Strait Islander Commission was created as part of the
Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (HREOC). Most
national human rights commissions across the world are yet to follow
Australia's example. The PFII should engage in dialogue with the NHRIs
with a view to sensitising governments and civil society on indigenous
peoples' issues, and ensuring the implementation of the Paris Principles
on NHRIs. This
includes exploring the possibility of appointing indigenous members to the
NHRIs and enhancing the promotion and protection of indigenous peoples'
rights at the national level. Indispensability
of a Secretariat ACCORDING to the ECOSOC resolution "the
financing of the Permanent Forum shall be provided from within existing
resources through the regular budget of the United Nations and its
specialized agencies and through such voluntary contributions as may be
donated". A separate secretariat is essential for the growth of
the PFII. Yet, the issue of a separate secretariat has become
unnecessarily controversial due to the United States' consistent
opposition to any new mechanisms, citing a lack of funds and most
importantly, the lack of enthusiasm, if not covert opposition, from the
staff of the OHCHR to the idea of a separate secretariat. During
the Second Adhoc Working Group meeting on the establishment of the
Permanent Forum, Giuliano Comba, representative of the OHCHR's
Administration Section, quoting unnamed UN authorities in New York, stated
that UN headquarters had advised that the PFII could not have a separate
secretariat, and would therefore be attached to the OHCHR. Furthermore, Mr
Comba added, a separate secretariat can be established only through a
convention or a treaty. The assertion that a separate secretariat can be
established only through a convention or treaty is false. In the past,
ECOSOC has established, through
resolutions, specialised agencies like the UNICEF, FAO and WHO, which have
their own secretariats. The Commission on Human Settlements, a Standing
Committee of ECOSOC, established through an ECOSOC resolution, also has a
separate secretariat based in Nairobi. In
July 2000, when OHCHR staff submitted Permanent Budgetary Implications (PBI)
to ECOSOC for holding the PFII session, there was no reference to a
separate secretariat. The PBI budget provided for travel fare for two
OHCHR staffers, making the position of the OHCHR obvious. This was also
reflected in the 2002 Annual Appeal of the OHCHR. Without a separate secretariat, the growth of the
PFII will be seriously hampered. The PFII will be reduced to a body
holding 10-day working sessions each year without any other programme of
activities. While the OHCHR has done commendable work on indigenous
issues, an Indigenous Peoples Team under the Research and Right to
Development Branch of the OHCHR does not provide any space for independent
decision-making by the OHCHR Secretariat for the growth of the PFII. It
will be lost in the OHCHR bureaucracy. At
the same time, setting up a separate unit similar to the recently
established Anti-Discrimination Unit within the OHCHR will not resolve the
problem. The budget for the PFII, which has a mandate beyond human rights,
will be lost in the competing priorities of the Annual Appeal of the OHCHR.
What the PFII needs is its own Secretariat for independent decision
making, including the possibility of raising funds through the Annual
Appeal, in order to fulfill its mandate. The Secretary General has designated the OHCHR as the
lead agency for the first session. The High Commissioner for Human Rights,
in an interview to Human Rights Features, had also spoken of the need to
bear in mind that "there are no resources for the Forum beyond the
first session." In its first session, either through a unanimous
resolution or a decision, the PFII should recommend to the UN Secretary
General the establishment - through ECOSOC - of a separate secretariat for
the Permanent Forum, to be funded through the regular budget of the UN and
staffed by qualified indigenous candidates. After
all, according to the PBI provided by OHCHR, "a separate secretariat
with a staff of five persons would cost about US$ 1.5 million per
annum", which, by UN budgetary standards, is a paltry sum. It is also essential that States support the idea of
the separate Secretariat and make commitments, such as providing Junior
Professional Officers (JPOs) exclusively for the Secretariat. The support
of other UN agencies such as UNESCO, UNITAR, UNFPA, UNICEF, FAO, WHO, WIPO,
HABITAT, ILO, OHCHR, UNDP, and WTO in the establishment of a separate
secretariat is also crucial. Under the big banyan tree called the OHCHR,
the PFII will be deprived of the sunshine it needs to flower and grow. |
West
Papua
or Irian Jaya, that is the question
WEST Papua, or Irian Jaya as it is known in
Indonesia, is the poorest and most backward province of Indonesia. Yet,
the Central Government of Indonesia and American and British Companies
have reaped the wealth of the province's natural resources. In harvesting the vast mineral deposits and timber resources
of the region, these international companies frequently trample the West
Papuans’ right to land displacing them in the process. West
Papua borders the independent nation of Papua New Guinea and forms the
western half of the world's second largest island. After 1969's
so-called "Act of Free Choice", West Papua became the
twenty-sixth province of Indonesia.
The Act provided for the transfer of ownership of West Papua to
Indonesia from the Netherlands. The referendum determining the future status of West Papua proved to be one of the darker chapters of UN history. Charged with the administration of the territory upon Dutch withdrawal in 1962, the UN monitored the Act of Free Choice voting which saw Indonesian authorities pressure 1,022 representatives of the territory's tribes into voting unanimously for integration into Indonesia. |